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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will conclude the author's consideration of
warranty law in North Dakota, which began with an explanation of
some of the more interesting aspects of the warranty of title.' It is
the goal of this article to explore some of the problems that occur
with respect to express and implied warranties which arise in
connection with the sale of goods. To that end, the article will first
1. Lord, Some Thoughts about Warranty Law in North Dakota, Part One., The Warranty of Title, 53
REV. 537 (1977).

N.D.L.
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discuss the way in which these warranties arise, including their
history and status, some of the more recent developments in this
state, and finally probable future prospects. The practitioner
should be aware of relatively recent federal legislation, the
2
Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
which will greatly expand the applicability of implied warranties. A
full discussion of this federal law is beyond the scope of this article.'
In addition, the recent developments in the law of strict liability
and products liability which complement and overlap warranty law
4
are beyond the scope of this article.
II. EXPRESS WARRANTIES
Express warranties have existed longer than any other but the
warranty of title. 5 Because express warranties are usually
intentionally created by the parties and are not some accident of
fate 6 or implication of positive law, 7 their boundaries have
remained relatively stable over the years, and the rules of law
governing them have changed very little. Nevertheless, the
codification of these boundaries and rules, first in the Uniform
Sales Act and more -r cently in the Uniform Commercial Code, has
provided sorme expansion of the use of such warranties as well as
some clarification of their hazier applications.
2. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 95558, 92 Stat. 2130 (1978); Pub. L. No. 94-299, S 2, 90 Stat. 588 (1976); Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat.
2183 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as the "Act"].
3. The Act gives the Federal Trade Commission the power to require that, when a consumer
product is sold with a written warranty, the warranty must be readily understandable as to its terms
and conditions, even to the extent of making the warranty available prior to purchase. The Act
further requires that all written warranties on consumer products be designated as either "full" or
"limited," depending upon whether the warranty meets the federal minimum standards. Whether
the warranty is full or limited, no disclaimer or modification of implied warranties is permissible if a
written warranty is given. Implied warranties can be limited in duration to the duration of a written
limited warranty, if reasonable. The effect is to make the Uniform Commercial Code implied
warranties significantly more important, since in many instances they will no longer be disclaimable.
The Act encourages informal dispute settlement and requires resort thereto if an informal dispute
settlement procedure approved by the Fedt.-ai -rade Commision is set up prior to the
commencement of any civil action. Beyond that, the Act confers a cause of action on any consumer
for failure to comply with any obligation of the Act, and gives state and federal courts concurrent
.Jurisdiction, subject to stiff jurisdictional limits for federal courts. The Act also allows for a grant of
attorney's fees. The Act, supra note 2.
For additional aspects of the Act and the regulations enacted pursuant thereto, see 16 C.F.R. 55
700.1-703.8 (1980).
4. See, e.g., Note, Economic Losses and Strict Products Liability: A Record ofJudicial Confusion Between
Contractand Tort, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 118 (1978).
5. This is true in North Dakota as it is generally. While warranty of title actions existed as early
as 1876, see Cheatham v. Wilber, 1 Dak. 335, 46 N.W. 580 (1876), the first non-title case was
decided in 1885. SeeJ.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Vennum, 4 Dak. 92, 23 N.W. 563 (1885). It
is surmised that warranty of title actions first arose because they had to do not only with the quality
of goods infuturo, but also with the purchaser's right to keep the goods in praesenti.
6. See U.C.C. S 2-313(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-30(2) (1968)1. The provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code are found in title 41 of the North Dakota Century Code. N.D. CENT.
CODE tit. 41 (1968 & Supp. 1979). Citations to both the U.C.C. and the North Dakota Century Code
will be given in this article, except when referring only to the official comments to the U.C.C., which
are not contained in the Century Code.
7. See U.C.C. S§ 2-314, 2-315 [N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 41-02-31, -32 (1968)].
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CREATION OF THE EXPRESS WARRANTY

1. Creation by Affirmation of Fact or Promise
Express warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code
arise in much the same way as they did under the prior statutes and
at common law. Section 2-3138 envisions the creation of warranties
by the seller, 9 who makes affirmations of fact or promises which
relate to the goods being sold. 10 Provided that the affirmation of
fact becomes "part of the basis of the bargain," an express
warranty that the goods will conform to the promise or affirmation
is thereby created.1 1
The requirement of an affirmation or promise differs scantly,
if at all, from prior law, although it is clear that the Code exacts a
clearer articulation of precisely what will create a warranty.1 2 All
that is necessary is that there be an affirmation of fact or a promise.
There will on occasion be difficulty in determining what qualifies as
an affirmation of fact, a difficulty not greatly alleviated by the
8. Section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model.
2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal
words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make
a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement
purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not
create a warranty.
U.C.C. S 2-313 [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-30 (1968)].
9. In the ordinary case, the buyer's "warranties" or promises relate not to quality but generally
to payment of the price and preservation of the goods. The only time this would not be the case is
when the buyer is also the seller, as with a casual exchange of goods, or, more frequently, in the
trade-in situation. It seems clear that when an individual contracts with a car dealer for the sale of an
automobile, for example, most people would characterize the dealer as the seller and the individual
as the buyer, and focus on the warranties created from that perspective. Where the "buyer" is
trading in goods, however, he may also find himself in the position of a seller, and probably should
be held liable if he creates any warranties which are subsequently breached. See Greene v. Hyden,
273 Ky. 783, 117 S.W.2d 985 (1938). In Greene, defendant agreed to put a new boiler extension on
the boiler he had traded to plaintiff. Defendant also agreed to put the boiler engine and boiler in good
running condition. The court held that the defendant had warranted that the engine and boiler
would be in good running condition when he turned them over to the plaintiff.
At least part of the reason for imposing the warranty liability traditionally exists because the
seller is in the best position to know the capabilities and limitations of the items sold; when the buyer
is trading in goods, he clearly is in such a position.
10. U.C.C. S 2-313(l) (a) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-30 (1) (a) (1968)].
11. Id.
12. In most North Dakota cases, the courts have been called upon to interpret written
warranties which were clearly intended to have some effect; to determine whether a warranty had
been breached, given that it had been made; or to determine whether the buyer had observed the
prerequisites to recovery based upon the warranty, such as giving notice or allowing an opportunity
to repair.
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admonitions in section 2-313(2) that no specific intention to make a
warranty is required1 3 and that affirmations as to value and
opinions or commendations do not create warranties.
It is safe to say that certain words, especially those that are
promissory in character, will create an express warranty. Thus,
there is no question that the use of the words "guaranty,"
''warranty," "promise," "affirm," even if followed by words of
limitation, value, or opinion, will aid a court in imposing warranty
liability.1 4 It is equally clear that some claims are so clearly based
on opinion or assertions of value that reasonable minds could not
seriously consider them to create express warranty liability.'

5

It is

In the handful of cases dealing with express warranties which arose other than by a writig, the
courts had little or no trouble imposing liability (or at least potential liability), although not always
under the rubric of express warranty. See, e.g., Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Mahon, 13 N.D. 516, 101
N.W. 903 (1904) (dictum that a sample could create an implied warranty); Northwestern Cordage
Co. v. Rice, 5 N.D. 432, 67 N.W. 298 (1896) (sale of "7,000 pounds of pure Manilla twine" as a
description of goods created an implied warranty that the goods would meet the description);
Canham v. Piano Mfg. Co., 3 N.D. 229, 55 N.W. 583 (1893) (oral express warranty creates
potential for liability provided plaintiffcan prove compliance).
13. Cf Halley v. Folsom, I N.D. 325, 48 N.W. 219 (1891). In Halley, the first North Dakota
decision dealing with a latent defect, the court stated:
It is entirely competent, however, for the vendor, in an executory contract of sale, to
make an absolute warranty of the quality of the goods. It is purely a question of intett.
If he intend Isici to extend the warranty beyond the delivery, and make himself
responsible for any damages that may result in case the goods are not as represented,
and-if the other party so understands it, he is bound. In this respect the law is the same
whether the contract of sale be executory or in praesenti.
Id. at 327, 48 N.W. at 219-20.
14. The clearest case of warranty being created is found in oral or written warranties
denominated as such. But suppose the word "guaranty" is used, followed by a seemingly innocuous
phrase: "We guarantee you will be delighted or your money back." Clearly no warranty of quality is
given or intended, although certainly some warranty (as to personal satisfaction) is made, and
confers certain rights on the buyer. A still closer case exists when the qualities of the product art!
touted, but in such a fashion as to leave doubt as to exactly what is being promised: "We guarantee
that Blammo powder will get your wash cleaner, whiter than the leading powder." Again, it's likely
that an express warranty is created, but determining whether the product conforms is again highly
subjective.
Finally, there are those phrases which create warranty because of the words used, even though
none was intended. See, e.., Hazefton Boiler Co. v. Fargo Gas & Elec. Co., 4 N.D. 365, 61 N.W.
151 (1894). In Hazelton Boiler, plaintiff sold defendant a boiler which was expressly warranted to
evaporate ten pounds of water for every pound of coal "which we guaranty to be a saving of at least
twenty per cent in fuel over any horizontal tubular boiler." Id. at 366, 61 N.W. at 152. The boiler
did evaporate ten pounds of water per pound of coal, but did not decrease fuel consumption by
twenty per cent compared to defendant's horizontal tubular boiler. The defendant failed to complete
payment of the price, urging that the guaranty of twenty percent savings created an express
warranty. The plaintiff argued that it was mere puffing. The court reversed a judgment for plaintiff,
finding that the "twenty percent" language was designed to convey a distinct and explicit
representation, and was not merely puffing. Id. at 374, 61 N.W. at 154-55. It is possible that any
time numbers are employed this result will occur, or that the use of the word "guaranty" provided
the added incentive necessary to declare promotional talk a warranty. Cf Boehm v. Fox, 473 F.2d
445 (10th Cir. 1973) ("guaranty" by affirmation that use of feed additive would increase milk
production by twenty-five percent could constitute an express warranty'; Whittington v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.W. Va. 1971) (statements that birth control pills were "virtually 100%
effective" creates no express warranty that pregnancy will not occur); .Jorritsma v. Farmers' Feed &
Supply Co., 277 Or. 499, 538 P.2d 61 (1975) (tag labeled "16% Dairy Feed" insufficent to establish
S.D. __
, 259 N.W.2d 496 (1977) (sale of printing
express warranty); Drier v Perfection, Inc., __
press with oral assertion that seller would make press work and "stand behind that one hundred per
cent" sufficient to create an express warranty).
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in the broad middle ground that problems most often arise, as
where a seller describes his used refrigerator as in "good
condition" and it turns out to require expensive repairs; 16 or where
a horse is said to be "sound," and is in fact ill; 17 or where a barn is
said to be of "first rate quality," and is not. 1 8 While each case will
ultimately turn on its peculiar facts, it generally seems safe to say
that any statement of fact which is promissory, or which is
reasonably believable and likely to be believed by a buyer, will be
found to create an express warranty, rendering the seller liable for
subsequent breach.
Moreover, the most recent cases suggest that express
warranties, like their implied warranty and strict liability
counterparts, are expanding, in terms of the types of affirmations
which will create express warranties. Thus, for example,
advertisement copy has recently been held to create an express
warranty,19 and television advertisements may soon be included. In
an interesting case decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, a distributor who remained silent during a
manufacturer's sales pitch was held to have adopted as his own the
express warranties created by the manufacturer's pitch, especially
since the pitch was part of a joint effort to sell the product.2 0 It is
probably not unreasonable to predict that by the end of this decade
express warranty liability will be imposed for what has traditionally
been considered puffing or opinion, in spite of the Code's explicit
21
disavowal of the seller's responsibility in those circumstances.
N.E.2d 627 (1976) (description of "75 ton Brownhoist" held not to create warranty that crane would
lift 75 tons); Whitmer v. Schneble, 29 Ill. App. 3d 659, 331 N.E.2d 115 (1975) (oral statement that
Doberman was docile held not to create express warranty in light of other written statements and
common knowledge); Carpenter v. Alberto Culver Co., 28 Mich. App. 399, 184 N.W.2d 547 (1970)
(sales clerk's statement that several friends of the clerk had used a particular dye and that her own
hair came out "very nice" and "very natural" created no express warranty); Performance Motors,
Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d 161 (1972) (guaranty of "perfect condition" does not create
express warranty).
The clearest cases are probably those in which the seller hedges, either in response to a buyer's
inquiry or of his own motion. A statement that "we do believe that we have the engine that will fill
the bill in all categories" would not create express warranty liability when the engine was not
suitable. Matlack, Inc. v. Hupp Corp., 57 F.R.D. 151 (E.D. Pa. 1972). A statement by the seller
that "maybe" dryer parts "might solve [the] problem" does not create warranty liability when the
problem is not solved. Hupp Corp. v. Metered Washer Serv., 256 Or. 245, 472 P.2d 816 (1970). A
statement that a product should be able to perform a task does not warrant that ability expressly.
Hobson Constr. Co. v. Hajoca Corp., 28 N.C. App. 684, 222 S.E.2d 709 (1976).
16. Eddington v. Dick, 87 Misc. 2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 180 (City Ct. of Geneva, Ontario
County 1976) (held warranty created and breached).
17. Cf Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (held no warranty was created
because of equal position of buyer and seller).
18. Bell v. Harrington Mfg. Co., 265 S.C. 468, 219 S.E.2d 906 (1975) (held sufficient
affirmation of fact to create warranty).
19. Interco, Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (statement in
seller's catalogue that floor covering would "absorb considerable flex without cracking"). But see
Salk v. Alpine Ski Shop, Inc., 115 R.I. 309, 342 A.2d 622 (1975) (advertisement may be proper
ground for warranty, but plaintiff failed to show failure to live up to advertised facts).
20. Bigelow v. Agway, Inc., 506 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1974).
21. To the extent that warranty liability is a policing tool to ensure fairness of the bargain made
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When this responsibility attaches, as it surely will, one might
question whether it accords with the perception of warranty as
resting "on 'dickered' aspects of the individual bargain," 2 2 or
whether the perception has shifted to the use of warranties to
prevent any unfairness in the distribution of goods.
Affirmation of fact or promise is perhaps the most complex
means of creating an express warranty. It offers the greatest
challenges to the ingenious practitioner, not only in discovering the
seller's action which forms the warranty, but also in pleading and
proving the action. The affirmation of fact or promise method,
however, is by no means the only way in which express warranties
are created. Two other specific methods of creating warranties
exist, and, although they tend to be less troublesome, difficulties
occasionally arise.
2. Creation by Description
Creation of express warranties by description occurs any time
there is a description of goods in a sale. An express warranty is
created that the goods will conform to the description.2 3 Warranty
by description was first recognized in North Dakota in a 1957 case
in which the plaintiffs, piano dealers, were held to have breached
their warranty that they were selling "new Ludwig pianos" when
24
they were in fact selling second-hand damaged ones.
Because it is almost impossible to describe goods without also
by the parties, the expansion of liability into such areas seems both fair and consistent. If a seller
makes claims about his product, a buyer should be entitled to believe them. Whether private civil
litigation is the best solution to this problem is another matter. Because of the increasing
sophistication of advertising techniques, and the broad media exposure given to manufactured
products, any single episode of warranty creation could yield massive and widespread liability.
Furthermore, the costs of individual or even class litigation would be immense in comparison to the
likely benefits, both in terms of buyer recovery and judicial economy, at least until such actions gain
acceptance on a large scale.
One relatively simple example will suffice. Children's television advertising often depicts
activity which is at best misleading and at worst plainly false, and which would traditionally fall
within the rubric of "puffing." The Federal Trade Commission and consumer activist groups have
spent years and millions of dollars studying the problems of awareness and effect. Solutions, such as
declaring all or certain types of advertising unfair trade practices, have not yet been attempted. If
one considers children's advertising in terms of warranty, it is not difficult to imagine the
characterization of much of children's advertising as an affirmation of fact or as promissory.
Certainly there is little question that such advertisements become a part of the basis of the bargains
which ensure a breach when affirmations are not fulfilled. Assuming that damages exist, a warranty
action could be brought and would likely succeed. Such actions, class or individual, might force a
solution more quickly and permanently than Federal Trade Commission fairness rules, but only at
some cost of fairness to manufacturers.
22. U.C.C. 5 2-313, Comment I.
23. U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (b) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-30(1)(b) (1968)]. It is interesting to note
that section 2-313 begins by indicating that express warranties can be created by the seller, and
follows with subsection (a), which specifically makes promises of affirmations by Mheseller the basis for
warranty. Subsection (b), however, dealing with warranty by description, and subsection (c),
dealing with warranties created by samples or models, are not solely created through actions by the
seller. These warranties will exist regardless of who describes the goods or produces the samples.
24. Karzen v. Heitzmann, 86 N.W.2d 514 (N.D. 1957).
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making factual affirmations, there is a good deal of overlap between
the express warranty by description and the warranty created by
affirmation. Thus, when an automobile is sold as a "1980 Ford,"
there is a description and at least two affirmations of fact. 25 If the
automobile turns out not to be a 1980 model or a Ford, the express
warranty created by description and affirmation is breached.
Because there is significant overlap, it is rare that courts will take
the time to articulate the distinction between the two modes of
creation. A distinction does exist, however, and is useful in those
instances in which the description implies only factual
representations. Thus, where the specifications for a steel truss on a
PSF
greenhouse contained the descriptive language "20
Snowload," the court had no trouble finding an express warranty
that the structure would withstand pressure of twenty pounds per
square foot, although it might have found it difficult to read into
that language a promise or affirmation. 26 Virtually any description
on a label or a container will create an express warranty that the
goods will conform to the label description. 27 Thus, in a myriad of
seed cases, express warranty liability has been imposed when seed
is misdescribed and later fails to produce because of this
misdescription. 28 There are also cases in which, but for the
descriptive language, the warranty might fail because it purports
merely to puff or opine.2 9 Even in those cases, however, liability
may exist, because the description, coupled with trade usage, is
deemed to mean more than would mere words alone.3 0 This
25. See Crane v. Wood Motors, Inc., 53 Mich. App. 17, 218 N.W.2d 420 (19"/4) (airplane
described as a 1969 model was in fact a 1968 model).
26. S-C Indus. v. American Hydrophonics Sys. Inc., 468 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1972).
27. Cf U.C.C. 5 2-314(2) (f) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-31(2) (f) (1968)1: "Goods to be
merchantable must be at least such as . . . conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on
the container or label if any."
28. See Smith v. Oscar H. Will & Co., 51 N.D. 357, 199 N.W. 861 (1924) (alfalfa seed turned
out to be sweet clover, held that, even though warranty disclaimed, there was a breach for failure to
deliver goods contracted for). But see Miller v. Klindworth, 98 N.W.2d 109 (N.D. 1959) (disclaimer
held valid when defendant is mere intermediary, and seed mislabeling is relied on by him in good
faith). Whether Miller retains vitality under the Code is questionable. It is certainly valid to the
extent that it allows disclaimer, but to the extent that it invokes the "good faith intermediary" as its
rationale it seems inconsistent with the provisions of section 2-314, if not with the express warranty
provisions as well.
For seed cases outside of North Dakota, see Agricultural Servs. Ass'n v. Ferry-Morse Seed
Co., 551 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1977); Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc.. 248 Ark. 858,
454 S.W.2d 307 (1970); Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966).
A particularly interesting case from South Dakota suggests that, even where there is neither a
true affirmation nor a true description, warranty liability is appropriate because of public policy and
the clear implication of words. In this case an insecticide labeled "for control of corn rootworm
larvae," and containing an express warranty that the contents conformed to the chemical
description, was found to create warranty liability for the effectiveness of the insecticide in
controlling rootworm. Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 89 S.D. 497. 234 N.W.2d 38 (1975). The
case probably extends section 2-313 to its outer limits.
29. See, e.g., Axford v. Gaines, 50 N.D. 341, 195 N.W. 555 (1923); Leroy v. Hagen. 44 N.D. 1,
175 N.W. 718 (1919).
30. Shepard v. Top Hat Land & Cattle Co.. 560 P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1977) (livestock sold as
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suggests that courts will read contractual language in the manner
intended by the parties, at least for purposes of imposing express
warranty liability. It also suggests that a warranty by description
often exists not because of the description itself but because of the
meaning attached to it by the parties. This is consistent with the
view that "the whole purpose of the law of [express] warranty is to
determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell" 3 1
and the buyer has agreed to buy.
3. Creation by Sample or Model
Clearly the easiest way to create an express warranty is by
words, although it should now be apparent that often, either
because words do not have fixed meanings or because people often
use noncommittal words, even that which is easy becomes difficult.
This is particularly true when the scope of the warranty is at issue.
The question whether a warranty exists is usually factual, while the
scope of the warranty, although closer to a legal question, is a
mixed one, at least in the sense that in order to determine the scope
of a warranty all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
transaction must be addressed.
Both of these questions are made easier when the express
warranty arises in accordance with section 2-313(1)(c) by the use of
samples or models, which provide a more static anchor on which to
attach warranty liability than either descriptive or promissory
words. The Code fails to define what is meant by the words sample
and model, except in the official comment. That definition,
distinguishing between samples, which are drawn from the bulk of
the goods, and models, which are representations of the goods not
drawn from their bulk, 32 has been adopted by the courts to
determine whether an express warranty is created. 33 This,
however, is only the starting point, for even though material is
drawn from bulk or is represented, there will almost always exist
the factual question of whether the sample or model is being used to
represent the qualities of the goods to be sold. Although the official
comment suggests that the use of a sample or model creates a
presumption that the parties will deal with the goods on those
terms, it also recognizes that often samples or models are used for
"Choice" imports an express warranty by promise). It is questionable whether the description
"choice" might also create (or negate) implied warranties by usage of trade. See U.C.C. §S 2-314(3),
2-316(3) (c) [N.D. CENT. CooE §§ 41-02-31(3), -33(3) (c) (1968 & Supp. 1979)]. Cf Zappanti v.
Berge Serv. Center, 26 Ariz. App. 398, 549 P.2d 178 (1976) (court held that an agreement describing
a vehicle as a 1969 model was not an express warranty that the vehicle's component parts were from
that year).
31. U.C.C. S 2-313, Comment 4.
32. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 6.
33. See Pacific Marine Schwabacher, Inc. v. Hydroswift Corp., 525 P.2d 615 (Utah 1974).
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illustrative purposes only.34 This dual function has created
practical problems for courts faced with determining whether a
warranty has been made.
In one recent case, the court indicated that the overriding
factor in each case is not the production of a sample, but whether
the parties intend to contract in accordance with the sample. 35 The
court allowed admission of evidence to show that a sample of coal
was not intended to warrant the probable quality of future coal
mined but only to demonstrate the past quality. In another recent
case, 36 a plastic model which was clearly used as representative of
goods to be produced was held not to create a warranty of literal
description. Thus, when the actual goods failed to meet the
specifications exactly, the court nevertheless denied liability, at
least absent expert testimony which the plaintiff failed to procure.
Moreover, there is disturbing language in the case, apparently
suggested by the Code comments, that any presumption which
might arise in a sale by sample is significantly weaker when the sale
is by model. 37 These cases suggest that, although the Code is
explicit as to when and whether a warranty will arise, factual
patterns do not always accomodate themselves to the statutory
language. They also suggest, however, that courts are unwilling to
apply the Code literally in this particular circumstance.
There are probably a number of reasons for this unwillingness
by the courts, although none appears very satisfactory. The official
comment, as noted earlier, purports to give more guidance here
than in the other express warranty situations. The comment makes
a clear distinction between samples and models which does not exist
in the statute, not only by defining the two terms but by pointing
clearly to their mercantile differences. Since samples are drawn
from the goods themselves, and models are not, courts seem willing
to exaggerate the differences, imposing warranty liability in the
sample case but not in the case of models. Unfortunately, the
comments are not the law, and the Code itself makes no textual
distinction between the treatment of samples and models.
The reluctance to apply section 2-3i3(1)(c) literally probably
also stems from the relative harshness of the Code rule when
samples or models are at issue. Unlike the spoken or written word,
which is capable of expansion, contraction, or interpretation, the
tangible sample or model speaks for itself. Thus, a court confronted
34.
35.
36.
37.

U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 6.
Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co.. 436 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Conn. 1975).
Id. at 1027.

520

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

with a sale with warranties created by description, affirmation, or
promise is faced with a traditional judicial task: interpret the
description, affirmation, or promise, apply that interpretation to
the item sold, and determine whether the warranty was breached.
With the warranty by sample or model, only the comparison and
the determination are necessary, for the sample or model is not
subject to interpretation. Either the item sold meets the quality of
the sample or model or it does not. Such a rule is sometimes
difficult for a court charged to do justice to apply, and still comport
with the contract as intended by the parties. Thus the courts
read exceptions into the statute, read certain rules out of the
statute, or simply fail to find warranty liability because of a failure
of proof.
The easiest of these techniques to apply is the failure of proof.
As with warranty litigation generally, the burden of pleading and
proving the breach of warranty as to goods that have been accepted
is on the buyer.3 8 To the extent that the gauge is not exact
conformity, but rather whether the goods themselves lived up to the
quality or characteristics of the sample or model, the buyer would
be required to show not only a deviation from the sample or model,
but also that the deviation caused the product's performance to be
inferior to that of the sample or model.3 9
In a recent case decided by the United States Court of Appeals
40
for the Eighth Circuit, Plasco, Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging Corp.,
although a deviation from sample was proved as to the purity of
plastic pellets, the plaintiff's recovery was disallowed because he
had failed to show that the damage resulted from the defect and not
from miscalculation on his part. 4 1 Unfortunately, this method of
dealing with samples or models is derived from the faulty premise
that all that is necessary is substantial conformity.
What makes the rule embodied in section 2-313(1)(c) so harsh
is that it requires exact, not merely substantial, conformity. Some
courts have apparently ignored this requirement to avoid liability
in certain cases. Thus, for example,, in Plasco the court found that
there was no breach of warranty because the plastic delivered
"generally conformed" to the sample shown. 42 This, of course,
38. U.C.C. S 2-607(4) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-70 (4) (1968)]. As to goods rejected prior to
acceptance, the seller has the burden of establishing conformity. See R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF SALES S 142, at 431 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NORDSTROM].
39. Thus, in Blockhead the buyer could show the deviation, but failed to demonstrate that the
deviation caused the problems. 402 F. Supp. at 1027-29.
40. 547 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1977).
41. Plasco, Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging Corp., 547 F.2d 86, 90 (8th Cir. 1977). See also Herman
H. Sticht Co. v. Bradford Equip. Co., 8 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 842 (Pa. C.P. Chester County 1970).
42. 547 F.2d at 90.

WARRANTY LAW

reads into the statute a word which does not appear. The result is
clearly defensible, although perhaps not justifiable, since the law of
contracts generally does not require exact conformity, with the
possible exception of express conditions. Why should the law of
warranty insist on such obedience if the plaintiff gets substantially
what he bargained for? The answer, if it is to be found at all, must
lie in the fact that the sample (and less so the model) is the thing
itself; to the extent that the plaintiff seeks that thing, he should be
entitled to it. Once the decision is made that the sample was part of
the basis of the bargain, warranty liability created by sample or
model should probably be strict, and, because of the definite nature
of the model or sample, even more strict than express warranty
created by other means.
It has been suggested that one way to view the sample or
model to avoid the strict approach is to determine its scope before
determining liability. 43 The difficulty with this approach is that it
requires a determination of not only whether a sample or model
was intended to be a sample or model, but also to what extent.
Thus, if a person purchasing 10,000 bricks were to be given one
brick as a sample, he could not reasonably expect that all 10,000
.4
would conform exactly as to texture, color, shape, and size
Rather, he could and would expect that all of the bricks would
share the common characteristics of brick, and that the sample
brick would thus qualify as a "general" sample. The problem with
this rationale is that the Code recognizes no distinction between
general and specific samples. Here it would probably be better to
disregard the use of the brick as a sample altogether and merely
state that it was used representatively. 45 Under this rationale no
express warranty liability attaches.
This highly restrictive approach is occasioned by the express
language of the statute, for it requires that the "whole of the
goods" conform to the sample. Nowhere else in the Code is there
such an exact requirement; however, nowhere else do the parties
contract along such specific, noninterpretable lines. Thus, any
46
discussion in the cases or by commentators that only the majority
of the goods need conform, or that substantial or general
conformity is sufficient, is probably in error, and unquestionably
47
reads the word "whole" out of the Code.
43. NORDSTROM, supra note 38, § 72, at 223.

44. Id.
45. This is recognized by Nordstrom when he concedes that the one brick is not really a sample
at all. Id. at 223-24.
46. See Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins Co., 366 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(express warranty by sample that the "bulk" shall conform).
47. The error, again, is at least understandable, if not forgiveable. It probably derives as much
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If it is a subterfuge to deny liability on the basis of failure of
proof, and error to omit from analysis the conformity of the whole
to a sample or model, it is at least as unfortunate to read into the
statute exceptions which do not exist. The most notorious of these is
the exception to warranty creation based upon an examination of
the sample or model by the buyer, which precludes reliance on
additional express assertions by the seller. There is substantial
surface appeal to the argument that, when the buyer examines a
sample, model, or the thing itself as fully as he would like, he
cannot thereafter rely upon express assertions made by the seller
with respect to the goods. After all, the buyer and the seller have
equal opportunity to notice discrepancies in the sample or model.
To the extent that the buyer uses his own observations rather than
the seller's, the seller should be relieved of some responsibility. The
Code, however, confers no disclaimer here aby examination, and
none should be read into the provision.
The exception is rooted partly in pre-Code law and largely in
common sense. "[I1f a presale inspection has revealed that the
seller's assertions of fact were untruthful," ' 48 there is no reason to
hold him to any express warranty, without regard to whether it was
created by affirmation, promise, description, or sample. The
primary reason for the rule, however, is that if one has discovered
that a thing is not true he no longer relies on its truth. Thus, it may
be said that the basis for nonliability in the instance where
examination reveals a defect is the buyer's inability to rely on the
seller's assertions. 49 The problem with this rationale is that the
Code no longer requires reliance in order to create express
warranty liability. 50 Therefore, the fact that the buyer is no longer
relying on the seller's assertions is of no import. Since he never had
to rely, his lack of reliance should not prejudice him. Thus, the
examination should not be held to undo warranties, since the
premise that he need rely on the seller's assertions is faulty.
Beyond the superficial appeal of logic that would refuse to
allow reliance on a known falsehood, there is the additional
consideration that full inspection or examination explicitly operates
to preclude implied warranties. 51 While it is one thing to say that an
from the Code sections dealing with merchantability as from a common-sense feeling that, so long as
the buyer gets essentially what he bargained for, no recovery is warranted. Compare section 2-314
and the comments thereto.
48. Cagney v. Cohn, 13 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 998, 1005 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973).
49. See Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1 (1967).
50. Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966); Elanco Prod. Co.
v. Akin-Tunnell, 474 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Cagney v. Cohn, 13 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
998 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973). See also U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3.
51. Section 2-316(3) (b) provides as follows:
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examination should preclude that which is implied to ensure
fairness, it is another thing altogether to preclude express warranty
formation at the exact moment the seller is urging the buyer
forward with abandon. The courts therefore have generally
declared that an examination will not undo an express warranty
previously created. 52 There are, however, decisions which are
53
either to the contrary or lean precariously in that direction.
There may yet be a way to avoid the conundrum of imposing
warranty liability when the defect is so obvious in the sample or
model as to preclude the buyer's belief that the seller's assertions
could be true. This involves a determination that, because the
defect was so obvious, the buyer could no longer assert that the false
attribute was part of the basis of the bargain. 54 This may amount to
little more than a resurrection of the reliance rationale, but it is at
least consistent with the Code language.5 5 At the same time, it
appears to allow for a more subjective approach to what is
inherently a subjective problem. One must concede, however, that
it still involves a large measure of weaseling.
One other item of interest should be noted with reference to
the express warranty by sample. While much has been said about
the strictness of this express warranty in application, its strictness
has been directed solely at the seller. Thus, the earlier portion of
this section laments the various methods that courts have employed
to relax the harshness when the buyer is alleging breach. Before
accusations of pro-buyer bias are made, it would be well to realize
that the harshness is often reflected back upon the buyer. The
buyer faces a hazard unexperienced elsewhere in contract law, at
least since caveat emptor began its decline, whenever the sale is by
sample. What the buyer sees is literally what he gets. That the
goods do not meet the buyer's purpose is irrelevant. 56 As long as
the goods conform to the sample, the seller's express warranty
[Wihen the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the
sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no
implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the
circumstances to have revealed to him ....
U.C.C. S 2-316(3)(b) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-33(3)(b)(Supp. 1979)1.
52. SeeGeneral Elec. Co. v. United States Dynamics, Inc., 403 F.2d 933 (1st Cir. 1968);
Cagney v. Cohn, 13 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 998 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973); Capital Equip. Enterprises
Inc. v. North Pier Terminal Co., 117 Il. App. 2d264, 254 N.E.2d542 (1969); Wernerv. Montana,
117 N.H. 721, 378 A.2d 1130(1977); Shepard v. Top Hat Land & Cattle Co., 560 P.2d 730 (Wyo.
1977).
53. SeeJanssen v. Hook, 1111.App. 3d 318, 272 N.E.2d 385 (1971); Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury
Coal & Coke Co., 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1 (1967).
54. City Mach. & Mfg. Co. v. A & A Mach. Corp., 4 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 461 (E.D.N.Y.
1967).
55. U.C.C. S 2-313, Comments 6 & 7.
56. But seediscussion of section 2 -315 of the Code, infra at notes 417-35 and accompanying text.
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obligation created by the sample is fulfilled. 57 This is true
irrespective of whether the buyer's purpose is unique or not.
58
Thus, in Mohasco Industries, Inc. v. Anderson Halverson Corp.,
the court held that no express warranty had been breached when
carpet purchased shaded excessively, since the buyer received
exactly what he ordered in accordance with the description and
sample. 59 In another case, where the buyer had used two generators
for a period of time and ordered additional ones specifying that they
should conform to the "samples" already owned, there was no
breach of express warranty when there was no showing of
nonconformity with the other generators. 60 In short, what the
buyer received was what he ordered in accordance with the sample,
and, so long as the parties were dealing on the basis of samples,
there could be no liability.
That the strictness which inheres in a sale by sample is part of
a two-edged sword may be small comfort to the seller or buyer
thereby impaled. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the Code
apparently fails to distinguish between express warranties created
by words and those created by sample, the distinction of strictness
in warranty by sample exists, and is in large measure occasioned by
the fact that objects tend to be of a more definite nature than words.
The astute reader will notice that throughout the discussion of
the creation of express warranties little has been said about what
effect the affirmation, promise, description, or sample must have
on the transaction. Does it make any difference if the buyer ignores
all of the descriptions or promises, or buys without paying the
slightest attention to the sample? For example, suppose a seller of
polystyrene beads, to be sold to the buyer and formed into
terrariums, allows the buyer to "test some samples." Suppose
further that the buyer is primarily concerned with the capability of
the beads to feed into his machinery, so that the clarity of the
terrariums produced with the sample does not attract his attention
(although in fact the terrariums so produced are crystal clear). The
buyer purchases several thousand pounds of the plastic beads and
subsequently learns that the beads do not feed well into his
machines because of defects in the machines, although the beads
are equal to the sample in size and shape. May the buyer now seek
57. This is where counseling comes in - where the sale is by sample, the watchword is silence.
As long as the seller makes no additional promises or affirmations, he warrants only that the goods
will conform to the sample.
58. 90 Nev. 114,520 P.2d 234 (1974).
59. Mohasco Indus., Inc. v. Anderson Halverson Corp., 90 Nev. 114, 520 P.2d 234 (1974).
60. Herman H. Sticht Co. v. Bradford Equip. Co., 8 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 842, 844 (Pa. C.P.
Chester County 1970).
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to call off the transaction, claiming that the terrariums produced
with the actual beads are not clear and that therefore an express
warranty has been breached? The answer may be found either by
analyzing backward, and asking whether the damages were caused
by the defect, or forward, by asking whether the clarity was "part
of the basis of the bargain." If clarity was part of the basis of the
bargain, there is an express warranty created and breached, and, at
the least, the buyer need not pay the full contract price. He may
also be able to avoid further liability, and may even recover
61
damages proximately caused by the breach.
4. Basis of the Bargain:Effect of Affirmation, Promise,
Description, or Sample on the Transaction
The "part of the basis of the bargain" language runs like a
thread through the express warranty section, which explains the
author's failure to address it directly before. If the affirmation,
promise, description, or sample forms part of the basis of the
bargain, the warranty is created. The problem, of course, is to
define "basis of the bargain." The term is one which is more easily
defined in the negative, by declaring what it is not, than in the
positive. Thus, a majority of courts have held that the test is not
whether the buyer has relied on the promise, affirmation,
description, or sample,6 2 as was required by pre-Code law. It is
61. Plasco, Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging Corp., 547 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1977). In fairness to the
court, their determination that damages were not causally linked was appropriate, and indeed
crucial, since the plaintiff was seeking damages due to "down time," and the court found that the
down time was not attributable to the defect. Id. at 89.
62. There are a number of indications that section 2-313 was intended to supplant the reliance
requisite of the Sales Act. The most obvious of these is the fact that the phrase "basis of the bargain"
is used in lieu of the word reliance. Additionally, official comment 3 indicates that, because
affirmations of fact tend to be seen as descriptive, "no particular reliance on such statements need be
shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement." Furthermore, official comment 7
suggests that "the precise time when words of description or affirmation are made or samples are
shown is not material." Thus, even post-delivery statements can create warranty. It therefore seems
apparent that reliance cannot be a factor, since the sale will have been induced by other means and
the buyer is not relying on the seller's assertions. Nevertheless, if those assertions are "part of the
contract," according to comment 7 the warranty will exist. It should thus be fairly clear that the
drafters meant to modify the old reliance test. Still, the area is said to be hopelessly confused, not
only as to whether that intent existed, but as to the extent of the change. SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 332-39 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as WHITE &
SUMMERS].

Thus, for example, the California Supreme Court, in Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534
P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1975), after noting the change brought about by the Code, refused to
decide whether reliance had been eliminated as a requirement, or whether the change merely
reflected a shift of the burden from the buyer to prove reliance to requiring the seller to prove nonreliance. Compare Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966) (clearly
indicating that reliance is no longer necessary) with Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 68 Cal. App.
3d 744, 137 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1977) (indicating reliance is necessary).
The requirement of reliance has apparently been abandoned in favor of the ill-defined basis of
the bargain standard in several jurisdictions. The reader should note that North Dakota is not among
them. See Winston Indus., Inc. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 55 Ala. App. 525, 317 So. 2d 493 (1975);
Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 521 P.2d 281 (1974); Brunner v. Jensen, 215 Kan.
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arguable that reliance should not play much of a role at all in
making the determination, except that, if reliance exists and has
been shown, a conclusive presumption should exist that the
assertion became part of the basis of the bargain. The courts
admittedly have not gone this far, although it is interesting to note
that in many of the cases where liability has been found reliance has
been shown, so that language disclaiming the need for reliance to
meet the test is obiter. 63 Thus, it would appear that where reliance
is demonstrated the basis of the bargain test is met.
The Code, in addition to its disinclination toward requiring
the element of reliance, also envisions that basis of the bargain does
not require a pre-sale or pre-delivery creation of warranties. In
other words, the fact that the first mention of an attribute occurs
after rather than before delivery does not, according to the official
comment, preclude a warranty based thereon from being part of
the basis of the bargain. 6 4 Although it is the author's belief that the
comment's language should be adhered to, it is not at all difficult to
see why it has not had an altogether spectacular reception when
urged upon the courts. 65 Although the comment speaks of weaving
the warranty-creating representations "into the fabric of the
agreement, ' 66 courts familiar only with the Emperor's old clothes
will have (and have had) difficulty seeing the new ones, in spite of
the insistence by the buyer that they are there. Still, as the clothes
become older and more comfortable, more and more courts will
67
begin to recognize their invisible threads.
416, 524 P.2d 1175 (1974); Interco, Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973); Elanco Prod.
Co. v. Akin-Tunnell, 474 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Cagney v. Coh, 13 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 998 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973).
The following courts still adhere to a reliance requirement: Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp.,
440 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676
(D.N.H. 1972). See also
Speed Fasteners Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967); Werner v.
Montana, 117 N.H. 721, 378 A.2d 1130 (1977) (effect ofnon-reliance).
In addition, Pennsylvania probably requires reliance of some sort before recovery can be had,
although the court framed the reliance more closely in terms of basis of the bargain. See Sessa v.
Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
Finally, the Illinois courts have had trouble making up their minds, similar to California. See
Hrosik v. J. Keim Builders, 37 11. App. 3d 352, 345 N.E.2d 514 (1976) (reliance essential); Alan
Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Enterprises, Inc., 39 Il.App. 3d 48, 349 N.E.2d 627 (1976) (no
particular reliance required); Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 44 I1. App. 3d 530, 358 N.E.2d 382
(1976) (basis of the bargain generally equates with reliance).
63. See, e.g., Brunner v. Jensen, 215 Kan. 416, 524 P.2d 1175 (1974); Interco, Inc. v.
Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
64. U.C.C. S 2-313, Comment 7.
65. Zoss v. Royal Chevrolet Inc., 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 527 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1972). But see
.Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976). Seealso Hrosik v.J. Keim Builders, 37
Ill. App. 3d 352, 345 N.E.2d 514 (1976). But see Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales Inc., 280
Or. 783, 572 P.2d 1322 (1977).
66. U.C.C. 5 2-313, Comtnent 3.
67. SeeJones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976); Autzen v. John C. Taylor
Lumber Sales Inc., 280 Or.783, 572 P.2d 1322 (1977).
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Having determined that the basis of the bargain does not
require reliance, and that assertions made after delivery can meet
the test, it is essential to attempt some definition of what it does
require, or at least give some guidance as to how one can tell
whether the "basis of the bargain" test is met. Others have tried to
give substance to the concept, with mixed success. Thus, for
example, the
Code comments discuss the basis of the bargain as its
''essence,'' 68 and the comments later suggest that the test is
whether the assertion is "fairly to be regarded as part of the
contract. "69 If the reader sees the basis of the bargain test being
diluted step by step, one can take small solace that at the
comments' end all statements are to be considered bases of the
bargain unless good reason suggests that they should not be. 70 All
in all, while courts and lawyers reading the comments get little in
the way of definition, there is a clear prediliction, at the very least,
to shift the burden to the seller to prove that his statements or
71
actions were not intended to form part of the deal.
Whether the drafters had difficulty articulating their meaning,
or were merely being purposely vague to enable expansion and
growth, courts which have dealt with the terminology have had
some difficulty determining what the term means. Not wanting to
fall too deeply into the "reliance" trap, the test nevertheless has
72
been variously described as "essentially a reliance requirement";
as one which "focuses upon [terms] . . . which clearly go to the

essence, or the basic assumption, of the bargain between the
parties"; 73 as one in which the key is whether "the buyers entered
the transaction with [the asserted attribute] in mind"; 74 and as a
test where the question is whether "[tihe words so used were meant
to induce purchases." 75 Courts must consider the negotiations of
the parties as a whole, particularly the buyer's concern 76 as to
specifics which subsequently lead to seller's assurances. Thus, the
majority of courts require at least that the buyer be aware of the
seller's words or conduct which would create the warranty, although there is disagreement as to exactly what part that awareness
68. U.C.C. S 2-313, Comment 6.
69. U.C.C. 5 2-313, Comment 7.
70. U.C.C. S 2-313, Comment 8. The comment explains that "common experience" will guide
triers of fact in determining the issue vis-a-vis puffing and opinion.
71. See U.C.C. S 2-313, Comments 3-8. Note that this typically requires the seller to prove a
negative fact.
72. Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760, 766 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
73. Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Enterprises, Inc., 39 Ill. App. 3d 48, 53, 349
N.E.2d 627, 632 (1976).
74. Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahern, 170 Ind. App. 84, __,
352 N.E.2d 774, 781 (1976).
75. Interco, Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257, 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
76. Werner v. Montana, 117 N.H. 721, 378 A.2d 1130 (1977).
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must play in the decision to buy."
a. Basis of the Bargain: The Pre-Sale Contribution
and Expectation Test
The cases leave one with the impression that the basis of the
bargain test is at best unclear, and not really susceptible to much
greater clarity. The following test, however, is suggested to
determine whether the basis of the bargain element is found: Was
the asserted attribute one which contributed to the decision to buy
the goods or one which, based upon the transaction as a whole, the
buyer could reasonably expect the goods to possess? If the answer to
either of those questions is in the affirmative, recovery should be
allowed for the failure of the goods to possess the expressed
attribute. The offered test has several advantages over those which
have generally been articulated. First, it avoids having to
characterize any single expression as essential, or more essential
than any other. Thus, for example, in the earlier hypothetical
dealing with plastic beads,7 8 it seems fairly clear that the buyer was
primarily interested in acquiring beads which could be readily fed
into his molding machinery. Therefore, the "essence" of the
contract was for particularly sized and shaped beads, and not beads
of crystal clarity. Using traditional "essence," "root," or "basic
assumption" analysis, one would almost be forced into conceding
that color was not part of the basis of the bargain, in spite of the fact
that the sample was clear. Therefore, even if the "color warranty"
was breached, it could not play a role in determining or assessing
damages, since it was not part of the basis of the bargain. This
would lead almost inexorably to the conclusion that color was of
secondary importance, a "loophole" through which the buyer
might plunge to escape from a transaction turned sour. 79 However,
such an analysis ignores the fact that the clarity of the sample
contributed to the decision to purchase. Had the original beads
produced an opaque product, and if the buyer's testimony is to be
believed, the transaction would not have been entered into. 80 To
that extent, then, the buyer should be able to disengage himself
from the transaction and recover damages for the breach when the
77. Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972) (must have relied on
the assertions); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973) (must
have read the brochure in which the ianguage occurred).
78. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
79. Although not articulated by the court in this fashion, the result of the case suggests that the
"color" straw was grasped. Plasco, Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging Corp., 547 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1977).
80. This seems clear given the factual background, since the buyer was in the business of
producing clear terrariums.
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purchased beads produce a cloudy product. Damages might even
include "down time" necessitated by buyer miscalculation, since
the buyer, no longer bound to the contract because of the breach,
would be under no compulsion to attempt to use the remaining
beads. While it may be suggested that such an analysis ignores
proximate cause and makes the seller in effect an insurer of exact
conformity, it is justifiable in that it recognizes that most bargains
are based on multiple, rather than single, factors. Moreover, to the
extent that the buyer would not have purchased the goods absent
the asserted quality, it ensures a greater degree of honesty in the
transaction.
Beyond that, the "contribution" aspect of the suggested test
for basis of the bargain accords with the realities of exchange
transactions. It is all well and good to say that a used car buyer is
primarily concerned with whether the subject of the sale will run
well, but it is myopic to suggest that, because of that, a seller's
statement that the tires are "in good condition" plays little or no
part in the bargain. 8 1 Buyers typically do not purchase solely on the
basis of one or even several factors; neither do they distinguish
among the myriad of assertions which accompany most sales, so
that it is impossible to accurately determine whether a particular
assertion was "basic," "important," "meaningful," "useful," or
Rather, buyers buy on the basis of an overall
"ignored."
impression, and to the extent that any. assertion by a seller
contributes to that overall impression, the buyer ought to be able to
expect that the asserted qualities will exist. If they do not, a breach
of express warranty should be found.
b. Basis of the Bargain:Contribution, Expectation,
and the Transactionas a Whole - Recovery in
a Post- TransactionSetting
To be sure, the suggested "contribution" test has drawbacks,
not the least of which is that it requires the use of hindsight to
determine whether a particular factor contributed to a sale.
Nonetheless, it is generally. preferable to a test which requires either
affirmative reliance (which will often not exist except in the most
general terms) orjudicial rankings of the importance attributable to
a given assertion.
The alternate test, to view the transaction as a whole and
determine whether the buyer could reasonably expect the goods to
possess certain attributes, is essential if recovery is to be had in a
post-transaction assertion setting or when it is difficult or
81. See Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 217, 490 P.2d 475 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
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impossible to pinpoint whether a buyer expressly considered the
warranted fact. To the extent that "bargain" and "agreement"
are synonymous,8 2 whether something is part of the basis of the
bargain must be determined with reference to the total transaction,
from beginning to end, and should include the parties' reasonable
commercial expectations. Thus, an express warranty which
incorporates the "usual factory guarantee" when a new mobile
home is sold with a written express warranty should be held
enforceable, 83 even though the plaintiff cannot show that he relied
upon the warranty, that the warranty contributed to the decision to
purchase, or that he was aware of its contents. Since the reasonable
commercial expectation exists that a mobile home sold within a
"warranty period" will be warranted, and since the express
warranty was in fact made, the buyer should be able to expect the
product to fulfill the warranty terms and be able to recover for
breach of warranty when it does not. 84 Lest this be confused with an
implied warranty of reasonable expectation, one must bear in mind
that the key is that the warranty has been expressly made. In other
words, this is not an instance where nothing is said as to warranty,
allowing only implied terms to arise; rather, something is said, but
only the fact of the communication, rather than its content, is
conveyed. Under such circumstances, the buyer should be able to
assert that the fact of a warranty, without regard to its terms,
created the reasonable expectation that the product would at least
conform to what is later found to have been warranted, and that
therefore the existence of a warranty was part of the basis of the
bargain. 85
The post-transaction assertion cases also fit well within the
reasonable expectation framework. The Code comments make it
clear that the drafters considered the time of creation of the
82. U.C.C. S 1-201 (3) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-01-11 (3) (Supp. 1979)]. See Allan Wood Steel
Co. v. Capital Equip. Enterprises, Inc., 39 Ill. App. 3d 48, 349 N.E.2d 627 (1976).
83. Winston Indus. Inc. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 55 Ala. App. 525, 317 So. 2d 493 (1975).
84. This type of situation may present facts which preclude assertion of the position that the
plaintiff was aware of the existence of the terrns of the warranty. See supra notes 58-60 and
accompanying text. It is, however, justifiable, because the purchaser is aware of the existence of a
warranty and is presumably on notice that the "usual factory guarantee" (whatever it may be)
exists. See Winston Indus. Inc. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 55 Ala. App. 525, 317 So. 2d 493 (1975). The
dissent in Winston vigorously argued that no warranty could exist without knowledge of the
affirmation or promise, apparently meaning the terms or extent of the warranty. Id. at __
, 317
So. 2d at 499 (Wright, .J., dissenting). Such analysis, based as it is upon traditional concepts of pure
contract, ignores the fact that a warranty was made and that the purchaser under those
circumstances could reasonably expect that defects covered by the warranty would be corrected.
Interestingly, the dissent apparently reached the same result by urging that the admission by the
defendant that a warranty was made estops the defendant from denying its existence, and allows the
issue to go to thejury. Id. Since ultimately the question is whether the jury should be entitled to hear
evidence on the issue, the estoppel alternative is generally acceptable, provided, however, that the
mere existence of the warranty is the estopping fact.
A5. All this is to say no more than that an assertion that a good is warranted creates certain
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warranty immaterial,8 6 and that a post-transaction warranty would
operate as a modification of the contract, which requires no
consideration under the Code." 7 It has elsewhere been noted that
the modification analysis will be of limited applicability,8 8 and it is
because of these limits that the "reasonable expectation" analysis is
offered as an alternative. Consider, for example, the struggle which
has been taking place in the Indiana courts since 1972. In that year
the superior court decided Zoss v. Royal Chevrolet, Inc., 89 a case
which involved the sale, acceptance, and subsequent revocation of
acceptance of an automobile. The court had to determine, among
other things, whether there had been a breach of warranty
justifying invocation of the Code revocation of acceptance rules.
The court indicated that that would require determining the scope
of the warranty, and thus whether the manufacturer's written
warranty, as well as oral express warranties created by the seller,
were part of the transaction. In finding that the manufacturer's
written warranty was not part of the transaction, the court noted:
"Every court considering this issue has held that a written
automobile warranty is not part of the contract unless its terms are
called to the buyer's attention prior to the signing of the
contract. "90 In making this statement, the court cited four cases,91
three which involved the effectiveness of disclaimers which were not
made available until after the sale, and one which involved
inconspicuousness of disclaimers generally. 9 2 Until the Zoss case, no
expectations that the good will be, at the least, expressly merchantable. This is to be distinguished
from a case in which the seller posts a sign declaring that all used cars have a "one year warranty,"
when in fact no warranty is given. See Hensley v. Colonial Dodge, Inc., 69 Mich. App. 597, 245
N.W.2d 142 (1976). Although it is the author's opinion that such language creates an express
warranty of merchantability, it is recognized that courts, such as the Hensley court, are likely to be
reluctant in imposing it. This should not preclude a finding that, having made the representation and
delivered a warranty after the sale, the seller is bound by the written warranty.
86. U.C.C. 5 2-313, Comment 7.
87. Id. SeeU.C.C. § 2-209(l) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-16(l)(1968)1.
88. White and Summers suggest a number of problems, including the basic difficulty of
characterizing a post-deal warranty as a "modification." They also detail the possibility of a statute
of frauds barrier if the contract as modified falls within the $500 or more statute of frauds provision.
See U.C.C. §§ 2-201, 2-209(3) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-08, -16(3) (1968)1. Additionally, because
White and Summers believe in the continuing "vitality" of reliance, they would cut off contract
remedies for assertions made more than a very short period after the sale, relegating the plaintiff to
his tort alternatives. Nevertheless, they would permit recovery according to the practicalities of the
real world in those instances in which the post-sale warranty closely follows the sale, or where a true
modification exists. The White and Summers middle ground, although internally inconsistent, is
preferable to a pure modification analysis, or the disallowance of recovery altogether. Its
disadvantage, stemming apparently from the desire to preclude recovery based on advertising that
occurs sometime after the sale which contains warranty language, is the difficulty of determining how
close to the sale is close enough. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra NOTE 62, § 9-4, at 332.
89. 11 U.C.C. REP. SEErV. 527 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1972).
90. Zoss v. Royal Chevrolet, Inc., 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 527, 531 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1972).
91. Tiger Motors Co. v. McMurty, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638 (1969); Marion Power Shovel
Co. v. Huntsman, 246 Ark. 152, 437 S.W.2d 784 (1969); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d
195(1968).
92. For purposes of disclaiming implied warranties, the disclaimer must be conspicous. See
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post-Code decision existed which dealt with a post-transaction
warranty. The Zoss court apparently believed that, since posttransaction warranty disclaimers were ineffective, it logically
followed that post-transaction warranties were likewise ineffective.
Unfortunately, this misreads the cases and the Code, and, even
though done in an effort to reach the correct result, causes further
problems.
The theory behind disallowing post-transaction disclaimers is
the dislike for unfair surprise. Thus, the Code provides that implied
warranties may be disclaimed only by conspicuous action or
language on the part of the seller. 93 Clearly, action taken or
language provided after the sale is inconspicuous, and therefore
ineffective to disclaim implied warranties which arose at the time of
the sale. This was, at least in part, the rationale of the cases cited by
the Zoss court. To the extent that the post-sale disclaimer attempts
to disclaim express warranties where there is no conspicuousness
requirement, the disclaimer should be denied effect as
"inoperative," since it is inconsistent with the express warranty
and therefore fails under section 2-316(1). 94 Coupled with the
foregoing is the rather specific allowance in comment 7 of posttransaction warranties which can become the basis of the bargain.
There is also no unfairness here, for the warranty writer clearly
intends to warrant the goods. In short, there is ample justification
for disregarding the reverse-logic arguments which result from
denying effect to post-sale disclaimers. Had the Zoss court merely
applied the Code rules it would have reached the same result, yet
would not have established such a potentially confusing precedent.
In 1976, the Court of Appeals of Indiana alleviated the
confusion somewhat in Jones v. Abriani,95 a case involving the alltime lemon of mobile homes. The court, in a highly sympathetic
opinion, allowed the buyer to reject goods more than a year after
their delivery, based in part on breach of a warranty created by a
post-sale promise. While the use of this base is probably dictum,
inasmuch as there was an express warranty created by sample and
implied warranty liability as well, the court nevertheless had little
trouble fitting the situation before it into the classic post-transaction
warranty mold. When defects became apparent after delivery, the
subsequent promise to repair created an express warranty which
U.C.C. § 2-316 [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33 (Supp. 1979)], and discussion infra at notes 370-72
and accompanying text.
93. U.C.C. § 2-316 (2), (3) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33 (2), (3) (Supp. 1979)1.
94. There may, of course, be parol evidence problems. See U.C.C. S 2-202 [N.D. CENT. CODE S

41-02-09 (1968)1.
95. 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976).
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became part of the basis of the bargain. The court went so far as to
quote the rule contained in section 2-209, which provides that a
modification requires no new consideration to bind the
defendants. 96
It is fairly certain that the court was unsure of itself in pressing
the post-sale warranty analysis, and that it used it primarily to
buttress an already overwhelming case. 97 Indeed, it is arguable that
this type of promise (to repair or cure) does not fit well within
comment 7's call for "additional assurance" at all, and that
therefore the words were perhaps better left unwritten by the court.
On the other hand, there is every reason to believe that a promise to
repair post-sale defects would form part of the basis of the bargain
and create something very closely akin to warranty, since it is a
promise which goes to the quality of the goods and will almost
certainly be relied upon by the buyer. Furthermore, it fits nicely
into the modification niche. In any case, the decision clearly
demonstrates a willingness to expand warranty liability to post-sale
assertions, and to that extent it is arguable that Zoss would no
longer be the prevailing view in Indiana. 98 Having set the stage for
expansion in Abriani, the court could clarify its position and set the
limits of "post-sale modification" in later cases.
Rather than clarify, the next decision at best froze and at worst
obscured those limits. The case was Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahern, 99
decided by the same court of appeals approximately one month
after Abriani. Auto-Teria involved a dispute between the buyers and
sellers of an automatic car wash system. Express warranties had
been made orally, by letter, and by brochures of the seller,
although the manufacturer's "warranty" was not delivered to the
buyers until after the sale. 10 0 When the machine failed to work
properly the defendant-buyers refused further payment, were sued,
and courterclaimed. 10 1 The trial court found for the defendants on
their counterclaim, and the court of appeals, in a scattergun
opinion, affirmed. 102 Once again it was probably unnecessary to
even consider the post-sale warranties, since there was sufficient
evidence of express warranties created earlier. Nevertheless, after
detailing the fact that express and implied warranties existed and
had not been disclaimed, the court, citing Zoss, indicated in broad
96.Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556,
, 350 N.E.2d 635, 645 (1976).
97. Id. at__
, 350 N.E.2d at 645-46.
98. It is interesting to note that the Abriani court failed to cite Zoss.
99. 170 1nd. App. 84, 352 N.E. 2d 774 (1976).
100. Auto-Teria, Inc, v. Ahern, 170 Ind. App. 84,
-, 352 N.E.2d
(1976).
101. Id. at __,
352 N.E.2d at 778.
102. Id. at__,
352 N.E.2d at 784.
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language that the trial court could have found that the post-sale
warranty was not part of the parties' contract.103 Once again, the
court seemed to indicate that warranties may not be created after
the transaction.
The Indiana cases suggest a number of thoughts concerning
the reasonable expectation analysis and the post-transaction
warranty. It is apparent, for example, that courts will generally
differentiate between the effectiveness of warranty and of
disclaimer. This is appropriate, but the differentiation should
probably be based on the conspicuousness rationale, and not solely
on the post-sale nature. Furthermore, one can sense a reluctance on
the part of courts to incorporate post-sale contract terms that are to
the disadvantage of the buyer. Thus, it is probable that the written
warranties in Zoss and Auto-Teria, unnoticed until after the sale,
would have limited the buyers' rights more than the earlier written
and oral warranties. Therefore, it is logical for a court to attempt to
do justice by holding that the earlier warranties are part of the
bargain and the latter are not. Unfortunately, the broad language
may actually be to the buyer's disadvantage, at least insofar as he
may be unable to take advantage of any beneficial aspects of the
post-sale warranty.
The solution seems to be to consider all aspects of the warranty
creation language, while disallowing consideration of all language
tending to limit or disclaim liability. While this appears at first
glance to protect the buyer at some extraordinary expense to the
seller, in reality it is consistent with the Code. At the outset, it must
be remembered that all promises or assertions are subject to the
parol evidence rule. The Code also generally makes disclaimers of
10 4
express warranties subordinate to the words which create them,
so that any inconsistency would ordinarily be resolved in favor of
the warranty. Furthermore, disclaimers of implied warranties must
be conspicuous, so post-sale disclaimers are clearly ineffective,
whereas the comment allows post-sale creation of warranty.
Finally, the post-sale written warranty contains the seller's words,
arguably intended to be believed by the buyer, and should
therefore become part of the deal. While it is possible to assert that
the seller's express written warranty is given as a trade off for his
ability to limit his other liability, and that it is therefore unfair to
impose express warranty liability and at the same time deprive the
seller of the right to limit, it is the seller who is largely able to avoid
103. Id. at __
, 352 N.E.2d at 782-83.
104. See U.C.C. §S 2-202, 2-316(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 41-02-09, -33(1) (1968 & Supp.

1979)].
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the problem altogether, at least when the liability is directed at the
immediate seller and not the manufacturer. Coupled with the other
reasons earlier advanced and the policy embodied in the Code, it is
appropriate to open the door to post-sale incorporation of warranty
while at the same time closing it to disclaimers and limitations.
In structuring the express warranty case, and without regard
to whether the narrow or broad approach to liability is accepted, it
is essential to remember that the existence and scope of an express
warranty is a question of fact. This means, among other things,
that ordinarily the allegation of express warranty will create a jury
question, precluding summary judgment. Thus, while the pure law
question of the need for reliance or some lesser requirement will
eventually become important in jury instructions, the threshhold
questions of whether the warranty exists and whether it has been
breached are more readily answerable.
The reasonable expectation analysis, or something akin to it,
has been employed in at least one very well reasoned opinion,
Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales, Inc. 105 The plaintiff bought a
used boat from the defendant for $100,000. The transaction began
in September, 1975, and ended with the buyer's revocation of
acceptance in March, 1976. During negotiations, plaintiff was
proferred a 1970 warranty booklet and a 1972 survey of the boat,
which represented the findings of an examination in that year for
insect and dry rot infestation. These documents were specifically
disregarded by the appellate court, probably because of their age
and the difficulty of determining whether they were being offered as
current. The plaintiff also offered proof of an oral representation of
"A-1 condition," which was refuted by the defendant and
disregarded by the court. Finally, there was a survey of the boat
conducted at the seller's request, apparently after the contract was
formed but before delivery to the buyer. When the seller told the
buyer that he would have a survey conducted, the buyer replied
that it was not necessary. After the survey was complete, but before
it was reduced to written form, the buyer had parted with a $20,000
down payment check. Two months later, dry rot was discovered,
and when further inspection revealed serious problems the buyer
attempted to revoke acceptance. 10 6 It seems clear that the buyer
neither wanted nor relied upon the 1975 survey; nevertheless, the
court, viewing the transaction as a whole, and comporting with the
105. 280 Or. 783, 572 P.2d 1322 (1977).
106. Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales, Inc., 280 Or. 783
(1977).

-

, 572 P.2d 1322, 1324
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reasonable expectations of the parties, upheld the jury's finding of a
warranty, and declared that it went to the basis of the bargain. 107
The court, after reviewing the facts and setting forth sections
2-313 (1) and (2), correctly noted that in order for a description to
become part of the basis of the bargain it need not be made by the
seller. 108 It then detailed the fact that "bargain" under the Code is
significantly broader than "contract," so that even if the sale was
consummated before the survey was prepared it could become part
of the basis of the bargain. Although the court waffled on this point,
noting that certain aspects of the sale had not yet occurred, it seems
clear that the key for the court was the buyer's reasonable
expectation, since the court affirmed on the basis that, although the
"description did not induce the actual formation of the contract,
the jury might have found that it did induce and was intended by
the Seller to induce Buyer's satisfaction with the agreement just
made, as well as to lessen Buyer's degree of vigilance in inspecting
the boat prior to acceptance." 10 9 Thus, even though the assertion
was after the fact, it could and did become the basis of the bargain.
As to the seller's rejoinder that because the buyer neither
requested nor considered essential the 1975 survey it could not have
been part of the basis of the bargain, the court replied that, since
the decription goes to the essence of the contract and the jury might
have so found, that finding is not to be disturbed. 110 In short,
although the buyer did not request, rely on, or even consider the
description, the warranty thereby made will protect him, since he
could reasonably expect that the statements made in the description
would be correct. Perhaps, in the final analysis, the way to decide
such cases is to ask whether the buyer would be entitled to rescind if
he were made aware of the defect at the time of the sale. If the
answer to that question is yes, the warranty created should inure to
the buyer's benefit.
Above all, as the court notes, the existence and scope of any
warranty is a jury question, and a finding by the jury will not be
overturned unless there is no substantial evidence to support the
verdict.II1 Thus, it becomes crucial in an action based upon breach
of warranty to present all 'elevant evidence as to the existence of the
warranty and its scope, even though much of it may be disregarded
on appeal. Secondarily, it is important to formulate the proper jury
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at___,
572 P.2d at 1326.
, 572 P.2d at 1325. Seesupra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
Id. at __
, 572 P.2d at 1326.
280 Or. at__
Id.
Id. See also City of Hazelton v. Daugherty, 275 N.W.2d 624 (N.D. 1979).
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instructions. The model instruction for a warranty plaintiff should
be couched in Code terms, preferably with avoidance of reliance
language. The jury should be informed as to the definition of
"bargain," and, even if instructions relating to "expectation" and
"commercial reality" are refused, reference should be made to the
transaction as a whole. Because of the jury question presented by
the mere suggestion of the existence of a warranty, summary
112
judgment is nearly always inappropriate.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the making of any
statement or affirmation, whether or not it falls within the purview
of the traditional express warranty, is likely to be deemed to create
express warranty responsibility. Indeed, it may be that we are
witnessing the demise of the classic "express warranty" and the
birth of an implied warranty of reasonable expectation or
merchantability created by express language, differing from the
traditional implied warranty of merchantability which arises
without regard to statements by the seller. This new implied
express warranty is one which is born of the seller's language and
conduct, and exists because the seller's language and conduct
implies to the reasonable buyer qualities which the purchased
product ought to possess. No longer will it be necessary for the
seller's affirmations, promises, descriptions, or samples to
expressly state that the product will conform to them; it is enough
that the words imply qualities or attributes to the goods. If they do,
the express warranty, implied though it may be, will be found to
exist. 113
5. Puffing: Statements of Value, Opinion, or Commendation
Given what has already been said about the expansion of
express warranty liability, it is unnecessary to do more than briefly
mention section 2-313 (2), which absolves the seller of liability for
statements of value, opinion, or commendation. The Code drafters
recognized that puffing would continue in the commercial world,
and opted to relegate policing to the law of fraud rather than to the
law of contract.1 1 4 The courts, however, have generally been
willing to tackle the puffing cases using contract analysis, and, for
the most part, liability in warranty has been found in all but the
most obvious cases of trade talk.1 15 The key in the opinion cases
112. SeeKnippv. Weinbaum, 351 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. Dist. (Ut. App. 1979).
113. Little Rock School Dist. v. Celotex Corp., 264 Ark. 757, 574 S.W.2d 669 (1978).
114. U.C.C. S 2-313, Comment 8.
115. Compare Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse, 445 F. Supp. 537 (D. Mass. 1977)
(phrase "to handle plastisol fumes" does not create warranty) with Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co.,
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does not seem to be whether the seller has control over the outcome
or attribute asserted, 116 although it seems clear that the greater the
"unknown" influence is, the less likely a warranty will be found.
Thus, for example, the newer or more experimental the
technology, the less likely is the imposition of warranty liability,
particularly where the language offered to create the warranty is
couched in ambiguous terms.11 7 Likewise, where nature or natural
forces are likely to determine the happening of an event, the courts
seem unwilling to characterize language as creating warranty
liability." 8 Finally, although the courts seem willing to give effect
to the use of equivocal language in failing to create a warranty,
especially where the whole transaction suggests that the seller is
merely guessing," 9 it is apparent that the mere use of equivocating
words will not shield a seller from liability when it is clear from the
surrounding facts and circumstances that the seller is actually
affirming a fact about which he should be knowledgeable. 120 In
short, the test has been said to be whether the seller "assume[d] to
assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or .

.

.

merely

express[ed] a judgment about a thing as to which [both seller and
buyer] may each be expected to have an opinion.' 12 1 In reality,
however, the relative ignorance of the buyer should play a small
part, and the test should be whether the seller's assertions, based
upon his position relative to the goods, are likely to be accepted by
the buyer as true or will substantially contribute to the sale. If so, it
seems improper not to impose responsibility when the assertions
turn out to be untrue.
B.

DISCLAIMER OF THE EXPRESS WARRANTY

Once the express warranty has been made it is virtually
84 S.D. 497, 234 N.W.2d 38 (1975) (phrase "for control of corn rootworm larvae" creates
warranty).
116. See McCarty v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 347 A.2d 253 (1975) (tires
guaranteed for 36,000 miles creates express warranty against blowouts for 36,000 miles).
117. See Whittington v. Eli Lilly & Co., 333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.W. Va. 1971) (birth control pills
said to be "virtually" 100% effective; court found no express warranty against pregnancy); Axion
Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 359 Mass. 474, 269 N.E.2d 664 (1971) (design formulations
characterized as prediction, not warranty).
118. See Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (horse said able to "jog home in
preferred company"; court held no warranty); Whitmer v. Schneble, 29 I1. App. 3d 659, 331
N.E.2d 115 (1975) (doberman described as docile; no warranty liability when dog bites child); cf
White Devon Farm v. Stahl, 88 Misc. 2d 961, 389 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (horse described as
breeder, which in fact sired 27 foals in 38 outings; court held warranty as breeder breached because
sperm count too low). See also Brunner v. Jensen, 215 Kan. 416, 524 P.2d 1175 (1974) (statement as
to time when cow would calve creates warranty).
119. See, e.g., Hupp Corp. v. Metered Washer Serv., 256 Or. 245, 472 P.2d 816 (1970) (use of
words "we think," "maybe," "might solve your problems"; court held no warranty).
120. See Matlack, Inc. v. Hupp Corp., 57 F.R.D. 151 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See Also Bell v.
Harrington Mfg. Co., 265 S.C. 468, 219 S.E.2d 906 (1975).
121. General Supply & Equip. Co. v. Phillips, 490 S.W.2d913, 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
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impossible to disclaim it,122 even when the warranty is created by
description or sample and the disclaiming language is explicit. The
comment to section 2-313 makes it clear that a warranty which is
created by description or sample cannot be undone, even by the
most explicit language. Nevertheless, and in spite of the rather selfevident notion that because express warranties are expressed they
should not be disclaimable after their creation, the Code drafters
included an explicit prohibition of unreasonable post-creation
disclaimers. 123 Thus, section 2-316(1) makes it clear that, where
reasonable, language or conduct of warranty is to be construed
consistently with language or conduct of disclaimer, but that where
such a construction is not reasonable the language or conduct of
warranty is to be given effect. The courts have generally complied
with the underlying theory expressed by section 2-316(1), and have
refused to give effect to attempts to disclaim express warranties
after the warranty has been created. 124 Most courts, however, have
attempted no reconciliation between express warranties and
disclaimers, but instead have merely paraphrased the Code and
given effect to the warranty.1 25 A few courts have even gone so far
as to state that a disclaimer of express warranties after the warranty
has been created is ineffective as a matter of law. 126 Few, if any, of
the cases have adequately analyzed whether and to what extent
warranties and disclaimers can coexist.
While the better rule requires strict construction of the
disclaimer against the seller, 1 27 this is not generally the starting
122. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 4; U.C.C. § 2-316 (1) and comments.
123. See U.C.C. § 2-316(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33(1) (Supp. 1979)]. The drafters may
well have foreseen that express warranty law was being expanded, and that to that extent some courts
might more liberally interpret exculpatory language, thereby allowing the seller to escape the more
easily imposed liability. It is not uncommon to set up, as a trade off, ready liability against ready
exculpation. Thus, although we have moved somewhat into the rbalm of conscience (i.e. protecting
buyers because it is right to do so), to the extent that we remain in the realm of contract sellers and
buyers ought to be free to bargain away liability. See U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 4.
124. See Community Television Serv. Inc. v. Dresser Indus., 586 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979); Berk v. Gordon Johnson Co., 232 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1964);
Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972);
Young & Cooper Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 521 P.2d 281 (1974); Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc.,
173 Mont. 345, 567 P.2d 916 (1977); Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc. 65 N.J. 336, 322
A.2d 440 (1974); Drier v. Perfection, Inc.,
S.D.
-,
259 N.W.2d 496 (1977).
125. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176, 465 S.W.2d 80 (1971); Walcott & Steele
Inc. v. Carpenter, 246 Ark. 95, 436 S.W.2d 820 (1969); Auto. Teria, Inc. v. Ahern, 170 Ind.
App. 84, 352 N.E.2d 774 (1976; Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976);
Wenner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 264 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1978); Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc., 173
Mont. 345, 567 P.2d 916 (1977). But see Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp.,
428 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153
Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972); Jordon v. Doonan Truck & Equip. Inc., 220 Kan. 431, 552
P.2d 881 (1976).
126. Chisholm v. J.R. Simplot Co., 94 Idaho 628, 495 P.2d 1113 (1972); Woodruff v. Clark
County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972): Young & Cooper v.
Vestring, 214 Kan. 311,521 P.2d 281 (1974).
127. Woodruffv. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188
(1972); Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 2d 104, 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1975).
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point. Rather, the agreement as a whole is to be viewed to
determine whether warranties have been created, what these
warranties encompass, whether the alleged breach of the warranty
is causally connected to the damages sustained, and, only then,
whether the disclaimer should be given validity. Often this will
appear to involve stacking the deck against a seller, for he will
almost always seek shelter behind a broad disclaimer if one is
involved, urging that, given the disclaimer language, no warranty
could have been created. Deferring for a moment the parol
evidence problems, the short answer must be that, to the extent
that express warranties can be made to coexist with words of
disclaimer, they should be so construed. The only way to determine
whether coexistence is possible is to determine the existence and
scope of the warranty. To analyze in any other manner, thus giving
blanket effect to the disclaimer, would in many cases substantially
destroy the bargain of the buyer, giving him a mere shadow of that
which he purchased.
The Code and the caselaw indicate that, where there are
internal inconsistencies, those supporting disclaimer must give way
to those supporting warranty. On balance such a result is fair,. since
it seems obvious that the seller of goods would not in one breath
create warranties and in the next destroy them. Certainly, even if
the seller did intend precisely that, no court would permit it.
Furthermore, because of the Code formula, it is unnecessary to do
so.
Some recent cases are instructive. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey had' an opportunity to discuss the effect of a blanket
disclaimer on express warranties in Realmuto v. Straub Motors Inc., 128
and concluded in dictum that the disclaimer would have to give
way to the express warranties. The court characterized any other
decision as unreasonable, relying on section 2-316(1). 129
More directly in point, the recent decision in Fargo Machine &
Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp. 130 suggests an appropriate way of
handling the problem. In that case, the plaintiff and the defendant
had agreed to the sale of a complex piece of machinery for a price of
roughly $150,000 after the plaintiff had read promotional literature
concerning the machine. The machine was purchased and
installed, with plaintiff paying approximately half the price. The
machine was allegedly defective, plaintiff refused to pay, and
litigation followed. Among other issues before the court were
128.65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440(1974).
129. Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336,
130. 428 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1977).

-,

322 A.2d 440, 442-43 (1974).
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whether an express warranty had been created by the promotional
literature, whether it was affected by an express warranty of
merchantability contained in the written contract, and whether a
disclaimer of all warranties except the express warranty of
merchantability would operate to disclaim the promotional
warranties. 131
The court paraphrased section 2-316(1) and "construed" the
disclaimer and the express promotional warranty consistently with
it. The court ignored entirely any parol evidence problem, and
found that the two warranties, read together, meant only that if the
machines were free from defect (as warranted) they would meet the
specifications in the promotional literature (also as warranted).
Therefore, the provisions were consistent. The problem, however,
is that the court failed to construe the express warranty with the
disclaimer; rather, it construed the two express warranties
together. 132
The same result could have been reached had the court
construed the broad disclaimer to avoid all warranties other than
those found to have actually been made. Alternatively, the court
could have stated more explicitly what it apparently meant: The
express warranty of merchantability is to be measured according to
the standard adopted by the parties, in this case according to
specifications contained in the promotional literature. The effect is
to define "defect in material or workmanship" to be any deviation
from specifications contained in the advertising. A final alternative,
which is less consistent with the Code, would be to hold that the
disclaimer was inconsistent with the express warranty and therefore
invalid.
,
Interestingly, the court ignored the parol evidence probi
treating the case as one with mere internal inconsistencies, rather
than as one involving pre-contract warranties which might well
have been merged in the written agreement. 133 In that posture, the
correctness of the result is clear. In addition, rather than relying too
heavily upon the specifications contained in the promotional
literature, the court instead held the seller to performance
expectations usual in the trade. In other words, even though the
machine did not operate as promised, "to the extent that
deficiencies and corrective service performed were routine for so
sophisticated a machine, no breach occurs."134 The court cited as
131.
1977).
132.
133.
134.

Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich.
Id. at 372-73.
Id. at 373.
Id.
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authority for this proposition comment 5 to section 2-313, which
purports to read into descriptions of goods any applicable trade
usage. 135 The extent to which that comment applies in this case is
unclear, however, for the comment seems to envision comparison
between technical specifications and the actual product, and not
comparison between an express warranty and deficiencies which
would pass without objection. Stated another way, the comment
seeks to make specification language comport with trade
expectations; the court in FargoMachine used trade expectations as a
gauge to determine whether the express warranty of
merchantability had been met, disregarding the warranty created
by the specifications. 136 Thus, trade usage is to be employed as an
interpretive device when it is unclear what the scope of a warranty
is; to the extent that the court in Fargo Machine used it without
regard to the specifications warranty, it did so in error.
If the Fargo Machine court had to struggle to fit a non-internal
inconsistency case into the section 2-316(1) mold, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota, in Wenner v. Gulf Oil Corp.,1 3 7 had a readymade fit. The plaintiff's cause of action sprouted from his
contention that the defendant's product, a herbicide aerially
applied to a corn field in 1974, left a carryover residue which
damaged plaintiff's wheat crop in 1975.138 Among other issues
decided by the court was the question whether a disclaimer
provision in small print on the back of the label would operate to
render a warranty made on the front of the label ineffective. 139 The
court made short work of defendant's contention that the
disclaimer should preempt the express warranty, quoting section 2316(1) and determining that the two could not reasonably be
reconciled. Thus, the disclaimer was ruled ineffective. 40
While there is no doubt that the court reached the correct
135. Id.
136. Id. At least two cases have applied the comment correctly, using trade usage to interpret
the scope of the warranty. See Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n v. S.S. Sovereign Faylenne, 24
U.C.C. REP. SERV. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (product sold as "agricultural grade"; held trade usage
interprets meaning, and thereafter question of whether warranty was met was for jury); Zappanti v.
Berge Serv. Center, 26 Ariz. App. 398, 549 P.2d 178 (1976) ("1976 V.W. Dunebuggy"; warranty
created by description is interpreted by trade usage so as not to require all component parts to be
1976 vintage).
137. 264 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1978).
138. Wenner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 264 N.W.2d 374, 383 (Minn. 1978).
139. Id. The warranty on the front of the label arose by the affirmation of fact that the herbicide
was "a low carryover herbicide, and when applied at the recommended rate, normal crop rotation is
possible the season following." The disclaimer, on the reverse side, issued a warranty of conformity
to description and of general fitness, but disclaimed responsibility for "damage to plants and crops to
which the material is applied [caused by] critical and unforeseeable factors." According to the
disclaimer, the risk of these losses was to fall on the buyer, and they might occur even though the
herbicide was generally itfor its intended purpose. Id.
140. Id. at 383-84.
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result, a purist might shudder at the rush to judgment. In actuality,
the warranty and the disclaimer could have, and probably should
have been construed consistently with one another. In this case, it
makes no difference; in another it might. If one changes the facts of
Wenner slightly, the problem can readily be seen. Were there no
express warranty of merchantability in Wenner, but only the "low
carryover" promise and the disclaimer, the analysis would
probably have been as follows: The defendant promised low
carryover, thereby creating an express warranty, which was
breached when carryover caused damage to a subsequent year's
crop. The defendant also disclaimed all warranties. The question
thus becomes whether the warranty and the disclaimer can coexist,
or whether one must give way. The disclaimer does not address
carryover, and is intended to protect defendant from liability if its
product is, for example, not merchantable. Thus, if the plaintiff's
crop had been damaged upon application, and assuming that the
disclaimer passed muster under other Code sections, 14 1 the
defendant would be insulated from responsibility. Were that form
of liability being asserted, the plaintiff would lose. The disclaimer,
however, only reaches the warranties disclaimed, and not the
express warranty of low carryover. Since it is the carryover which
caused the damage, and low carryover was warranted, the plaintiff
prevails. The warranty of low carryover is different from the
warranty of merchantability, and is therefore consistent with
rendering the disclaimer effective only for the warranty of
merchantability. In short, the defendant is entitled to the insulation
afforded by the disclaimer; the plaintiff is entitled to the protection
afforded by the express warranty.
Failure to analyze in the above manner would potentially
deprive the seller of goods the protection which he has ostensibly
bargained for. By analyzing in the suggested manner, however, the
Code ideal of coexistence is achieved.
C.

UNCONSCIONABILITY AND DISCLAIMERS

Related to the problem of whether express warranties and
disclaimers can coexist is the concern of the courts with
overreaching and unconscionability. Many of the cases which
refuse to enforce disclaimers are, expressly or implicitly, affirming
the conviction that courts will not enforce grossly unfair bargains.
Part of the reason for a court's refusal to devote substantial energy
to reconciliation of express warranties and disclaimers, and instead
141. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) & (3) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33 (2) & (3) (Supp. 1979)].
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hold that the disclaimer is ineffective (as in Wenner), is the
unarticulated belief that to give with one hand and take away with
the other is unfair or unconscionable. The Code, however, allows,
42
and may even encourage, the articulation of that ideal.
It would have been a simple matter to draft a per se rule of
unconscionability any time there was both an express warranty and
an attempted disclaimer. The drafters of the Code instead invoked
a rule of coexistence where possible. The disclaimer will give way
when coexistence is not possible. Nevertheless, the Code leaves
open the possibility of unconscionability analysis as an alternative,
through the use of sections 2-302 and 2-719.141 Enough has been
written elsewhere about the general application of these two
sections of the Code, 144 and our concern here will be solely with the
use of the sections in a warranty setting, particularly where
disclaimers seek to preclude warranty liability.
142. Id. A simple hypothetical might involve yet another modification of the Wenner facts. If an
express warranty given by the seller is coupled with an equally explicit disclaimer of unavoidable
risks, it should be possible to balance the two and reach a reasonable result. Thus, for example, there
might be a warranty that "this product will kill weeds," followed by the language "but, even though
fit for use, and properly applied, it may also damage plants or crops." In that case, it is fair and
reasonable to place the risk on the buyer who is made aware of the possibility of harm. See Kleven v.
Geigy Agricultural Chems., 35 Minn. 810, 227 N.W.2d 566 (1975). The key is that the buyer is
made aware of the harm under circumstances where the existence and scope of the warranty do not
overshadow the limitations thereafter placed on the product's effectiveness.
143. Section 2-302 of the Code provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
making the determination.
U.C.C. S 2-302 [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-19(1968)].
Section 2-719 of the Code provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of the
preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for
those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages
recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of
the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of nonconforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly
agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential
purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of
damages where the loss is commercial is not.
U.C.C. S 2-719 [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-98 (1968)1.
144. For further discussion of sections 2-302 and 2-719, see Fahlgren, Unconscionability: Warranty
Disclaimers and Consequential Damage Limitations, 20 ST. Louis U.LJ. 435 (1976); LEFF,
Unconscionabilityand the Code - The Emporer'sNew Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
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1. UnconscionableDisclaimers: The Courts' Options
While section 2-719 is specifically directed at limitations of
remedies, and will therefore have special relevance in the
disclaimer area, the practitioner should not forget the general
unconscionability provision of section 2-302. That section may be
invoked any time a contract or any clause therein (e.g., a disclaimer
provision) is alleged to have been unconscionable at the time the
contract or clause was entered into. At that point, the court is to
determine whether the contract or clause is unconscionable as a
matter of law, taking into account the commercial setting, purpose,
and effect of the clause. 14 5 In the majority of states, including North
Dakota, the claim of unconscionability precludes summary
judgment, for the parties are to be given an evidentiary hearing to
assist the court in determining the question of unconscionability.14 6
Following the hearing, the court makes its determination, and, if
the contract or clause is deemed unconscionable, the court has
three options: refusal to enforce the contract, enforcement of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or limitation of the
offending clause to avoid an unconscionable result.
Although one can imagine situations in which a court, faced
with a warranty disclaimer provision, might opt to refuse to enforce
the entire contract, 14 7 most of the cases involve refusal to enforce
the offending clause, or construction of the offending clause to
avoid an offensive or unconscionable result. 14 8 The net result may
be the same, for the refusal to enforce a clause may give rise to a
right to revoke acceptance, or "rescind," thereby entitling the
buyer to recover the price paid and cancel the agreement. 149 At the
very least, after the clause is preempted the buyer is entitled to
breach of warranty damages, the difference between the value of
the goods accepted and their value if they had conformed to the
1 50
warranty.
Perhaps the greatest hurdle for the buyer in a warrantydisclaimer-unconscionability case is not the assertion or proof of
unconscionability, but rather the fact that section 2-316(1) allows
145. U.C.C. S 2-302(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-19(2) (1968)].
146. See Haugen v. Ford Motor Co., 219 N.W.2d 462 (N.D. 1974). But seeEarl M. Jorgensen
Co. v. Mark Constr., Inc., 56 Hawaii 466, 540 P.2d 978 (1975).
147. For example, the sale on credit of a new product with all warranties properly disclaimed,
where the buyer has made no down payment, followed by the complete loss of the product caused by
an undetectable defect, might cause a court to balk at making the buyer pay any of the purchase
price. Such a case, although easy to imagine, is highly unlikely to occur.
148. SeeJacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250 (1972);
Oddo v. General Motors, 22 U.C.C. REp. SERV. 147 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Eckstein v. Cummins,
41 Ohio App. 2d 1,321 N.E.2d 897 (1974).
149. See U.C.C. § 2-711(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-90(1) (1968)].
150. See U.C.C. § 2-714(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE §'41-02-93(1) (1968)].
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the disclaimer of express warranties when the disclaiming language
is not inconsistent with the language creating the warranty. Thus,
in the simplest case, where a used car is sold as a "1970 Chevrolet"
and a clause that "there are no express warranties" is
conspicuously present, a court would have no trouble construing
the two expressions together: the car is expressly warranted to be a
1970 model Chevrolet, and all other warranties are validly
disclaimed. If we assume an oral express warranty before the sale
(barred from admission by the parol evidence rule), the proper
disclaimer of implied warranties, and the loss of the car due to
failure to meet the oral express warranty, the buyer has only one
contract remedy:1 51 he must prevail upon the court to declare the
disclaimer invalid as unconscionable, thereby resurrecting any
express or implied warranties. 152 The few couits which have
considered this question, however, have been reluctant to declare
unconscionable under the general provisions of section 2-302 that
153
which the Code specifically permits.
2. Limitation of Remedies
If the problem is a dispute between a specific and a general
statutory provision, one would expect the specific to prevail. But
where the disclaimer also serves to limit liabili'ty, the clash is
between two specific provisions, and, on the whole, the limitation
clauses have fared less well than general disclaimers when
confronted with an unconscionability challenge.
Section 2-719 is applicable whenever a clause seeks to limit
remedies in the event of a breach. 154 Thus, while there is no
requirement that the clause include a disclaimer of warranties, in
the usual standard form contract a warranty will be given. All other
warranties will be disclaimed, and the remedies available for breach
of any warranty will be limited, for example, to repair or
replacement. 155 Section 2-719 governs the effectiveness of the
151. At this point tort law, rather than contract law, will probably provide the most appropriate
answer.
152. The reader should recognize that the invocation of unconscionability does not necessarily
remove the parol evidence bar, although, absent the offending clause, the argument can be made
that the writing was either not final, or not complete and exclusive. See U.C.C. S 2-202 [N.D. CENT.
CODE S 41-02-09 (1968)]. See also Butcher v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co., 20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d
1352 (1978).
153. Avery v. Aladdin Prods. Div., Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 128 Ga. App. 266, 196 S.E.2d 357
(1973); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Chapman, 129 Ga. App. 830, 201 S.E.2d 686 (1973).
154. This is true except as to a limitation by means of a liquidated damage provision, covered in
section 2-718. See Ray Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Weyrauch, 238 N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1975).
155. The Magnuson-Moss Act, discussed supra at note 2, would be applicable here, but detailed
consideration of its provisions is beyond the scope of this article. See Lester, How to Speak MagnusonMoss: A Primer on the New Federal Warrany Act, 52 FLA. B.J. 301 (1978); Note, Consumer Product
Warranties Under the Magusson-Moss Warranty Act and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 CORNELL L. REv.
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limitation on remedies. Generally speaking, the Code allows the
seller not only to disclaim warranties, but also to limit the remedies
afforded to the buyer in the event of a breach of the warranty given.
Subsection (1)(a) makes it clear, however, that unless "expressly
agreed," the limited remedy is optional and cumulative, rather
than the sole or exclusive remedy. Thus, the first policing tool for
the courts will be a determination that no express agreement was
made as to exclusivity, 15 6 and therefore resort to all potential Code
remedies may be had.
As might be expected, the ingenious drafters of form contracts
can and do readily prevent policing by this method, merely by
inserting a clause indicating an express agreement. The inquiry
then becomes whether "an exclusive or limited remedy [fails] of its
essential purpose,"' 1 57 for, if it does, the parties can retreat to the
general Code remedies. Not surprisingly, this section has been
invoked to allow application of the general remedies under
circumstances in which it would be unconscionable to limit
remedies. The courts, however, invariably rely upon the comment
language rather than upon general rules dealing with
unconscionability:
[Ilt is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least
minimum adequate remedies be available. . . . [Wlhere
an apparently fair and reasonable clause because of
circumstances fails in its purpose or operates to deprive
either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it
158
must give way to the general remedy provisions ....
At least a part of the reason for reliance on the comment to section
2-719 is based upon the time for viewing the transaction. As
indicated earlier, unconscionability is to be determined at the time
of the making of the contract, whereas section 2-719(2) assumes
fairness of the clause at the time of making which becomes unfair
due to later circumstances. Nevertheless, just as courts often strike
down contract clauses as unconscionable which appear to have
been fair at the outset because of later occurrences, so too do they
apply section 2-719 to clauses which were doomed to fail of their
purpose from the outset. 159 However, the vast majority of courts
738 (1977); Note, An Empirical Study of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 31 STAN. L. RE\.. 1117
(1979).
156. Ralston Purina Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 540 F.2d 915 (8th Cir. 1976);
Council Bros. v. Ray Burner Co., 473 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1973); Stream v. Sportscar Salon, Ltd., 91
Misc. 2d 99, 397 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1977); Mott Equity Elevator v. Svihovec, 236 N.W.2d 900 (N.D.
1975).
157. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-98(2) (1968)1.
2
158. U.C.C. § -719, Comment 1.
159. See Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Ala. 1975); Jacobs v. Merto
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considering claims under section 2-719(2) have either implied or
stated that the clause at issue would not be per se unconscionable
absent circumstances which arose after the contract was entered
into. 160
If the courts prefer to employ the lack of express agreement
and failure of essential purpose analysis when the limitation clause
speaks solely to direct damages resulting from a breach, when the
loss is consequential unconscionability analysis comes to the fore.
To the extent that disclaimers of warranty and exclusions of
consequential damages both have as their goal the total insulation
of the seller (as opposed to limiting the buyer's remedy to
predetermined alternatives), a pure unconscionability analysis
based upon fairness, either at the time of making the contract or at
the time of transaction breakdown, is more appropriate than a
purely prospective rule. Thus, section 2-719(3) adopts as the test
for limitation or exclusion of consequential damages the gauge of
unconscionability of the clause. It is here that overlap between
section 2-302 and section 2-719 is most apparent, except that any
attempt to limit consequential damages for personal injury caused
by consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable.
The section in effect allows, if it does not encourage, claims of
unconscionability any time there is a limitation or exclusion of
consequential damages. As would be expected, most assertions of
unconscionability in commercial transactions have been met with
some disdain. 161 By the same token, where personal injury has
occurred, the fact that goods were not consumer goods, but were
commercial goods, has not precluded the imposition of liability, the
courts readily finding
that the exclusion
clauses are2
16
unconscionable, even though not on a prima facie basis.
Although the drafters specifically provided that limitation of
liability for consequential losses in a commercial transaction is not
prima facie unconscionable, when the goods are consumer goods
and the loss is economic courts will generally be more receptive to
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250 (1972); Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575
S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1978); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 265 N.W.2d 513 (1978).
160. See, e.g., Kohlerberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods, Inc., 265 Ark. 584, 510 S.W.2d 555 (1974);
Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1,321 N.E.2d 897 (1974).
161. United States Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 509 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1975);
Cryogenic Equip., Inc. v. Southern Nitrogen, Inc., 490 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1974); Posttapes Assoc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 450 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Boone Valley Coop. Processing Ass'n v.
French Oil Mill Mach. Co., 383 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Raybond Elecs. v. Glen-Mar Door
Mfg. Co., 22 Ariz. App. 409, 528 P.2d 160 (1974); J.D. Pavlak, Ltd. v. William Davies Co., 40 Ill.
App. 3d 1, 351 N.E.2d 243 (1976); Willie v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549
P.2d 903 (1976); Kansas City Structural Steel Co. v. L.G. Barcus & Sons, 217 Kan. 88, 535
P.2d 419 (1975). But see Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90
(1974).
162. See Ford MotorCo. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778(1968).
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damages than to the nonthe consumer who seeks to recover
63
consumer who seeks the same. 1
If one considers the creation and scope of warranties, coupled
with the ability to disclaim them under section 2-316 and the
specific disallowance of unconscionable consequential damage
limitation clauses, a problem is readily apparent: Can the seller, by
failing to give or by effectively disclaiming warranties, insulate
himself from liability for consequential loss which results from
consumer (or other) goods? The answer is uncertain, and the two
respected authors of the primary treatise in the area are in
64
disagreement. 1

The Code drafters apparently intended section 2-316 to
operate independently of section 2-719, thereby enabling sellers to
disclaim all warranties and removing any question of consequential
damages (for if there is no warranty there is no breach, and there
can be no damages, direct or consequential). 165 At the same time,
however, if the seller has made a warranty, he cannot thereafter
limit consequential damages in certain cases. Thus, the intended
scheme would probably allow the seller not to warrant, but if a
warranty was given it would disallow the limitation. On the whole,
the intended Code scheme is a model of fairness, balancing the
seller's rights and responsibilities. The courts have generally
frustrated the drafters' intent, however, in effect making it
impossible to disclaim warranties where the preclusion of
consequential damage recovery for personal injury would thereby
result. In applying general unconscionability analysis under section
2-302, the courts have ignored two Code comments, 166 and, more
importantly, have answered without fully addressing the question
163. See, e.g., Morris v. (2nevrolet Motor Div., 39 Cal. App. id 917, 114 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1974);
.Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250 (1972); McCarty v. E.
.J. Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 347 A.2d 253 (1975); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86
Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975).
164. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 62, at 375-97.
165. Id.
166. The two comments seemingly ignored are comment 2 to section 2-316 and comment 3 to
section 2-719. Comment 2 to section 2-316 provides:
The seller is protected under this Article against false allegations of oral
warranties by its provisions on parol and extrinsic evidence and against unauthorized
representations by the customary "lack of authority" clauses. This Article treats the
limitation or avoidance of consequential damages as a matter of limiting remedies for
breach, separate from the matter of creation of liability under a warranty. If no
warranty exists, there is of course no problem of limiting remedies for breach of
warranty. Under subsection (4) the question of limitation of remedy is governed by the
sections referred to rather than by this section.
U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 2. Comment 3 to section 2-719 provides:
Subsection

(3)

recognizes

the

validity

of clauses

limiting

or

excluding
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whether proper disclaimers can be unconscionable. 167
Two recent cases are illustrative. In Knipp v. Weinbaum, 168 the
plaintiff purchased a used motorcycle from the defendant under
contract terms stating that the motorcycle was sold "as is," thereby
attempting to exclude or disclaim all implied warranties.
Additionally, there did not appear to be any express warranties
relevant to the action. Allegedly due to a defective axle weld, the
motorcycle went out of control and crashed, injuring the plaintiff.
Plaintiff sued, alleging breach of express and implied warranties
and negligence. The lower court granted defendant's motion for
16 9
summary judgment and plaintiff appealed.
1
The court recognized the issue to be whether the "as is"
language operated to disclaim the implied warranties, and in light
of section 2-316(3)(a) there could be little doubt that it would:
"[U nless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties
are excluded by expressions like "as is" . . . which . . .[call] the buyer's
attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there
is no implied warranty." 17 0 The court nevertheless placed emphasis
on the language "unless the circumstances indicate otherwise"
To foreclose consideration of his claim by permitting an
"as is" disclaimer to operate as an automatic absolution of
responsibility through the mechanism of summary
judgment would belie the policy behind [section 2-719(3)]
which states that ... limitation of consequential damages
for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is
17 1
prima facie unconscionable.
From there, it was a small step to find circumstances which
indicated otherwise. For example, the seller may have intended the
"as is" language to refer only to minor defects. Thus, in spite of
the fact that the seller has used appropriate language to completely
disclaim his liability, the court refused to accord him that right,
paying mere lip service to the Code's expressed contemplation that
the seller may in fact fully disclaim implied warranties. It is
arguable that such a construction does more to "belie the policy"
consequential damages but makes it clear that they may not operate in an
unconscionable manner. Actually such terms are merely an allocation of unknown or
undeterminable risks. The seller in all cases is free to disclaim warranties in the
manner provided in Section 2-316.
U.C.C. § 2-719, Comment 3.
167. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 62, at 485; Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The
Emperor'sNew Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
168. 351. So. 2d 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
169. Knipp v. Weinbaum, 351 So. 2d 1081, 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
170. U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (a) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-33(3) (a) (Supp. 1979)] (emphasis
added).
171. 351 So. 2dat 1084.
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behind the Code than would allowing the seller to exculpate himself
completely.

172

If the Knipp court ignored the Code's scheme, thereby
frustrating the drafters' intent, it at least did so directly. The same
cannot be said of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in
Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 173 involving the sale of a motor
home with both a disclaimer of warranties and a limitation of
remedies, and a subsequent myriad of problems with the vehicle.
The warranty disclaimer specifically and properly excluded all
express and implied warranties except an express warranty of
freedom from defects in material and workmanship. It also limited
the buyer's remedy for breach of that warranty to repair or
replacement at the seller's option, and reiterated the exclusion of all
74
other express and implied warranties. 1
The court's result-oriented opinion initially noted the
conceptual differences between disclaimers and limitations, and
determined that the present contract contained both a disclaimer
and a limitation. The court then asserted, without citation or
analysis, that general unconscionability rules could operate to
restrict the seller's ability to disclaim or exclude warranties,
apparently assuming that the potential conflict between sections 2302 and 2-316 had either never existed or had somehow been fully
resolved. It then concluded that the express warranty of freedom
from defects in material and workmanship took precedence over
the disclaimer, a gratuitous conclusion considering that the
contract itself expressly disclaimed only "other" warranties.
Turning its attention to the limitation, the court concluded that if
the limitation were unconsionable it would be deleted, and cited as
authority for this proposition comment 1 to section 2-719.1 7 5 The

concession was made, however, that the clause was not
unconscionable on its face. The clear implication must therefore be
that if it is unconscionable in effect it is equally subject to deletion.
Rather than pursue this rationale, the court based its decision
on the failure of essential purpose, holding that where after
reasonable opportunities to correct defects a seller cannot or does
not do so the limited remedy fails of its purpose.1 76 Although one
cannot readily quarrel with this holding, one may ask the nagging
172. The stated policy underlying the Code is to allow the seller to disclaim all warranties. See
U.C.C. § 2-316, Comments 2, 6-9.
173. 83 Wis. 2d 406, 265 N.W.2d 513 (1978).
174. Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 414-17, 265 N.W.2d 513, 518-20
(1978).
175. Id. at 418-19, 256 N.W.2d at 520.
176. Id. at 421,256 N.W.2d at 523.
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question: Is the court in reality holding that an attempted
disclaimer which also limits remedies is in fact unconscionable,
since it may leave the buyer dissatisfied, thereby equating
unconscionability with failure of essential purpose? If so, it renders
much of sections 2-316 and 2-719 mere surplussage; if not, much of
the opinion is not only unnecessary but is misleading. The clear
impression left by the court is that a seller who properly excludes
warranties and properly limits liability may nevertheless find
himself saddled with full and unlimited liability because of
potential unconscionability. The case is all the more disturbing
because it involves only loss of bargain, and no personal injury.
It is suggested that the proper approach to take in such cases is
to allow the seller to disclaim all warranties, provided it is done
properly, even though the effect is to preclude a buyer from
recovering consequential damages for personal injuries. Such a
result need not offend anyone's sense of justice; presumably the
incidents of the bargain reflect the buyer's willingness to forego any
remedy, for if they do not he would not agree to the sale in the first
place. To increase the safeguards already afforded the buyer
through section 2-316 by engrafting on an unconsionability tendril
would be. appropriate only under the most extraordinary
circumstances. Merely protecting the foolish but aware buyer does
not seem sufficient.
D. EXPRESS WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE
RULE

As indicated earlier, it is virtually impossible to disclaim an
express warranty after making it, although it is less difficult to set
limits on its effect, subject perhaps to doctrines such as
unconscionability and failure of essential purpose.1 77 Nevertheless,
there is one instance in which a disclaimer of an express warranty is
readily accomplished without a great deal of judicial inquiry into
fairness or effect. Although courts have recently begun to question
the propriety of this aspect of the parol evidence rule, it largely
remains true that the existence of certain oral warranties which
precede or accompany the written document containing other
warranties cannot be proved.
Section 2-316(1), as indicated earlier, specifically requires
consistent construction between words creating and negating
warranties unless such a construction is unreasonable, in which
case the words of negation are inoperative.1 78 The section,
177. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
178. See supra text accompanying note 104.
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however, also explicitly subjects evidence concerning the creation
of the warranties to the parol evidence rule, thereby allowing or
possibly causing the words of negation to take precedence. While it
is of course possible that the operation of the parol evidence rule
would benefit the buyer, for instance where a written warranty
exists and the seller seeks to introduce evidence concerning a prior
oral disclaimer, 17 9 in the usual case the section serves as a sellerprotective device.
That there have been only a handful of cases discussing the
admissibility of parol evidence of prior oral warranties is testimony
to the familarity of lawyers with the doctrine and the theories
behind it. Still, in the age of consumerism it can safely be predicted
that more cases are likely to challenge these underlying theories,
and more courts are likely to exhibit a willingness to constrict the
application of the parol evidence rule or undermine it completely.
With that in mind, it is important to examine what the rule, in this
context, does and does not do.
1. Exceptions to the ParolEvidence Rule
The traditional parol evidence formulation bars testimony as
to prior oral or written agreements and contemporaneous oral
agreements which vary or contradict a fully integrated
agreement.1 8 0 In most states, including North Dakota, there are
several exceptions which have been carved out of the doctrine to
avoid unfair or harsh results. Thus, the rule has no application
when the writing relied upon or the integrated agreement is shown
to be invalid because of fraud,18 1 lack of consideration, 8 2 mutual
mistake or accident, 18 3 or other circumstances which prevented the
formation of a binding contract. 18 4 Nor does the rule bar testimony
with respect to subsequent agreements, even though the
subsequent agreement contradicts or varies the writing and without
18 5
regard to whether the subsequent agreement is oral or written.
Finally, at common law an agreement's meaning could be
explained by parol evidence if the language used by the parties was
ambiguous or unclear. 18 6 Of course, this led to cases in which the
179. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Vic Tanny Int'l of Toledo, 46 Ohio App. 2d 137, 346 N.E.2d 330
(1975).
180. See N.D. CENT. COD S 9-06-07 (1975).
181. See Schue v. Jacoby, 162 N.W.2d 377 (N.D. 1968); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Anderson, 155 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968); Carufel v. Kounts, 60 N.D. 91, 232 N.W. 609 (1930).
182. See Erickson v. Wiper, 33 N.D. 193, 157 N.W. 592 (1916).
183. See Larson v. Wood, 75 N.D. 9, 25 N.W.2d 100 (1946); Allgood v. National'Life Iris. C.,
61 N.D. 763, 240 N.W. 874 (1932).
184. See Edwards & McCulloch Lumber Co. v. Baker, 2 N.D. 289, 50 N.W. 718 (1891).
185. SeeJohnson v. Auran, 214 N.W.2d 641 (N.D. 1974) (written); Quinlivan v. Dennstedt
Land Co., 39 N.D. 606,168 N.W. 51 (1918) (oral).
186. See Kennedy v. Falde, 4 Dak. 319, 29 N.W. 667 (1886).
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parties sought, by means of explanation, to vary the terms of the
writing. In some cases they were successful 18 7 and in others they
were not. 188
2. The ParolEvidence Rule and the Code
With the advent of the Uniform Commercial Code, the parol
evidence rule as applied to sales of goods became more flexible,
alleviating some of the problems which had arisen under earlier
statutes. Although most of the traditional exceptions to the parol
evidence rule continue to have vitality under the Code, as a result
of its approach certain exceptions, such as the necessity of an
ambiguity, no longer plague the courts. The intent of the drafters
of the Code was to liberalize the parol evidence rule, theoretically
making it easier to adduce the true intentions of the contracting
parties in light of their commercial understandings. Nevertheless,
tension continues to exist as to the role of written contracts when
assertions of oral agreements are made. Although the Code has
liberalized the rule, courts have generally continued to refuse to
admit evidence of pre-sale warranties, particularly where the
writing mentions warranties.
Under the Code, as under previous law, the application of the
parol evidence rule requires a two-pronged analysis. The first
inquiry is whether the writings of the parties contain the final
expression as to the terms included in the agreement. 189 This
question has been infrequently considered by the courts, and is
raised chiefly when one of the parties insists that the writings of the
parties, although appearing contractual in nature, are still in a
pre-contractual phase. The question of finality is generally one of
fact, 190 and the few cases considering the issue have indicated that
the mere fact that terms are embodied in a writing will not create a
presumption of their finality. 191 Of course, if the issue is resolved by
determining that the writings were not intended to be a final
expression of the terms, then under both the Code and pre-Code
rules parol evidence is admissible, even though it contradicts or
varies the writings. Furthermore, even if the writings embody the
187. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Burke, 8 N.D. 118, 77 N.W. 279 (1898).
188. See, e.g., Baird v. Keitzman, 60 N.D. 317, 233 N.W. 905 (1930); Routier v. Williams, 52
N.D. 793, 204 N.W. 678 (1925).
189. U.C.C. S 2-202 IN.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-09 (1968)].
190. See Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 400 F. Supp. 273 (E.D.
Wis. 1975); cf U.C.C. § 2-202(b) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-09(2) (1968)].
191. See, e.g., Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 400 F. Supp. 273
(E.D. Wis. 1975); Pendleton Grain Growers v. Pedro, 271 Or. 24, 530 P.2d 85 (1975).
A North Dakota case provides a good example of a court skipping over finality to the second
inquiry, that of completeness and exclusivity, when it could merely have determined non-finality. See
Merwin v. Ziebarth, 252 N.W.2d 193 (N.D. 1977).
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final expression of the parties concerning the covered terms (i.e.,
even though a contract has been formed and its terms are set),
under the Code the writings may nevertheless be explained or
supplemented through the parties' course of dealing, 192 course of
performance, 193 and through trade usage. 194 Most courts, however,
have refrained from admitting contradictory, explanatory, or
supplementary usage, dealing, or performance, reasoning that, in
spite of the Code's liberalization, the best gauge of the parties'
contract is the language used. 195 In so doing, these courts have
probably frustrated the Code's scheme, paying mere lip service to
the Code drafters' attempt to cut back on the vitality of the parol
evidence rule and instead applying section 2-202 consistently with
pre-Code law.
In any event, once the determination of finality has been made
the inquiry shifts to a consideration of whether the writings embody
the complete and exclusive statement of all the terms of the parties'
agreement. This, unlike the decision as to finality, is a question of
la v,196 and unless the writings are complete and exclusive,
consistent additional terms may be admitted into evidence. The
determination of completeness and exclusivity depends upon
whether the subject matter of the alleged consistent additional term
would certainly have been included in the writing. 197 Regrettably,
most courts have clung to pre-Code notions that a merger clause
will demonstrate completeness and exclusivity, although a few
courts have rendered decisions more in keeping with the Code. 198
It is here where the parol evidence rule and the express
warranty come into conflict. Typically, the seller makes certain
pre-sale warranties. The buyer and the seller then enter into a
192. Course of dealing is a sequence of conduct between the parties under previous contracts, or
leading up to the instant contract. SeeU.C.C. § 1-205(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-15(1) (1968)].
193. Course of performance is a sequence of conduct between the parties under the instant
contract. U.C.C. § 2-208 [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-15 (1968)].
194. Trade usage is a practice which is regularly observed in the locality, vocation, or trade.
U.C.C. § 1-205(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-15(2) (1968)1. Thus, for example, a provisi'n in a
contract calling for delivery of five hundred tons of stainless steel could be explained by trade usage to
mean up to five hundred tons, thereby raising a factual question as to whether delivery of two
hundred tons constituted a breach. See, e.g., Michael Schiavone & Sons v. Securalloy Co., 312 F.
Supp. 801 (D. Conn. 1970).
195. See, e.g., Southern Concrete Serv. Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581
(N.D. Ga. 1975) (parties' estimate of 70,000 cubic yards of concrete could not be explained to mean
12,542 cubic yards); Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assocs., 38 Md. 144, 380 A.2d 618 (1977)
(prior course of dealing which demonstrated unilateral cancellation privileges could not
"supplement" instant contract with unilateral cancellation term); Peoples Bank & Trust v. Reiff,
256 N.W.2d 336 (N.D. 1977) (alleged oral agreement giving bank priority in secured transaction
inadmissible as course of dealing where writing set forth priority scheme).
196. U.C.C. § 2-202(b) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-09(2) (1968)1.
197. U.C.C. § 2-202, Comment 3.
198. Berk v. Gordon Johnson Co., 232 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1964) (words "Kosher
operation" in contract for sale of poultry processing equipment would be assumed to be an express
warranty, and language of disclaimer in contract would not negate warranty).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

written contract, which usually contains both a disclaimer
provision and a merger clause. Thereafter the buyer discovers that
the product does not meet the standard set by the alleged warranty.
If the buyer can show the prior oral agreement, under section 2316(1) the words of disclaimer will be ineffective and the buyer can
take advantage of the warranty. In order for the buyer to prove the
alleged warranty, however, he must first overcome the disclaimer
and then overcome the merger clause, for even without a disclaimer
not even consistent additional terms may be proved if the writing is
found to be complete and exclusive. In short, the seller, by virtue of
the Code's parol evidence rule, is given complete protection against
not only "false allegations of oral warranties,'' 199 but also against
true allegations of oral warranties. 200 With very few exceptions,
this has meant that even express warranties are not too difficult to
disclaim.
Illustrative of this proposition is Jordan v. Doonan Truck &
Equipment, Inc. 20 1 The plaintiff purchased a used truck from the

defendant, allegedly in reliance on certain express warranties made
prior to the signing of the contract to the effect that certain costly
repairs would not be required for several months. The contract as
signed contained a merger clause indicating that it was complete
and exclusive, and a clause stating, "as is, where is, no warranty."
The plaintiff requested a jury instruction that express warranties
could not be disclaimed, but was refused, allowing the court to
admit the parol evidence. The jury found for the defendant, 02the
plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed. 2
The Jordan court recognized the issue to be whether the parol
evidence was admissible, 20 3 for, if it was not, plaintiff's cause of
action dissipated. Noting the conflict between sections 2-316(1) and
2-202, the court reconciled the two sections with a literal, and
probably correct, reading. The court held that section 2-316 makes
disclaimers ineffective to the extent that they are inconsistent with
20 4
express warranties, but subject to the parol evidence rule.
Therefore, if the agreement is integrated, the parol evidence rule
precludes proof of the oral warranty, notwithstanding the fact that
it and the disclaimer are inconsistent. Finally, the court cited the
comment to section 2-316, and reasoned that the Code's scheme is
designed to accomodate both the seller and the buyer, protecting
199. U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 2.
200. U.C.C. § 2-202 [N.D.CENT. CODE 5 41-02-09(1968)].

201. 220 Kan. 431, 552 P.2d 881 (1976).
202. Jordan v. Doonan Truck & Equip., Inc., 220 Kan. 431, 436, 552 P.2d 881,884 (1976).
203. Id. at 433, 552 P.2d at 883.
204. Id. at 434, 552 P.2d at 883.
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the former from untrue allegations and the latter from surprise. 20 5
Thus, to the extent that the buyer knew of and understood the
disclaimer language he was not surprised, and the parol evidence
rule is applicable.
Although the case is clearly consistent with the Code's
approach, it does little to comfort the buyer who asserts that, in
spite of having read the disclaimer, he assumed that the oral
express warranties were somehow different or not disclaimed. The
court leaves open only the traditional escape hatch: if the buyer can
prove fraud or some other accepted exception, then and only then
can he escape the rigors of the rule.
Other cases have been decided which discuss the two sections,
and for the most part the results have been the same. 20 6 Still, some
courts, perhaps more sensitive to the position of the buyer and the
policy of liberalization embodied in the Code, have concocted
ingenious approaches to circumvent the application of section 2202 to express warranty cases. Thus, although calling or
denominating the representation an express warranty, thereby
showing an inconsistency, is not likely to afford relief, 20 7 a less
direct approach, challenging the finality, completeness, and
exclusivity of the agreement, has been employed with some
success. 20 8 Even here the terms sought to be admitted cannot
contradict any term contained in that part of the agreement which
is complete. 20 9 Thus, there can be no disclaimer clause present
which the alleged warranty would vary. Or can there be?
Take, for example, the case of Drier v. Perfection, Inc. 210 The
plaintiff purchased a printing press from the defendant, who in turn
had purchased it from the manufacturer. Upon delivery of the press
it was discovered to be defective, and for approximately one month
repair efforts were generally unsuccessful. Upon the defendant
corporation president's assurance that they would "make it print
and .. . stand behind that one hundred percent,' '211 plaintiff kept
the machine and signed a security agreement containing a broad
disclaimer of warranty provision. Problems with the machine
continued and, after seven months, plaintiff purchased another
205. Id. at 435, 552 P.2d at 884.
206. See, e.g., Redfern Meats v. Hertz Corp., 134 Ga. App. 381, 215 S.E.2d 10 (1975); FMC
Corp. v. Seal Tape Ltd., 90 Misc. 2d 1043, 396 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1977); Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74
Misc. 2d 402, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1972).
207. See Shore Line Properties, Inc. v. Deer-O-Paints & Chem., Ltd., 24 Ariz. App. 331, 538
P.2d 760 (1975).
208. Michael Schiavone & Sons v. Securalloy Co., 312 F. Supp. 801 (D. Conn. 1970); Symonds
v. Adler Restaurant Equip. Co., 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 808 (Okla. 1969).
209. Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 26 A.D.2d 41,270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966).
210. __
S.D. __
, 259 N.W.2d 496 (1977).
211. Drier v. Perfection, Inc., __
S.D. ... ,

,259 N.W.2d 496, 500 (1977).

558

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

press, declared the contract with defendant at an end, sued, and
recovered ajudgment against defendant for $14,200. On appeal the
judgment was affirmed, with the South Dakota Supreme
Court
2 12
focusing its attack on the finality of the parties' contract.
In Drier, the court first determined that the president's
assurance was an express warranty, and then addressed the
primary question, whether parol evidence was precluded by the
security agreement since it specifically disclaimed all warranties,
including all express warranties. The court construed section 2316(1) to mean that "words or conduct to negate or limit an express
warranty fare] inoperative, subject to the parol evidence rule."
Thus, if the parol evidence rule "does not apply to a writing where
no final expression was intended, any words which limit the express
warranty ...

are inoperative," 2 1 3 and the inquiry must be whether

2 14
the writing was final. Finality is for the trial court to determine,
and since it did not determine the writing to be final the parol
evidence rule, section 2-202, was inapplicable. Section 2-316(1) in
this situation presents no barrier: since there was no determination
of finality, the parol evidence rule is inapplicable and the
inconsistent disclaimer gives way. The only problem with this
rationale is that it probably misinterprets the Code. 2 15 On the other
hand, if what the court is really saying is that the writing was not
final with respect to the terms contained therein, here the warranty
disclaimer, then perhaps the decision is not really a misinterpretation. In order to reach that result, however, it must either
be asserted that the warranty terms had not yet been "ironed out,"
which is highly unlikely, or that the plaintiff could have and would
have insisted on warranties being made, which does not appear to
have been the case. Finally, it may be that the court reasoned that
since the defendant made inconsistent warranty statements it is
precluded from asserting the finality of the agreement as a matter of
law. To the extent that this would virtually always be the case, it
would vitiate the parol evidence rule entirely. That, in fact, appears
to be the result of the court's holding in Drier.

Other courts have reached similar results in far less direct and
more devious manners. Thus, for example, the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina completely ignored the Code in deciding that
evidence of an oral agreement was admissible, relying instead on a
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at__
, 259 N.W.2d at 502-03, 508.
Id. at
, 259 N.W.2d at 503.
Id.
[19661 3 BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE (Sales & Bulk Transfers) S 4-

08[31, at 252-53.
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citation from Corbin on Contracts and the somehow divined intent of
21 6
the parties.
It remains clear that the concepts of completeness and
exclusivity can be legitimately used by the courts to avoid the rigors
of section 2-202. One such instance of legitimate use is Centennial
Insurance Co. v. Vic Tanny International of Toledo, Inc.,217 a case
involving the sale of used sauna equipment. Plaintiffs sought
damages resulting from a fire allegedly caused by a defect in the
goods. The defendant brought a third party claim against its seller,
alleging breach of warranty. The third party defendant was granted
summary judgment, based on the fact that the written contract
could not be varied by evidence of oral express warranties. 21 8 The
writing apparently contained neither a disclaimer nor a merger
clause. The appellate court held that there existed a genuine issue
of material fact which precluded summary judgment, that being
whether the alleged oral warranties were consistent additional
terms. The court properly recognized that even those terms could
not be admitted if the agreement was complete and exclusive, and
implicitly found the agreement not to be integrated. 2 19 The absence
of a merger clause, if not determinative, at least played a significant
part in the court's decision.
In addition to those courts which have used the completeness
and exclusivity escape hatch, some courts have applied more
traditional exceptions to avoid the harshness often mandated by
section 2-202. Thus, for example, fraud which induces a party to
enter into a contract vitiates the contract's validity, and makes the
parol evidence rule unavailable. Illustrative is Ed Fine Oldsmobile,
Inc. v. Knisley, 220 in which the buyer of a used car was permitted to
introduce evidence of prior oral representations that the car had
not been raced when, after purchase, it became apparent that it had
been. 22' In Leveridge v. Notaras,2 22 the court applied the rule that
ambiguous terms may always be explained through parol evidence,
holding that where there was a conflict between a printed form
warranty disclaimer and a handwritten notation of a thirty-day
warranty, parol proof as to the scope of the thirty-day provision was
admissible because the internal inconsistencies created an
216. A & A Discount Center, Inc. v. Sawyer, 27 N.C. App. 528,
-,
219 S.E.2d 532, 53435 (1975) (citing 3 A. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS S 585, at 481 (1960)).
217. 46 Ohio App. 2d 137, 346 N.E.2d 330 (1975).
218. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Vic Tanny Int'l of Toledo, Inc., 46 Ohio App. 2d 137,
-,
346
N.E.2d 330, 334-35 (1975).
219. Id. at ____, 346 N.E.2d at 337.

220. 319 A.2d 33 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
221. Ed Fine Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Knisley, 319 A.2d 33, 36 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
222. 433 P.2d 935 (Okla. 1967).
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ambiguity. 223 Since a finding of ambiguity is not a prerequisite to
the admission of such evidence under the Code, the court could
merely have stated that it was permitting course of performance
evidence to explain the terms. 224 Interestingly, the buyer, although
claiming a warranty, had agreed to pay for certain repairs during
the warranty period. Although evidence of this was admissible,
225
according to the court it was not conclusive.
If, as indicated in Leveridge, an undertaking by the buyer to pay
for repairs is not suggestive of the absence of warranty, then it
would stand to reason that an undertaking by the seller of the
responsibility for repairs should not suggest the existence of a
warranty, particularly in the face of a warranty disclaimer. The
Court of Appeals of Colorado, however, has indicated that this is
not necessarily the case. In O'Neil v. InternationalHarvester Co., 226 the
plaintiff purchased a used truck from defendant after reading the
purchase contract, which contained both a disclaimer provision and
a merger clause. Thereafter, the truck broke down and plaintiff
returned it to defendant, at which time defendant allegedly agreed
to repair it and split the expense. Repair attempts apparently were
unsuccessful, and plaintiff sought to revoke his acceptance. When
defendant refused, plaintiff sued, seeking rescission and damages,
and defendant counterclaimed for the purchase price. 227 Summary
judgment was granted to the defendant, and plaintiff appealed,
alleging that summary judgment was improper because an express
warranty had been made and breached. 228 Because of the merger
clause and the disclaimer, it became necessary to consider whether
evidence of the alleged oral express warranty was admissible, for, if
so, a question of fact would exist, precluding summary judg2 29
ment.
The court first agreed with the defendant that the disclaimer
provision muted implied warranties, and went on to consider
whether it also barred testimony concerning express warranties.
The court, referring to section 2-316(1), indicated that the alleged
express warranties were totally inconsistent with the disclaimer,
and that therefore, subject to section 2-202, the express warranties
would control. 230 The court then noted the difficulty of reconciling
223. Leveridge v. Notaras, 433 P.2d 935, 941 (Okla. 1967).
224. U.C.C. 5 2-202(a) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-09(1) (1968)1.
225. 433 P.2d at 941.
226. 40 Colo. App. 369, 575 P.2d 862 (1978).
227. O'Neil v. International Harvester Co., 40 Colo. App. 369, 371, 575 P.2d 862, 864(1978).
228. Id. at 371, 575 P.2d at 865.
229. Id. at 373, 575 P.2d at 865.
230 Id. at 372, 575 P.2d at 865.
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the two Code sections, and explicitly refused to reach the issue of
whether the alleged oral warranties were admissible. The court
instead held as follows:
Where, as here, the buyer alleges the existence of oral
warranties prior to the execution of the written contract,
as well as conductfollowing the sale (such as a commitment to pay
for certain repairs) which tends to show that warranties were in
fact made, there is a material issue of fact for resolution.
That issue is whether the parties intended the written
contract to be a final expression of this agreement, and if
not, what the terms actually agreed upon by the parties
231
consisted of.
In other words, an exception was carved out of the Code parol
evidence rule, providing that allegations of oral warranty, coupled
with allegations of subsequent conduct which suggest the existence
of the warranty, are sufficient to cast doubt on the finality of the
writing. This is true even though a merger clause is present and the
admitted testimony directly contradicts the writing. It is suggested
that, while it has long been the rule that testimony is generally
admissible to demonstrate non-finality, few courts would go so far
as this one. In effect, the exception has in this case swallowed the
rule, for the court further noted that "under such circumstances,
evidence of both oral warranties and the conduct of the parties
subsequent to signing the contract is admissible for purpose [sic] of
resolving this [fact] issue. ''232
At this point it should be apparent that, although it is the
expressed policy of the Code that express warranties should govern
inconsistent disclaimers, because of the application of the parol
evidence rule prior express warranties often will not be admissible
into evidence. It therefore becomes increasingly possible to in effect
disclaim express warranties, even under circumstances where there
is little doubt that the warranties were made. One of the reasons for
this is the fact that most standard form contracts contain both
disclaimer provisions and integration clauses. Disclaimer
provisions will render evidence of an express warranty inadmissible
as inconsistent, and integration clauses will likely cause a court to
consider the agreement not only final but also complete and
exclusive. It is interesting to note that few cases have adequately
233
analyzed the completeness and exclusivity criteria. The Code
231. Id. at 373, 575 P.2d at 865 (emphasis added).
232. Id.
233. See U.C.C. S 2-202, Comment 3
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apparently requires that the court determine whether, if the alleged
term had been agreed upon, it would certainly have been
included.2 3 4 Although it is generally true that parties to a written
agreement would consider warranties sufficiently important to
include them in a writing, it is obvious that all too often sellers will
make promises or affirmations to induce a sale (intending, of
course, to keep them) which are never reduced to writing and
which are in fact directly contrary to standard form provisions. It is
suggested that in this relatively narrow area the underlying Code
policies of giving effect to express warranties and relaxing the parol
evidence rule can best be furthered by admitting evidence of the
warranty.
E. DAMAGES
1. Damages Under the Code
The Code damage rules for breach of warranty are relatively
straightforward and easy to apply. Where a breach of warranty
exists and is discovered at the time of delivery, the buyer may reject
the goods.2 35 If the buyer rightfully rejects the goods,2 36 he may
either "cover" by procuring substitute goods and thereafter
recover the difference between cover cost and contract price, 237 or
he may bring an action to recover the difference between market
price and contract price, 23 8 which in most cases will be the same as
cover damages. If the buyer discovers or should have discovered
the breach, and it is a breach which would have given him a right to
reject the goods, but he nevertheless did not exercise that right, he
will be deemed to have accepted the goods. 239 If he accepts the
goods, he may still be able to revoke his acceptance if the defect
substantially impairs the value of the goods to the buyer and he
accepted assuming the defect would be corrected and it has not
been. 240 This is also the case if he accepted the goods without
discovering the defect because the defect was difficult to discover or
24 1
the seller assured him that the goods were of acceptable quality.
234. See, e.g., Connerv. May, 444 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
235. See U.C.C. S 2-601, 2-612, 2-508 [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-64, -75, -56 (1968)]. See
generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 62, at 293-324.
236. See U.C.C. :S 2-602, 2-603, 2-604 [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-65 to -67 (1968)].
237. See U.C.C. SS 2-711(1)(a), 2-712(1) & (2) [N.D. CENT. CODE §S 41-02-90(I)(a), -91(1) &
(2) (1968)1. The buyer can also recover consequential or incidental damages, but cannot recover for
expenses that were avoided by virtue of the seller's breach.
238. See U.C.C. §5 2-711(1) (b), 2-713(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE SS 41-02-90(1)(b), -92(1) (1968)1.
Again, consequential or incidental damages are recoverable, and costs avoided are not.
239. See U.C.C. S 2-606(1) (b) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-69(1) (b) (1968)1.
240. U.C.C. S 2-608(1) (a) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-71(1) (a) (1968)1; see Erling v. Homera,
298 N.W.2d 478 (N.D. 1980).
241. U.C.C. 5 2-608 (1) (b) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-71(1) (b) (1968)1.
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If the buyer revokes his acceptance, he may recover damages as set
242
out above with respect to rejected goods.
When the buyer has accepted goods, he must pay for them at
the contract rate. 24 31 After acceptance, he is obligated to notify the
seller of any breach which he has discovered or which he should
have discovered. 244 If he fails to notify the seller within a reasonable
time, the buyer loses any remedy against the seller. 245 Once the
buyer has accepted the goods, discovered the defect, and notified
the seller, he is entitled to damages for the breach of warranty.
Section 2-714(2) specifically sets forth the damages for breach of
warranty as "the difference at the time and place of acceptance
between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would
have had if they had been as warranted, unless special
circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount."
Subsection (3) of section 2-714 codifies the rule that the buyer is
also entitled to recover consequential and incidental damages as
defined in section 2-715.246
It is interesting to note that, while section 2-714(2) deals
specifically with breach of warranty damages, subsection (1), which
is the general damage rule, is, according to the comment to section
2-714, applicable to breaches of warranty as well. 247 That
subsection provides that recoverable damages are to be
"determined in any manner which is reasonable." While no case
has been found which explicitly relies on this dichotomy for
assessing damages differently than on an "as warranted minus as
accepted" basis, a number of decisions exist in which different
damages have been awarded.
2. Direct and ConsequentialDamagesDistinguished
At the heart of the matter is the fundamental, albeit not always
clear, distinction between direct damages and consequential or
indirect damages. Direct damages are generally loss of bargain
damages, those which arise out of the breach itself. Indirect
damages are those which arise as a result of this particular breach
because of circumstances contemplated by the parties at the time
242. U.C.C. § 2-608(3) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-71(3) (1968)].
243. U.C.C. § 2-607(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-70(1) (1968)].
244. U.C.C. S 2-607 (3) (a) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-70(3) (a) (1968)1.
245. Id.
246. U.C.C. §§ 2-714(2) & (3), 2-715 [N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 41-02-93(2) & (3), -94 (1968)].
Incidental damages are basically costs associated with the care and handling of the goods or their
substitutes. Consequential damages are those unavoidable damages which flow from the breach and
which the seller could reasonably have expected to flow from the breach. They include personal and
property damage caused by breach of warranty.
247. U.C.C. S 2-714, Comment 2.
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the contract was entered into.2 48 Although both are recoverable, for
recovery of consequential damages the plaintiff must prove not only
the breach and the injury caused thereby, but that the injury was
one which could have been foreseen or contemplated by the seller.
Thus, for example, lost profits,2 49 loss of use damages, 250 personal
injury or property injury damages, and a whole range of other
consequential damages will be properly recoverable if they can be
proven and if they can be shown to have been foreseeable. These
foreseeability questions do not generally arise with direct damages,
or, more properly, foreseeability is clearly present with direct
damages, because those damages are expected and likely to follow
51
any breach of like character.
3. Measures of Damages: Special Circumstances
Because both types of damages are recoverable, it would not
seem terribly important to distinguish between them. The Code
scheme has caused some confusion, however, because it allows at
least four measures of damage under section 2-714 when a breach
of warranty has occurred. By far the most common measure of
damages is that suggested in subsection (2), the difference in value
rule. 252 However, the Code also allows damages to be determined
in any other reasonable manner. 253 Moreover, even subsection (2)
248. See Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md. 277, 329 A.2d 28 (1974); Kleven v.
Geigy Agricultural Chem., 303 Minn. 320, 227 N.W.2d 566 (1975).
249. See Multivision Northwest, Inc. v.Jerrold Elec. Corp., 356 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ga. 1972);
Bemidji Sales Barn, Inc. v. Chatfield, 312 Minn. 11,250 N.W.2d 185 (1977).
250. See McGrady v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 46 111. App. 3d 136, 360 N.E.2d 818 (1977).
251. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES S 8, at 32-34 (1935). The
sale of a car that is defective will result in damages equal to the amount that the defect lowers the
value. In other words, if the car without the defect is worth $5,000, and with the defect only $4,000,
the damages would be $1,000. Ordinarily the relative values will be determined by market price,
which would depend on what costs were associated with repairing the car. This has led many courts
to substitute cost of repair for the primary measure of damages set out in section 2-714(2). In any
event, if the defect rendered the car unusable, for example, consequential damages might also be
recoverable, depending upon what damages could have been foreseen. In brief, the distinction
between consequential and general damages may be said to be whether the damages are such as
ordinarily flow from a breach of that character, or are less usual.
252. See, e.g., Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977); Courtesy
Motor Sales, Inc. v. Farrior, 53 Ala. App. 94,
-,
298 So. 2d 26, 34 (1974); Thompson
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Myers, 48 Ala. App. 350, 264 So. 2d 893 (1972); Union Motors, Inc. v.
Phillips, 241 Ark. 857, 410 S.W.2d 747 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Gunn, 123 Ga. App. 550, 181
S.E.2d 694 (1971); McGrady v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 46 111. App. 3d 136, 360 N.E.2d 818 (1977);
Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v. Bailey, 154 Ind. App. 632, 291 N.E.2d 92 (1972); Arnold v. Ford
Motor Co., 90 N.M. 549, 566 P.2d 98 (1977); Eckstein v. Cummins, 46 Ohio App. 2d 192, 347
N.E.2d 549 (1975); K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303. 263 A.2d 390 (1970);
Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 89 S.D. 497, 234 N.W.2d 38 (1975).
253. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
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allows the calculation to be based upon a different standard where
"special circumstances show proximate damages of a different
amount. ' 2 54 This language has confused courts, leading many to
commingle the special circumstance language with the "proper
case" language in subsection (3). Subsection (3) provides that, in a
proper case, consequential and incidental damages are also
recoverable 255
Thus, for example, in Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 256 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that the fact
that oil produced by the defendant had been worth what plaintiff
had paid for it, but was nevertheless not as warranted, was a special
circumstance which made the damages due the plaintiff different
from the standard measure. 257 The difference in the measure of
damages was to be the addition of consequential and incidental
damages. The court based its reasoning on the fact that the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose had been breached, and
that therefore the oil was of good quality but simply not as
warranted. It is suggested that this conclusion misses the point of
the special circumstances language.
In Lewis, the defendant supplied oil for use in plaintiff's
machine under circumstances in which the particular purpose
warranty was created. The oil did not work in the 'machine,
apparently because it lacked an essential additive. This caused the
plaintiff to incur substantial costs. In finding that special
circumstances were present and that the standard measure of
damages was therefore inapplicable, the court made one
fundamental misstatement: that the plaintiff "did not pay a price
exceeding the value of the goods delivered. "258 In other words, the
goods delivered were worth what they would have been worth had
they been as warranted. Therefore, a special circumstance was
present. Such reasoning is not unattractive, but it misses the mark.
Had the oil been as warranted, it would have been worth what the
plaintiff paid, but as delivered it was worthless, since it could not be
used in plaintiff's machine. Therefore, the standard damages could
have been given to plaintiff, and it could then have been
determined whether this was a proper case for incidental and
consequential damages. The court did allow recovery for
consequential and incidental loss, but apparently felt that it could
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

U.C.C. 5 2-714(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-93(2)(1968)1.
U.C.C. 5 2-714 (3) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-93(3) (1968)].
438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971).
Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 507 (8th Cir. 1971).
Id.
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not have done so absent the special circumstances language. 259
Other cases equating special circumstances with a proper case
for incidental and consequential damages abound. 260 In one
jurisdiction, Pennsylvania, the special circumstances-proper case
question has come full circle, beginning in 1963 with a case which
equated the two, and ending in 1977 with a case which more
26 1
correctly interprets the Code. Keystone. Diesel Engine Co. v. Irwin
involved the question whether the buyer of a diesel engine could
recover lost profits occasioned by a breach, clearly a question of
consequential damages. In holding that the buyer could not recover
lost profits, the court indicated that special circumstances would
exist where the buyer communicated enough facts to the seller to
262
bring the subsequent damages within the parties' contemplation.
In other words, special circumstances must exist before
consequential damages are recoverable.
This led a number of courts applying Pennsylvania law to
conclude that consequential damages would not be recoverable
absent special circumstances, thereby reading the "proper case"
language of section 2-714(3) out of the Code. Illustrative is R.I.
Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement Products Corp.2 63 In that case, the
plaintiff sold cement blocks to the defendant over a period of
several years. After switching to a new type of block at the request
of the defendant, plaintiff experienced difficulty in manufacturing,
which resulted in defective blocks. Defendant refused to pay for
them, claiming that plaintiff was responsible not only for the
defective blocks but for damages which resulted from their use, and
plaintiff sued for the purchase price. Defendant counterclaimed,
and at trial plaintiff was awarded the price, offset by defendant's
direct damages. The trial court, however, refused to award
damages to defendant for six other items of consequential injury,
and it was from this refusal that defendant appealed. The Superior
Court of Pennsylvania reversed in part, holding that at least four
items of damages for which recovery had been denied could in fact
264
be recovered.
259. Id. at 508.
260. See, e.g., Acme Pump Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 32 Conn. Supp. 69, 337 A.2d
672 (C.P. 1974) (special circumstances allow buyer to recover consequential damages for litigation
costs); Murray v. Kleen Leen, Inc., 41 Ill. App. 3d 436, 354 N.E.2d 415 (1976); Adams v. J.I. Case
Co., 124 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970) (communication by buyer to seller of particular needs
sufficient to show special circumstances and allow buyer to recover consequential damages for lost
profits); General Supply & Equip. Co. v. Phillips, 490 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.Civ. App. 1972); Air Prods.
&Chem., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
261. 411 Pa. 222, 191 A.2d 376 (1963).
262. Keystone Diesel Engine Co. v. Irwin, 411 Pa. 222, __,
191 A.2d 376, 378 (1963).
263. 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 242, 336 A.2d 397 (1975).
264. R.I. Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement Prods. Corp., 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 242, __
, 336
A.2d 397, 398 (1975).
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The court first explored briefly the quandary which had
existed in Pennsylvania since Keystone, noting that Keystone could
have been decided without any reference whatsoever to the special
circumstances language. 265 The court also invited the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to clarify what would constitute a proper case for
consequential damages. 266 In spite of recognizing that use of the
special circumstances language would be inappropriate in a
consequential damage decision, the court determined again that
foreknowledge was a special circumstance which allowed recovery
of consequential damages. 267 Plaintiff appealed, and the supreme
court did in fact clarify the Pennsylvania rule. 268

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in effect overruled
Keystone, thereby properly applying the Code. It reasoned that the
special circumstances language of section 2-714(2) does not concern
itself with consequential damages, but rather is concerned with
"value

of the goods damages.

' 269

Therefore,

one may clearly

recover consequential or incidental damages absent a showing of
special circumstances, so long as it is a "proper case" for their
recovery. Whether it is a "proper case" depends solely upon
whether the seller "had reason to know" the buyer's need. 2 70 Since
the plaintiff clearly did have such reason to know, he was
responsible, and the superior court's decision was affirmed.
It is thu's apparent that the "special circumstances" language
of section 2-714(2) is not to be equated with the "proper case"
language of subsection (3). Unfortunately, in deciding this issue the
Pennsylvania court went no further; it did not indicate either what
special circumstances might be or when they might alter the
general damages rules. There are, however, a few cases in which
courts have considered these questions.
Two of the cases, from New York2 71 and North Dakota ,272
dealt with breach of the warranty of title, and have been previously
discussed by this author. 273 These cases concluded that in a breach
of warranty of title case courts would likely invoke the special
circumstances language to lower damages, thereby avoiding what
appears to be a windfall in favor of the buyer. 21 4 There appears to
265. Id. at__,
336A.2d at 403.
266. Id.
267. Id. at __,336 A.2d at 404.
268. R.I. Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement Prods. Corp., 474 Pa. 199, 378 A.2d 288 (1977).
269. Id. at__
, 378 A.2d at 291 (emphasis in original).
270. Id. See U.C.C. 5 2-715(2) (a) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-94(2) (a) (1968)].
271. Itoh v. Kimi Sales Ltd., 74 Misc. 2d 402,345 N.Y.S.2d 416 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973).
272. Schneidt v. Absey Motors, Inc., 248 N.W.2d 792 (N.D. 1976).
273. See Lord, Some Thoughts About Warranty Law in North Dakota, Part I The Warranty of Title, 53
N.D.L. REV. 537, 544-66 (1977).
274. If the seller has no title and sells a chattel valued at $5,000 to a buyer, the breach of

568

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

be only one other case which suggests another circumstance
sufficiently special to avoid the general damage rule. In Downs v.
Shouse, 27 decided by the Court of Appeals of Arizona, plaintiffs
purchased a used airplane from defendant, relying in part upon
certain express warranties regarding the plane's condition and the
oil consumption of the plane. The plane was damaged, allegedly
due to mechanical problems which amounted to a breach of
warranty, and plaintiffs refused to pay defendant a portion of the
purchase price still owed ($1,500). Defendant thereupon removed
certain equipment from the plane, and plaintiffs sued to replevy the
equipment and to recover damages for breach of warranty.
Judgment was rendered for plaintiffs on the breach of warranty
claim for $128.68, and- against defendant on its counterclaim for
27 6
$1,500. The defendant appealed.
After determining that there had been a warranty and that it
had been breached, the court considered the question of damages.
The defendant argued that the record showed no evidence of the
market value of the plane, so that the damages awarded were based
on an improper calculation. 2 77 The court, however, after noting
that damages were ordinarily to be assessed at value as warranted
minus value as delivered, indicated that that measure "is not
exclusive of the buyer's remedies where the property is not totally
destroyed. If by reasonable expenditure goods may be made to
conform to the warranty, the amount of such expenditure may be
the measure of such damages. ' 278 In other words, special
circumstances exist either when no proof of actual value is given, or
279
when the goods have been repaired.
Therefore, special circumstances, calling for the application of
other than the standard damage measure, will be deemed to exist in
three or perhaps four situations. First, in warranty of title cases,
courts are likely to hold special circumstances extant; second,
special circumstances will exist where the loss is occasioned
subjectively but not objectively, 28 0 that is, where the ojective loss in
warranty would occur at that point, giving the buyer the difference between the value as warranted
($5,000) and as delivered ($0). If the buyer has had the use of the chattel for a period of time,
however, he has been enriched by that use. Therefore, courts will often give the buyer damages
based upon the value of the chattel when the buyer is dispossessed, which in most cases will be
significantly lower.
275. 18 Ariz. App. 225, 501 P.2d 401 (1972).
276. Downs v. Shouse, 18 Ariz. App. 225, __,
501 P.2d 401,403-04 (1972).
277. Id. at
,501 P.2d at 406.
278. Id.
279. See alsoS.H. Nevers Corp. v. Husky Hydraulics, Inc., 408 A.2d 676, 681 (Me. 1979) (cost
of repairs can be used as a yardstick to gauge the difference in value between goods as warranted and
as received).
280. Some commentators believe this is the only situation in which special circumstances should
be held to exist. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 62, at 383.
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value is different from the subjective loss in value; 28 1 third, special
circumstances will exist where there otherwise might be no recovery
at all because of a lack of proof; and, finally, special circumstances
may be deemed to exist where the goods are repaired, with the
28 2
repair costs normally being equated with the loss in value.
Thus, there are four measures of damage possible in a breach
of warranty case, and an effort should be made to keep them
distinct. 283 The Code's policy of liberality can be well implemented
by assessing damages generally on the basis of value as warranted
minus value as delivered. Where, however, such a meaure does not
adequately compensate or threatens to overcompensate the buyer,
other damages are appropriate, measured in any reasonable
manner. By invoking the special circumstances language, a court
may respond to any particular situation in which it finds itself.
Finally, in most cases, the award of consequential or incidental
damages will also be appropriate.
4. The PrimaryDamage Rule and Cost of Repair
Although much has been said about the other measures of
damage, it is necessary to discuss the primary breach of warranty
measure, which is the difference between the value of the goods as
warranted and as delivered. The standard is basically objective,
and remarkably simple to apply. Nevertheless, a number of cases
have shown a marked preference for cost of repair damages. 28 4 As
indicated earlier, these two figures may often coincide, and there
would thus seem to be little harm in applying the cost of repair
standard. This repair figure is particularly useful where there is
little or no evidence as to the market value of the goods as
281. Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971).
282. A recent Iowa case has indicated that special circumstances might also exist where the
defect is latent and its scope is not feasibly discoverable. In that case, damages are to be assessed at a
later time, with reference not solely to difference in value but also to plaintiff's costs in attempting to
rectify the problem. Holm v. Hansen, 248 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 1976). In Holm, defendant sold
plaintiff cattle, some of which were infected with brucellosis, which plaintiff subsequently discovered.
Plaintiff, rather than segregate the cattle known to be infected, maintained the herd, attempting to
treat all of the cows. Id. at 505. The Supreme Court of Iowa held that plaintiff had shown special
circumstances which entitled him to other than standard damages. Id. at 510. This may suggest
another special circumstance, or a combination, where the loss is subjective and "repairs" are
attempted. It may also be that the cost ofunsuccessful repairs is merely an incidental damage item.
283. While four measures of damage are standard, recent developments in warranty law suggest
that a fifth measure, punitive damages, may be allowable under some circumstances, although as a
general rule punitive damages for breach of contract are not allowed. When breach of an express
warranty for a stepladder resulted in personal injuries, the court in Cantrell v. Amarillo Hardware
Co., 226 Kan. 681, 602 P.2d 1326 (1979), found punitive damages awarded in the amount of
$18,500 were not excessive, and upheld the award. Punitive damages may be allowed in cases of
gross neglect, or in cases where the goods are so severely defective that an award of punitive damages
is reasonable in light of the evidence presented. Coyle Chevrolet Co. %,.Carrier, __
Ind. App.
__,
397 N.E.2d 1283 (1979). This type of award suggests yet another special circumstance
where punishment or deterrence is a goal.
284. See infra note 285.
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warranted or as delivered,2 85 but plaintiffs should be aware that not
all courts look favorably upon the use of the repair figure. Thus, for
example, in Bergenstock v. Lemay's G.M. C., Inc., 286 the trial court
directed a verdict for the defendant, holding that plaintiff had failed
to demonstrate the proper measure of damages when the primary
evidence admitted was directed toward establishing cost of repair.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the lower court should
have inferred the fair market value of the chattel from the sum
received at a forced sale. 287 Nevertheless, the case stands as a
reminder to future litigants that not all courts will welcome the cost
of repair figure.
One of the quirks of the standard measure of damages is that
the ascertainment of value is to occur as of the time of acceptance,
and not at some earlier point. While ordinarily this will coincide
rather closely with the actual delivery date, it need not always.
Because acceptance under the Code will generally occur only after
288
the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods,
it is possible that the value of the goods might decrease between
actual delivery and acceptance. To the extent that the buyer takes
advantage of the reasonable opportunity to inspect prior to
acceptance, and then decides to accept the goods in spite of a
discovered breach of warranty and seek damages instead, he should
not be charged with the loss in value caused by his use during the
inspection period. 289 Similarly, cases which insist upon the buyer
demonstrating the existence of the breaching defect at the time of
delivery are probably in error, since the critical time frame is
probably later. 290 Nevertheless, because a determination of the
time of acceptance is a question of fact, 29 1 and because many courts
might balk at the prospect of unjustly enriching a buyer, the time of
delivery is often substituted for the time of acceptance.
One other quirk of the Code scheme is worthy of particular
285. See Tarter v. Monark Boat Co., 430 F. Supp. 1290 (E.D. Mo. 1977), a/t'd, 574 F.2d 984
(8th Cir. 1978). See also Cagney v. Cohn, 13 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 998 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1977); S.H.
S.D.
Nevers Corp. v. Husky Hydraulics, Inc., 408 A.2d 676 (Me. 1979); Carlson v. Rysavy, __
___
262 N.W.2d 27 (1977).
286. 118 R.I. 75, 372 A.2d 69(1977).
__,
372 A.2d 69, 75 (1977).
287. Bergenstock v. Lemay's G.M.C., Inc., 118 R.I. 75,
288. U.C.C. S 2-606 [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-69 (1968)].
289. Although no cases have been found, one can readily imagine a case where a chattel declines
in value immediately upon purchase, such as a car, and declines further with use, so that after an
appropriate inspection period the value as accepted is diminished by factors other than merely the
defect. Under those circumstances the buyer might be better offrejecting the goods, particularly if he
is to be charged with the loss in value attributed to depreciation and use. To the extent that the value
of a like chattel without the defect would have declined a like amount, he does, in effect, pay for his
use of the chattel. Cf U.C.C. 5 2-608(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-71(2) (1968)] (revocation of
acceptance must occur before substantial change in condition of goods not caused by the defect).
290. See, e.g., Blade v. Sloan, 108 111. App. 2d 397, 248 N.E.2d 142 (1969).
291. See La Villa Fair v. Lewis Carpet Mills, Inc., 219 Kan. 395, 548 P.2d 825 (1976).
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note. The damage rule embodied in section 2-714 does not
necessarily relate to the contract or list price, but rather is to be
applied according to the value of goods as warranted and as
accepted. 292 Thus, for example, where the buyer of a mobile home
purchased it for $5,300, and it was discovered to be defective and
worth only $2,000, the damage award was not $3,300. Rather, the
award was $4,000, representing the difference between the value of
the mobile home if it had been as warranted and the value as
delivered and accepted. 293 The theory behind this award is that the
disappointed buyer should not be penalized for having made a good
bargain, 294 and is therefore entitled to the higher damage figure.
The rule seems justifiable if for no other reason than that the buyer,
if he is now to seek an equivalent, will in all probability have to
expend at least that much on the open market. 295 Nevertheless, an
argument can be made that, because the buyer in fact made a good
bargain, his actual damages are best reflected by the difference
between purchase price and value, thereby suggesting yet another
"special circumstance" showing proximate damages of a different
amount than the standard measure. On the whole, however, most
courts have insisted on a determination of fair market value on the
relevant dates, 296 although some are willing to assert that the
297
purchase price is prima facie evidence of value.
III. IMPLIED WARRANTIES
Thus far the focus of this article has been on the creation of
and consequences attendant to express warranties. As the focus
shifts to implied warranties, it should be remembered that what has
been said with respect to damages and to remedies and their
limitations will apply to implied warranties as well.
Generally there are three implied warranties which may arise
from the sale of goods under the Code. The practitioner will
undoubtedly be familiar with two of these, but the third may be
unfamiliar to many attorneys. The -three are the warranty of
merchantability (often confusingly called the warranty of fitness or
292. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-93(2) (1968)].
293. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Morrison, 502 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). See also K &
C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 263 A.2d 390 (1970); Carlson v. Rysavy,
S.D.
., 262 N.W.2d 27 (1978); Fredrick v. Dreyer, __
S.D. __
, 257 N.W.2d 835
(1977).
294. See K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 263 A.2d 390 (1970).
295. Of course, this justification diminishes as the period between original purchase and
discovery of the defect shortens. This is presumably so because the buyer could get a "good deal"
elsewhere. Likewise, the longer the period between acceptance and judgment, the less likely the
buyer will be able to use the damage award to replace the defective good.
296. See supra cases cited in note 293.
297. See,e.g., K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303. 263 A.2d 390 (1970).
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general fitness), the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,
and those warranties which arise between the parties from their
course of dealing or usage of trade.
A.

WARRANTIES ARISING FROM COURSE OF DEALING OR USAGE

OF TRADE

1. Creation of Implied Warranties by Course of Dealing or Usage
of Trade
Probably the most often overlooked implied warranties are
those which arise from the parties' course of dealing 298 or from

trade usage. 299 Section 2-314, which also details the general
warranty of merchantability, specifically includes the availability of
virtually an unlimited number of warranties. Section 2-314(3)
provides a panoply of unnamed implied warranties which are
capable of being created through dealing or usage, and implies that
these warranties are subject to exclusion or modification as,
permitted by section 2-316.300 While it appears clear that usage and
dealing can properly be used to explain or supplement the general
warranty of merchantability, thus giving content and form to the
seller's obligations generally under section 2-314, it seems equally
clear that such a reading of the Code tends to diminish the effect of
the specificity of section 2-314(3). In other words, unless there are
instances where implied warranties exist other than !as an adjunct to
the general merchantability warranty, it would seem that
subsection (3) is superfluous. Such a reading ignores both the clear
language of the statute and the rule of statutory construction which
favors interpretation designed to give effect to each word or phrase
in a statute.3 0 1 Nevertheless, either because litigants have failed to
298. U.C.C. S 1-205(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-01-15(1) (1968)]. Section 1-205(1) defines
course of dealing as a "sequence of previous conduct between the parties . . . which . . . [establishes]
a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct." Section 1205(3) provides that course of dealing is to supplement generally the terms of the parties' agreement.
Course of dealing, which involves these same parties against a backdrop of prior contracts or
transactions, is not to be confused with course of performance, which envisions conduct within a
particular transaction. See U.C.C. S 2-208 [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-15 (1968)].
299. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-15(2) (1968)]. Section 1-205(2) defines
usage of trade as "any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance . . . as to
justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." The
question whether a usage of trade exists and what its boundaries are is a fact question, and any
applicable usage is to be employed to supplement the parties' agreement generally.
300. Section 2-314(3) provides: "Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied
warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade." U.C.C. S 2-314(3) [N.D. CENT.
CODES 41-02-31(3) (1968)].
Subsections (b) and (c) of section 2-316(3) deal generally with exclusion of all implied
warranties. Section 2-316(3) (c) is of particular note, and provides that "[ain implied warranty can
also be excluded or modified by course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade."
U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (c) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33(3) (c) (Supp. 1979)]. Interestingly, it appears
that course of performance can operate to exclude or modify an implied warranty but not to create
one. Cf infra notes 358-60 and accompanying text.
301. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 1-02-07 (1975). See also Wallenstinson v. Williams County, 101
N.W.2d 571, 577 (N.D. 1960).
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raise independent warranties or because courts have failed to
address them, very few cases are to be found which discuss implied
30 2
warranties actually created by dealing or usage.
Perhaps the best examples of such cases are two lower state
court decisions from 1970. Gindy Manufacturing Corp. v. Cardinale
Trucking Corp.303 involved the sale of twenty-five new semi-trailers
by plaintiff to *defendant, a subsequent default on the installment
obligation, repossession by the seller, and an attempt to obtain a
deficiency judgment against the buyer. The defendant buyer raised
a defense of breach of warranty, in spite of a warranty disclaimer
indicating that the sale of the trucks was "as is." Among other
questions presented to the court were whether there existed a
warranty created by trade usage or course of dealing, and whether
the "as is" disclaimer would be effective to exclude such implied
warranties. 30 4 The defendant claimed that both usage of trade and a
course of dealing covering twenty years precluded the inclusion of
an "as is" clause in the contract, and in fact created warranties
ancillary to the warranty of merchantability. Specifically, the
defendant contended that there was a trade usage to the effect that
manufacturing defects would be repaired by the seller, and that a
course of dealing between the parties had in fact incorporated that
usage. 30 5 The court, accepting for the purpose of a motion for
summary judgment the truth of the defendant's allegations,
indicated:
Repairs undertaken by plaintiff, the usage of trade and
prior dealings of the parties offer strong evidence of
plaintiff's obligation to make such repairs, whether in
satisfaction of an implied warranty of merchantability or
in satisfaction of a stricter implied warranty claimed by
defendant under [section 2-314(3)] . . . , namely, an
implied warranty to repair all defects in manufacture
regardless of their seriousness. . . . Accordingly, unless
properly disclaimed ... there arose in this transaction an
implied warranty . . . to accept responsibility for defects
302. See infra notes 303-22 and accompanying text.
303. 111 N.J. Super. 383, 268 A.2d 345 (1970).
304. Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383, -,
268 A.2d
345,346(1970).
305. Id. at __
, 268 A.2d at 349. The defendant also alleged a course of performance
whereby the plaintiff had undertaken the responsibility of such repairs in this case. The court, rather
than answer the more difficult question of whether course of performance could create warranties, see
supra note 300, responded by stating that course of performance was relevant to interpreting the
agreement under section 2-208. 111 NJ. Super. at __.
268 A.2d at 349.
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in manufacture at least to the extent of repair or
3 06

replacement.

It is important to note that this warranty, implied by usage of trade
and course of dealing, existed without regard to the question of
whether the warranty of merchantability existed, had been
disclaimed, or had even been breached. The court concluded that,
because the "as is" clause was inconspicuous, it did not effectively
30
disclaim this warranty.

7

The court then faced an even more perplexing problem,
whether, without regard to the inconspicuousness of the "as is"
clause as it affected the warranty of merchantability, such a clause
could operate to exclude the warranty implied by usage and
dealing. Confronted with the clear language of section 2-316(3)
(a), 30 8 which specifies that all implied warranties are disclaimed by
an "as is" term "unless the circumstances indicate otherwise,"
and the equally clear statement in section 2-314 that warranties
created by usage and dealing are subject to exclusion, the court
seemingly had little choice but to concede that the disclaimer should
be given effect. With remarkable footwork, however, the court
concluded that the trade usage and course of dealing which had
initially created the warranties also constituted circumstances
which would indicate that the disclaimer was expected not to
apply. 30

9

In

other words,

since usage and dealing created a

warranty on the part of the seller to repair new goods, "[a] buyer
could reasonably expect that the ["as is" clause] was to apply only
when the form contract was employed in the sale of used
vehicles. "310 Thus, not only do usage and dealing create
warranties, but they also provide circumstances surrounding the
transaction which make it difficult to disclaim those warranties.
This, of course, nullifies the effect of a general or broad
disclaimer clause, at least insofar as usage and dealing warranties
are concerned. While it appears at first glance to conflict with the
explicit language of section 2-316(3) (a), the decision is probably
306. 111 NJ.Super. at__,
307. Id. at __

268 A.2d at 349.

, 268 A.2d at 353-54.

308. Section 2-316(3) (a) provides:
[Uinless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by
expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or other language which in common
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes
plain that there is no implied warranty ....
U.C.C. S 2-316(3) (a) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33 (3) (a) (Supp. 1979)].
309. 111 N.J. Super. at __
,268 A.2d at 353.
310. Id.
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legitimate. When one of the parties invokes usage or dealing, what
he is saying is that he contracted in reference to those things, as did
the other party, justifying the need for something more explicit
than a blanket disclaimer to exclude them. On the other hand, it
should not be impossible for the seller to exclude trade usage or
course of dealing from the specific contract if such an exclusion is in
fact intended and bargained for. It seems clear that a specific
disclaimer or exclusion, directed at trade usage and course of
dealing, would be given effect. Further, if there are other objective
indicia that the parties intended to exclude course of dealing and
usage of trade, 3 11 these could be shown to negate any warranty
which might otherwise arise. It does seem likely, however, that any
true or apparent conflict between the existence of a warranty and its
exclusion will be resolved in favor of the existence of the warranty.
In Adams v.J.. Case Co., 31 2 the reference to usage and dealing
is less clear. The plaintiff had purchased a tractor from defendant,
signing a contract which disclaimed all warranties except an
express warranty to repair or replace defective parts, and which
excluded liability for all other damages, including consequential
loss. Plaintiff's primary contention was that the tractor was
defective, and that the defendant was "wilfully dilatory" in making
repairs, thereby not only breaching the express warranty but also
breaching an implied warranty, created by course of dealing and
usage of trade, that repairs would be effected promptly and within a
reasonable time. 313 Plaintiff also argued that, because of this
breach, he was entitled to consequential damages for lost hours, or
down time, notwithstanding the express provision barring recovery
for consequential loss, 31 4 the theory apparently being that the
failure to abide by the terms of the express warranty, in breaching
the implied warranty, negated the exclusion. The court accepted
31 5
the plaintiff's arguments.
Aside from the fact that resort to such a complicated argument
was probably unnecessary because of section 2-719(2),316 the
court's approach and reasoning are acceptable, since the case arose
311. For example, factors such as a lower price, used goods, discussions during negotiations, a
marked departure in the other contract terms from prior contracts, or a marked departure from
industry-wide forms or practices with respect to other aspects of the contract would all be useful in
determining whether the parties intended to contract with reference to dealing or usage.
312. 125 Il.App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970).
313. Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill.
App. 2d 388, 392, 403, 261 N.E.2d 1, 3, 8 (1970). Also
raised by plaintiff was the argument that the limitation of remedy clause failed of its essential
purpose, thereby allowing resort to Code remedies generally under section 2-719(2). Id. at 402-03,
261 N.E.2d at 7-8.
314. Id. at 404, 261 N.E.2d at 8.
315. Id. at 406, 261 N.E.2d at 9.
316. "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose,
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in the context of a motion to dismiss and plaintiff's allegations were
therefore accepted as true. Conceding that the defendant could
legitimately restrict its liability, the Adams court nevertheless had to
determine whether the defendant had met its responsibility under
the restrictive warranty it gave. 3 17 This, in turn, would depend
upon whether repair or replacement had occurred within an
appropriate time. Since the warranty of repair or replacement
contained no time limit within which the defendant was bound 3to
18
perform, defendant was bound to act within a reasonable time.
In order to determine this reasonable time, resort could be had to
course of dealing and usage of trade 3 19 to determine what these
parties had in fact viewed as an appropriate time frame within
which to repair or replace and what others in the trade would
consider a reasonable time. This evidence not only establishes the
contours of the parties' agreement, thereby acting as an
interpretive device, but also implies a warranty or promise that the
defendant will in fact repair or replace within the discovered time
frame or be liable for breach. Therefore, if the plaintiff can
establish that prior dealings resulted in a repair-replacement time
frame expectation of one week, or that there was a trade usage that
similar repairs would be effected within one week, a warranty
would be implied that the defendant would perform within the oneweek period. Moreover, this is true regardless of the exclusion,
since by failing to live up to the express warranty as interpreted by
trade usage and course of dealing the defendant had committed a
breach, and the exclusion is invalid, making implication of the
warranty permissible.
It should be apparent that usage and dealing therefore carry a
dual burden, as interpretive devices and creating implied
warranties. It should also be apparent that courts will not take
remedy may be had as provided in.t.his Act." U.C.C. S 2-719(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-98(2)

(1968)].
317. 125 Il1. App. 2d at 402-03, 261 N.E.2d at 7-8.
318. Id. at 403, 261 N.E.2d at 8. Section 2-309(1) provides: "The time for shipment or delivery
or any other action under a contract if not provided in this Article or agreed upon shall be a
reasonable time." See also Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977) (a limited
remedy fails of its essential purpose when the seller fails to repair the goods within a reasonable time).
In Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D.C. Del. 1973), the court noted that the
purpose of the exclusive remedy is to give the buyer goods that conform to the contract within a
reasonable time after a defective part is discovered. When a warrantor fails to correct the defect as
promised within a reasonable time, he is liable for a breach of warranty. The limited, exclusive
remedy fails of its purpose, and is thus avoided under section 2-719(2) whenever the warrantor fails
to correct the defect within a reasonable period. See also Ford Motor Co. v. Gunn, 123 Ga. App. 550,
181 S.E.2d 694 (1971) (it is the refusal to remedy within a reasonable time or lack of success in the
attempts to remedy which would constitute a breach of warranty).
319. Under section 1-204(2), a reasonable time is to be determined according to "the nature,
purpose and circumstances" of the action to be taken. U.C.C. § 1-204(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-

01-14(2) (1968)].
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lightly the parties' reliance upon dealing and usage, and will in fact
go to great lengths in attempting to reconcile ostensible intentions,
as reflected in the prior dealings and trade expectations, with those
reflected by general disclaimers. It is to be expected that, absent
convincing, clear, and explicit language of exclusion directed at the0
32
specific transaction, courts will rule in favor of the warranty.
Oddly enough, such reactions by courts tend to elevate these
particular implied warranties to a position of eminence equivalent
to or higher than 321 even express warranties. While such a result is
clearly inconsistent with the intent of the Code drafters, 322 it is
clearly consistent with modern commercial dealing.
Although trade usage and dealing only infrequently create
independent warranties, they exist with somewhat greater
frequency as adjuncts to merchantability and as disclaimers of
warranties which might otherwise exist. There are apparently three
reasons for this. First, at least a portion of the general warranty of
merchantability requirements, embodied in section 2-314(2)(a)," are
framed with reference to "the trade,''323 suggesting that trade
usage and course of dealing are to be integrated into any
consideration of merchantability. 324 This, of course, enables courts
to consider dealing and usage as it affects merchantability, and not
merely as creative of independent, distinct warranties. Thus, two
cases 325 have suggested that usage and dealing are to be viewed not
only for the purpose of deciding whether independent warranties
other than merchantability exist, but also to determine whether the
goods are to be considered merchantable. Second, to the extent that
course of dealing and usage of trade can, under section 2-314(3),
create independent warranties, so too should evidence of usage and
dealing be relevant to demonstrate that no warranties exist, not so
320. See, e.g., Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n v. S.S. Sovereign Faylenne, 24 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 74(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
321. Unlike express warranties, which are subject to parol evidence rule exclusion, the implied
warranty of usage or dealing will almost always be admissible to explain or supplement even a fully
integrated agreement. U.C.C. § 2-202 [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-09 (1968)]. Only where the
agreement specifically excludes trade usage or prior dealing would the parol evidence rule be a bar to
the admissibility of such evidence.
322. SeeU.C.C. S 2-314, Comment 12.
323. Section 2-314(2) (a) provides: "Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as ... pass
without objection in the trade under the contract description .... U.C.C. 5 2-314 (2) (a) [N.D.
CENT. CODE S 41-02-31(2) (a) (1968)].
324. Comment 2 to section 2-314 provides:
The question when the warranty is imposed turns basically on the meaning of the
terms of the agreement as recognized in the trade. Goods delivered under an
agreement made by a merchant in a given line of trade must be of a quality
comparable to that generally acceptable in that line of trade under the description or
other designation of the goods used in the agreement.
U.C.C. S 2-314, Comment 2.
325. See infra notes 327-38 and accompanying text.
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much because the usage and dealing operate to disclaim otherwise
extant warranties, but because they demonstrate that in this
particular transaction no warranty was intended. Finally, implied
warranties can be disclaimed by usage and dealing because of
inclusion of a specific provision for such exclusion in section 2316(3)(c), thus leading some courts to confuse the issue by
declaring that usage and dealing exclude warranties when in fact
326
they do not.
The first line of cases is exemplified by Fear Ranches, Inc. v.
Berry327 and Ambassador Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel Co. 328 In Fear, the
plaintiff alleged that a portion of the herd of cattle he had purchased
was infected with a disease that made them unfit for breeding
purposes, for which they had been purchased. 329 The defendant
Berry was in the business of selling cattle to packers and not for
breeding, and therefore he was not a merchant with respect to this
particular type of goods and could not make a warranty of
merchantability. 330 The defendant Perschbacker, however, was
held to be a merchant as to breeder cattle and was held to have
made such a warranty. The lower court found that the cattle were
merchantable, apparently based in part on statistics which
indicated a low incidence of the disease in the state where the
transaction took place, and in part on trade usage concerning the
sale of cattle in that state. 331 The trial court did not, however, make
findings of fact relative to whether, by virtue of this trade usage,
cattle infected with the disease might nevertheless be merchantable,
or whether the presence of the disease would render the cattle
unmerchantable. 332 Since "[tihe trial court's conclusion could have
been based on custom or usage relative to the presence or absence
of this disease at the time of sale - 'merchantable' thus meaning
that by custom there existed no implied warranty of freedom from
brucellosis," 3 33 the case was remanded so that findings regarding
usage as it affected merchantability could be made. In other words,
usage and dealing were to be considered not in determining
326. See, e.g., Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 445 F. Supp. 507 (D. Me. 1977);
United States Leasing Corp. v. Comerald Assoc., Inc., 101 Misc. 2d 773, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1979). Seealso infra notes 348-57 and accompanying text.
327. 470 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1972), appeal after remand, 503 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1974).
328. 33 Mich. App. 495, 190 N.W.2d 275 (1971).
329. Fear Ranches, Inc. v. Berry, 470 F.2d 905, 906-07 (10th Cir. 1972), appealafierremand, 503
F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1974). The disease, brucellosis, did not otherwise render the cattle unfit, so they
could still be used for human consumption. Plaintiff, however, was a breeder, not a packer.
330. Generally, only a merchant dealing in goods of the kind can be deemed to make an implied
warranty of merchantability. U.C.C. § 2-314 [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-31 (1968)]. For further
discussion of this area see infra notes 577-906 and accompanying text.
331. 470 F.2d at907.
332. Id. at 908.
333. Id.
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whether separate implied warranties might exist, but in considering
whether goods met a trade standard of merchantability. 334
Although the court did not specify which subsection of section 2314 controlled, it is clear from its discussion that trade usage was to
be viewed primarily, if not solely, with an eye toward general
merchantability.
Somewhat more clear in this respect is the opinion in
Ambassador Steel, for the court in that case at least recognized the
availability of both subsections of section 2-314. Plaintiff had sold
approximately $10,000 worth of steel to defendant, and received
partial payment of roughly $4,000. When defendant failed to pay
the balance, plaintiff sued, and defendant countered that the steel
shipped was defective in that it was not "commercial quality,"
referring to its carbon content. Defendant further alleged that
because of this defect the steel had cracked after resale, causing loss
;to the defendant. The lower court held for the defendant and on
appeal was affirmed. 3 5
The appellate court treated defendant's claim as one of
merchantability, rather than fitness for particular purpose, since
there was no indication that defendant had made plaintiff aware of
any particular use to which the steel would be put. 3 6 In discussing
merchantability, however, the court noted both subsections 2314(2) and (3), thus commingling the general trade notions
inherent in merchantability with those embodied in other, more
specific trade warranties. 337 In addressing the issue of whether there
was a trade usage which defined merchantability, the court
continued:
[Tihere was also ample testimony below to the effect that
when an order is placed without specification as to the
334. Id. One might make the argument that the warranty sought to be shown was actually not
an adjunct to merchantability, but rather a distinct implied warranty of freedom from brucellosis.
Viewed in this manner, the goods could be found to be merchantable and yet a breach of the other
implied warranty might arise. While ordinarily it would make little difference whether such a
warranty were deemed one of merchantability or one of freedom from disease, if merchantability has
been disclaimed the other warranty might nevertheless continue to exist. It therefore may become
important to distinguish between the two types of implied warranties.
It is to be noted that Fearalso stands for the proposition that custom and usage can demonstrate
the absence of warranty. Thus, if the lower court on remand were to find that by trade usage the
existence of brucellosis would not constitute a breach, it would in effect be finding that, under section
2-314(3), the trade provided for no additional warranties. This may fall into the second reason
advanced in the text rather than the third, since it requires no finding that trade usage has excluded a
warranty which would otherwise exist. This was precisely the court's finding in Fearon remand. The
district court found that when a buyer selected the cattle a trade usage existed that no implied
warranties were given. See Fear Ranches, Inc. v. Berry, 503 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1974).
335. Ambassador Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel Co., 33 Mich. App. 495, __
, 190 N.W.2d 275,
277-78 (1971).
336. Id. at__
, 190 N.W.2d at 279.
337. [d.
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particular quality desired, custom and usage of the steel
business is that a "commercial quality" steel, that is,
steel with a carbon content between 1010 and 1020, is to
be used. Further testimony was to the effect that if one
desired steel other than "commercial quality" it must be
specified in the order, according to local custom and
usage . . . . Therefore, plaintiff breached the implied
warranty of merchantability in selling to defendant steel
of a different quality than ordinarily sold in the custom
and usage of the steel business .... 118
It therefore appears fairly certain that when a court is faced
with a claim based upon the warranty of merchantability it should
appropriately flesh out the warranty with reference to usage and
dealing. However, it should also be clear that reference to usage
and dealing may impose distinct warranties and not merely provide
evidence to serve as an adjunct to the general merchantability
requirements. Without direction from counsel, it is likely that
courts will resort to a general merchantability analysis. The
practitioner should therefore point out the possibility of
independent warranties which may arise by trade usage and
dealing. To fail to do so invites a court to ignore a possible basis of
recovery,
particularly
when the general
warranty
of
merchantability has been disclaimed.
A second line of cases exists in which courts employ usage and
dealing, apparently under section 2-314(3), to discover that other
implied warranties have not arisen. One such case, Fear Ranches,
Inc. v. Berry,3 39 has already been discussed, and it should suffice to
reiterate that on remand the trial court found that, by usage of
trade, no implied warranty of freedom from disease existed. Again,
there is often a lack of clarity whether the courts are employing
usage and dealing merely to define merchantability or to discover
the existence and scope of additional warranties. The distinction
will often be unimportant, although it may be significant when a
disclaimer exists.
Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 340 one of a number of seed cases
which raises questions
about
implied warranties of
merchantability, fitness, and yield, 34 1 also illustrates well this
338. Id.
339. See supra notes 329-34 and accompanying text.
340.12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
341. Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972). See also
Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 454 S.W.2d 307 (1970); Zicari v.
Joseph Harris Co., 33 A.D.2d 17, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1969).
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second area of confusion. The plaintiffs had purchased seed corn
from the defendant which did not meet their expectations. They
brought an action based upon breach of express and implied
warranties, alleging, with respect to the implied warranty claims,
the existence of warranties of merchantability and fitness for
particular purpose, and subsidiary warranties of yield and freedom
from disease.34 2 The court, using a scattergun approach, declared
that no such implied warranties existed, on the basis of two
theories. The first theory, framed in terms of whether a warranty of
merchantability existed, employed trade usage and course of
dealing to establish the negative proposition that no warranty of
yield or freedom from disease existed. 343 Although not articulated
very clearly, a careful reading of the opinion suggests that the court
was not determining whether the seed was merchantable under
section 2-316(2). The court also was not declaring that, pursuant to
section 2-316(3) (c), the trade usage or course of dealing excluded
implied warranties. 344 Rather, the court was determining whether,
under section 2-314(3), there were other implied warranties which
existed regarding yield and freedom from disease. 34 5 Finding the
existence of either warranty to be contrary both to usage and
dealing, the court held that no such warranty existed, and that
therefore there had been no breach. 34 6 The court then considered
its second approach to non-liability, analysis under section 2316(3)(c), and found that, in addition to dealing and usage not
creating any warranties, they actually excluded the creation of
implied warranties of any character. 34 71 In other words, course of
dealing and usage of trade could imply certain warranties, but did
not do so in this case. That determination, however, by resort to
section 2-314(3), is independent of any determination of
merchantability or disclaimer.
The importance of the distinction in Bickett, although not
clearly articulated, is crucial, for the general warranty of
merchantability had been disclaimed both by words and by trade
and conduct. Thus, if liability were to be imposed at all, it would
have to be on the basis of these subsidiary warranties.
The third area of confusion, and by far the one into which
most of the cases fall, is caused by the explicit reference in section 2342. 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 632.
343. Id. at 635.
344. The court did so rule later in the opinion. Id. at 644-47.

345. Compareid. at 634-36 with id. at 642-44.
346. Id. at 635.
347. Id. at 642-44. Section 2-316(3) (c) provides: "An implied warranty can also be excluded or
modified by course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade." U.C.C. 5 2-316(3) (c)

[N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33(3) (c) (Supp. 1979)].
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316(3)(c) to usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of
performance being capable of excluding all implied warranties. 34
Unlike the first two problem areas, which arise primarily because
of the interrelationship between, and failure to distinguish among,
the warranties of merchantability and those which can arise
independently, the confusion exists here because of the
introductory language to sections 2-314(1) and (3), "unless
excluded or modified."

349

Instead of analyzing the creation and

disclaimer of warranties separately, the courts have merely
considered usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of
performance, and asked the question: "What effect does all this
have on warranty? ' 3 50 It is perhaps useful to try to put the three
applicable sections into perspective.
Goods sold by a merchant who deals in such goods must be
merchantable, which refers to, among other things, trade
standards.

351

Furthermore, the sale of goods may impose a higher

or different warranty liability because of the parties' expectations,
based upon prior dealings or trade usage. 352 By the same token,
however, the parties to a transaction might expect that no implied
warranties are to exist because of past dealings or trade usage. It is
this third factor which section 2-316(3) (c) seeks to include in any
determination, and while it is obvious that the concepts embodied
353
in section 2-316(3) (c) are distinct from, if not incompatible with,
those of section 2-314, it is also painfully obvious that some courts
considering the distinctions have become hopelessly entangled in
the web created by the mystical phrases "usage of trade" and
"course of dealing.

354

2. Exclusion or Modification by Usage, Dealing, and Performance
Generally, the role that usage, dealing, and performance play
348. U.C.C. §2-316(3) (c)[N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-33(3)(c) (Supp. 1979)1.
349. See supra note 300.
350. See supra note 326.
351. U.C.C. § 2-314(l), 2-314(2)(a)[N.D. CENT. CODE §541-02-31(1), -31(2) (a) (1968)1.
352. U.C.C. § 2-314(3) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-31(3)(1968)].
353. It is difficult, although not impossible, to hypothesize a case where goods are
merchantable, but where other trade or dealing expectations are not met and trade usage or course of
dealing might exclude implied warranties. For example, an automobile junk dealer might purchase
junked cars for reconditioning, parts, and scrap, and determine the use to be made with respect to
each shipment. A course of dealing might exist with respect to a warranty of freedom from rust, and
yet the trade usage might be that all junked cars are sold with no other implied warranties, such as
suitability of parts or quality of scrap. Thus, virtually any junked car would be "merchantable"
provided there was no rust, in spite of the fact that none of the car's parts were in working order or
that the metal was of below average quality. It is probably impossible, however, to imagine a case
where trade expectations would both create warranties under section 2-314(3) and disclaim them
under section 2-316(3) (c), except where one set of expectations was created, for example, by usage,
and another set was disclaimed by prior dealings. In that case, section 1-205 would establish a
hierarchy as to which expectations would control.
354. See supra note 326.
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in the exclusion of implied warranties is residual. Section 2-316(3)
(c) provides that there may be an exclusion or modification based
upon the parties' expectations, even though in a particular
3 55
transaction the specific rules for disclaiming an implied warranty
have not been followed, the agreement manifests no general
exclusion, 3 56 or the goods have not been examined or there has not
been a refusal to examine 357 which would bar warranties. The
theory behind the section is apparently the same as that behind the
general reliance on usage and dealing: since the parties' conduct is
fashioned with reference to their trade and past relationship, their
expectations which are an outgrowth of such relationships should
be given effect. Nevertheless, problems have arisen and are likely to
arise in applying the section because of the overlap between it and
section 2-314.
Initially, it is unclear why the Code drafters apparently made
section 2-316(3) (c) more pervasive than section 2-314(3). Unlike
355. Section 2-316(2) provides the "specific"
merchantability and fitness for particular purpose:

rules for disclaiming the implied warranties of

(2) Subject to subsection (3) [the general or broad rules], to exclude or modify the
implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or
modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and
conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it
states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the
description on the face hereof."
U.C.C. S 2-316(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-33(2) (Supp. 1979)].
For a more detailed discussion of exclusion of warranties, see infra notes 907-1015 and
accompanying text.
356. Section 2-316(3) provides the "general" rules for disclaiming implied warranties, methods
by which the seller can bring to the buyer's attention that no implied warranties are made without
specifically disclaiming them in accordance with section 2-316(2):
Notwithstanding subsection (2):
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by
expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or other language which in common
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes
plain that there is no implied warranty ....
U.C.C. S 2-316(3) (a) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-33(3) (a) (Supp. 1979)]. This provision has already
been explored in some detail, see supra notes 308-11 and accompanying text, and will be considered
more fully infra at notes 907-34 and accompanying text.
357. The second "general" means of avoiding all implied warranties is set forth in section 2316(3) (b), which provides for exclusion on the basis of the buyer's examination of or refusal to
examine goods. Again, there is no need under these circumstances for the seller to explicitly disclaim
using the language required by subsection (2). Section 2-316(3) (b) provides:
Notwithstanding subsection (2):
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the
sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no
implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the
circumstances to have revealed to him ....
U.C.C. S 2-316(3) (b) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33(3) (b) (Supp. 1979)]. This provision will be
considered more fully infra at notes 935-41 and accompanying text.
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section 2-314(3), which indicates that warranties can arise by virtue
of trade usage and course of dealing, section 2-316(3) (c) includes
not only usage and dealing but also course of performance. Neither
the comments nor the legislative history of the two sections reveals
any particular reason why course of performance should not be able
to create warranties but should be able to exclude or modify them.
Furthermore, one is hard pressed to discern any justifiable reason
why a warranty could not be created by course of performance
when it could thereby be excluded. Perhaps the thought is that the
creation of warranties should be more clearly shown than their
exclusion, and that course of performance, to the extent that it does
not exist long enough to establish a course of dealing, would not
offer sufficient justification for altering the parties' expectations.
Alternatively, the difference may be based upon the hierarchy set
up under the Code scheme for course of performance, course of
dealing, and usage of trade.15 1 Course of performance, since it
suggests how the parties are interpreting this particular contract, is
generally held to control over inconsistent course of dealing or
usage of trade. 35 9 Finally, it might be suggested that if a particular
course of performance had created the expectation of warranty it
would fit within a general rubric of "course of dealing." This, of
course, melds the concept of course of performance into course of
dealing, which the Code attempts to distinguish, but would seem
justifiable, particularly when the court is confronted with a
situation in which there is no real course of dealing but where there
has been a course of performance sufficient to suggest the parties'
intent. 360
A second problem, of more practical concern, is that, either in
the creation or the exclusion of warranty liability, the usage,
358. See U.C.C. 5§ 1-205(4), 2-208(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-15(4), 41-02-15(2) (1968)1.
359. Therefore, the thought might go, if these parties in this particular transaction, in the course
of multiple performances, are excluding warranties, notwithstanding a course of dealing which had
in the past created such warranties, the course of performance should be accorded greater weight.
The difficulty with this proposition, however, is that the reverse ought to be equally true. That is, if
no warranties had been implied by past course of dealing, but the parties had in this series of
transactions established the expectation of warranty, their course of performance, and hence
warranty creation, should prevail.
360. To illustrate, suppose a contract is entered into between A and B, who have never dealt
with one another, for the sale of 12 "gizmos," one to be delivered each month for a year. Trade
usage would require each gizmo to be suitable for incorporation into a machine without
modification. The first six arrive and require modification, which buyer undertakes without
objection. Buyer's acquiescence would result in a course of performance which modified the
warranties otherwise created by usage of trade.
Likewise, if we assume that A and B, never having dealt before, enter into this same contract for
gizmos and no trade usage concerning modification exists, and seller ships the first six so that no
modification is required, buyer could assert that the parties' course of performance created a
warranty that the gizmos would be machine ready. Section 2-314(3), since it is silent on the question
of whether course of performance can create warranties, could not be applied unless a court were
willing to hold that a course of dealing had been established. It is to be hoped that a court would be
willing to do so, in spite of the absence of explicit provisions.
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dealing, or performance must be shown to exist. This problem,
generally applicable any time usage, dealing, or performance are
involved, 3 61 is equally visible whenever the existence of a warranty
is at issue. Thus, for example, in Georgia Timberlands, Inc. v. Southern
Airways Co., 362 the defendant was held not to be entitled to
summary judgment, although he had presented testimony
indicating that there was an established trade usage in the sale of
used airplanes that no warranties existed (or that the implied
warranty of merchantability was excluded), because he had not
shown whether the scope of the custom was merely local or
universal. 63 Similarly, in Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co.,364 the court
held that the seller had failed to prove a usage of trade which would
disclaim an implied warranty of merchantability because the only
evidence tending to support the existence of the exclusion was the
lack of customer complaints and the fact that disclaimer clauses
appeared in all local seed order forms. 361 Thus, although usage,
dealing, and performance may exclude or modify implied
warranties, they must first be shown to exist.
Another problem involves the interrelationship between
disclaimers accomplished by usage, dealing, and performance, and
those accomplished in any other manner. This problem was
addressed earlier in the discussion of the creation of implied
warranties by usage of trade, but there the issue was whether a
general "as is" disclaimer could operate to disclaim the warranties
created by usage.3 66 The conclusion was that it should not. Here,
on the other hand, the problem is whether a course of performance
or dealing can exist which will effectively exclude warranties on the
basis of the buyer's acceptance of prior performances which
included a written disclaimer. Assuming, for example, that the
seller can show that in the past he has dealt with the buyer under
contract provisions which excluded warranties, does that establish
conduct sufficient to obviate warranty responsibility in this
instance? While this problem at first glance appears only to restate
the question whether a course of performance or dealing can be
shown, in fact it goes beyond that question. It is fundamentally
361. E..e., Posttapes Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 450 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Western State Bank v. First Union Bank & Trust Co., 172 Ind. App. 321, 360 N.E.2d 254
(1977). See tJ.C.C. S 1-205(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-01-15(2) (1968)] ("existence and scope ... are
to be proved as facts").
362. 125 Ga. App. 404, 188 S.E.2d 108(1972).
363. Georgia Timberlands, Inc. v. Southern Airways Co., 125 Ga. App. 404,
.,
188
S.E.2d 108, 110(1972).
364.33 A.D.2d 17, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1969).
365. Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 A.D.2d 17, __,
304 N.Y.S.2d 918, 923-24 (1969).
366. See discussion ofGindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 1 I N.J. Super. 383, 268
A.2d 345 (1970), at text accompanying notes 304-11.
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concerned not with the question of the existence of a course of
dealing or performance, but, assuming it exists, whether it is
effective. Two cases illustrate the problem, and appear to resolve it
in contradictory ways.
3 67
In Geo. C. Christopher & Son v. Kansas Paint & Color Co.,
plaintiff had purchased paint primer from defendant to be used to
prime structural steel. The defendant knew of the plaintiff's needs
and provided primer to meet those needs, thereby creating an
implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose.3 68 The primer,
delivered in installments, rusted, cracked, and peeled when applied
to the steel. When the contractor for whom the plaintiff had applied
the primer objected, the work was redone, at a cost to the plaintiff
of $112,000. Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of warranty, and
defendant defended on the grounds that a written disclaimer
existed and that, because a series of performances had occurred,
the existence of the written disclaimer, even if not effective in its
own right to disclaim the implied warranty, should be effective to
establish a course of performance which would exclude the
3 69
warranty. The court disagreed.
As to the effectiveness of the written disclaimer, the court first
noted that the disclaimer appeared on an invoice which was sent to
plaintiff after the first shipment of primer. Therefore the written
disclaimer itself could not be effective, since it was given after the
fact rather than at the time the contract was entered into.
Notwithstanding this, however, the seller contended that once the
disclaimer was first sent to buyer, and subsequently appeared in all
later invoices, its existence, though not effective as a disclaimer per
se, established a course of performance which would exclude the
implied warranty.3 70 In response, the court ruled in effect that,
because the disclaimer must be conspicuous in order to be valid
under section 2-316(2), its existence for purposes of section 2316(3)(c) to create a course of performance must also be
conspicuously brought to the buyer's attention. Since this was not
done, no course of performance was created, or, perhaps more
3 71
properly, it could not be relied upon by the seller.
The court's conclusion has a great deal of initial appeal, and
may be defensible in a logical sense. It may, however, fly in the face
367. 215 Kan. 185, 523 P.2d 709. modified andaff'd, 215 Kan. 510, 525 P.2d 626 (1974).
368. Geo. C. Christopher & Son v. Kansas Paint & Color Co., 215 Kan. 185, 194, 523
P.2d 709, 715, modified and aff'd, 215 Kan. 510, 525 P.2d 626 (1974). Seealso infra notes 417-554 and
accompanying text.
369. 215 Kan. at 190-97, 523 P.2d at 713-18.
370. Id. at 194-95, 523 P.2d at 715-16.
371. Id. at 195-96, 523 P.2d at 718.
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of section 2-316(3)(c). The appeal of the court's rule is twofold.
First, if the disclaimer is specifically unenforceable under section 2316(2) because it is not conspicuous, a seller should not be able to
resort to the more general and easier method of disclaimer under
section 2-316(3)(c). This, however, is explicitly refuted by reference
to the introductory language of subsection (3). The clearly
expressed thought is that, even though the seller has not met the
more rigorous specifics of subsection (2), he can rely on usage,
dealing, and performance to insulate himself from liability which
otherwise would exist. Second, the court's analysis has appeal as a
matter of fairness, since fairness might dictate that the language not
be given effect if it is inconspicuous. On the other hand, subsection
(3) (c) contains no requirement of conspicuousness, and the whole
concept of course of performance (how these parties acted, as
opposed to or adjunctive to their words), tends to make
conspicuousness relatively less important. Moreover, the
"notwithstanding subsection (2)" language in subsection (3) again
demonstrates that conspicuousness, although required in order to
disclaim by words, is not required for disclaimer by action.3 72
Finally, the court's decision may be logically defended. If the
disclaimer is not conspicuous, the plaintiff is entitled, under section
2-314(2), to assert that he did not notice it, or that it should not
operate against him whether or not he noticed it. Since it is not
effective unless it is conspicuous, the fact that plaintiff saw it is of no
import;3 73 the clause is ineffective. If this is so, it makes no sense to
give the language effect for purposes of creating a course of
performance but not for purposes of disclaimer. Either language is
effective or it is not; it cannot be ineffective for one purpose and
effective for others. The difficulty here, of course, is that this
analysis has the effect of not merely declaring the language
ineffective, but of excising it entirely. It is one thing to say that
inconspicuous language will not operate to disclaim warranties; it is
quite another to say that it cannot operate at all to demonstrate
some other purpose, for example the existence of a course of
performance. This is precisely what the Kansas court did, however,
372. The author recognizes that it is possible to "find" a conspicuousness requirement under
subsection (3), and this has in fact been done by a number of courts in relation to "as is" disclaimers.
See, e.g., Osborne v. Genevie. 289 So. 2d 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Woodruff v. Clark County
Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972); Gindy Mfg. Corp. v.
Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383, 268 A.2d 345 (1970). However, it is one thing to
say that conspicuousness is a requirement when the seller is relying on words exclusively to show the
disclaimer; it is another when conduct is at issue.
373. See, e.g., Orange Motors of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So. 2d
319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). But seeTennessee Carolina Transp. Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C.
423,
-,
196 S.E.2d 711, 718 (1973).
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for it ruled that the disclaimer was inadmissible, not merely
ineffective. 374 Thus, even if it could have been shown that the buyer
saw the disclaimer and acquiesced therein, this evidence would
apparently have been inadmissible, even though it may have
created a course of performance.
It appears that the ultimate reasoning of the Kansas court was
that, because the disclaimer had not been given until after the sale,
it could not have been seen by the buyer. Therefore, it did not
create a course of performance. Unfortunately, because the
disclaimer was ruled inadmissible the seller was never given the
375
opportunity to prove the existence of the course of performance.
A better approach to the problem, which is more consistent
with the Code and more likely to result in rational, fair decisions, is
to consider the existence of a course of dealing, usage of trade, or
course of performance separately from the validity of any
disclaimer clause on which it might be based. 376 This is the
approach taken by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in Country Clubs, Inc. v. Allis-ChalmersManufacturingCo. 377
In Country Clubs, plaintiff had purchased golf carts from
defendant pursuant to an agreement which contained a general
warranty coupled with a limitation of liability to repair and
replacement. There was, additionally, a disclaimer provision which
378
purported to disclaim all other warranties, statutory or implied.
When the golf carts broke down defendant agreed to repair them,
and performed approximately $12,000 worth of repairs, for which
it billed plaintiff some $4,600, asserting that that amount
represented repairs required because of ordinary wear and tear,
and not because of a defect. Plaintiff refused to pay and filed suit,
apparently alleging breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability and seeking monetary damages. 37 9 The trial court
held that by their conduct the parties had excluded implied
374. 215 Kan. at 195-96, 523 P.2dat 718.
375. Id.
376. Admittedly, this is easier to do when the conduct of the parties affirmatively indicates a
course of performance, as opposed to the Kansas Paint case, in which the defendant was apparently
attempting to show that the buyer's acquiescence in the existence of the clause, if knowing,
established a course of performance.
377. 430 F.2d 1394(6th Cir. 1970).
378. Country Clubs, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 1394, 1396 (6th Cir. 1970).
The disclaimer provision failed to contain any mention of the word "merchantability," as required
under section 2-316(2). Moreover, there was no finding of conspicuousness. The court specifically
refused to consider whether the disclaimer was effective under the Code, although it appears certain
that it would not have been.
379. Id. It is unclear from the report of the case whether plaintiff alleged breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability. The court suggests that the district court found both that plaintiff had
by his course of dealing or performance excluded the implied warranties, and somehow limited his
remedy to repair or replacement. Id. Moreover, the court later ruled, citing section 2-316(3), that
course of dealing or performance had resulted in a "limitation of implied warranties." Id. at 1397.
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warranties and adopted the warranty included in the sales
agreement, including the limitation of liability to repair or
380
replacement. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Court of Appeals framed the issue as "whether . . .two
businessmen in an arm's-length transaction may in their course of
dealing or course of performance exclude or limit the implied
warranty of merchantability. "381 In ruling that they could, the
court noted that as an abstract proposition such exclusion or
modification is allowed, and pointed to factors which could lead to
such a finding in this case. 382 Thus, the fact that plaintiff's
president was an attorney who should have noticed the disclaimer,
that he had ordered on the form without signing it, that he had filed
claims under the written warranty which provided for repair or
replacement, and that he had refused to pay on the basis that the
warranty made defendant responsible to repair or replace, all
pointed to a pattern of conduct which amounted to acquiescence in
the terms of the written warranty, and effectively barred resort to
any implied warranty of merchantability. In other words, the
course of performance 38 3 operated to exclude the implied warranty,
and had been created by the parties' actions, which indicated that
the written warranty in the sales agreement was the only warranty.
It is crucial to an appreciation of the court's decision to realize
that the disclaimer of warranties which was contained in the
contract was probably ineffective, since it did not mention the word
"merchantability." The court specifically noted that its conclusion
that course of performance had effectively modified or excluded the
warranty of merchantability was not dependent upon a finding of
validity of the disclaimer. 384 Rather, unlike the Kansas Paint case,
Country Clubs clearly establishes that where the parties act as
though there are no warranties (or, more precisely, no other
warranties) there are none. Course of performance has eliminated
them, even though they would not have otherwise been eliminated.
In this sense, the Country Clubs case represents the better view.38 5
380. Id.at 1396.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 1396-97.
383. The court, although recognizing that dealing and performance are not the same, refused to
distinguish them. Id. at 1397.
384. Id.
385. While the cases are readily distinguishable on a variety of grounds, one cannot help but
conclude that the Kansas court which decided Kansas Paint would analyze Country Clubs differently,
and arrive at the opposite conclusion. The theory in Kansas Paint was that, since the disclaimer
provision was ineffective, it could not be the basis for a course of performance. 215 Kan. at 193-94,
523 P.2d at 716. In Country Clubs, the disclaimer provision was ineffective, but the court allowed
merchantability to be disclaimed by the course of performance. 430 F.2d at 1397. It is not as clear
that the Country Clubs court would arrive at the same result in the case confronting the Kansas court,
although it seems likely.
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3. Limitation of Remedies by Usage, Dealing, or Performance
While Country Clubs was probably decided properly with
respect to the role of course of performance, it does raise a question
concerning what exactly is meant by the Code language indicating
that implied warranties can be "excluded or modified." The Code
uses the terms "exclude or modify" throughout section 2-316, and
there is no reason to believe that the use of the words in subsection
(3) is to be given any different meaning than their use in subsection
(2). Simply stated, there is, as noted earlier, 38 6 a distinction
between excluding warranties entirely and limiting the remedy for
breach. The former is covered by section 2-316, the latter by
section 2-719. Similarly, modification of warranties, to the extent'
that it has an effect on the warranty itself rather than on the
remedy, would be governed by section 2-316. Section 2-719 has no
explicit counterpart to section 2-316's constant reference to trade,
dealing, or performance. 387 Because of the overlap between the two
concepts, it is necessary to explore them in the abstract, and
question whether Country Clubs and similar cases have arrived at
appropriate results, specifically to the extent that their holdings
deal not with exclusion or modification but with limitation.
In a sense, it is probably fair to say that any time there is an
exclusion or modification of warranty there is also a limitation of
remedy, and vice versa. Thus, for example, if a sale of widgets is
without warranty there can be no breach of warranty, and the
remedy is thus limited, and in this case nonexistent. Similarly, if
the goods are fully warranted but the remedy is limited to repair or
replacement, in effect the "full warranty" does not warrant that
the goods are necessarily acceptable, but only that if they are not
they will be repaired or replaced. As indicated earlier, resort to
these subtleties is usually obviated by the inclusion of both
disclaimer provisions and limitation clauses in standard contracts.
Given the overlap between exclusion and limitation, the
question becomes what is meant by exclusion, modification, and
limitation by usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of
386. See supra notes 154-76 and accompanying text.
387. Of course, sections 1-205(3) and 2-208(1), to the extent that they allow usage, dealing, and
performance to give flesh to the parties' agreement, are implicit in section 2-719, since that section
refers to limitations of remedy by agreement. Moreover, the definition of "agreement" in section 1201(3) explicitly incorporates the concepts of usage, dealing, and performance:
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language
or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of
trade or course of performance as provided in this Act.
U.C.C. 5 1-201(3) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-01-11 (Supp. 1979)1.
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performance. A simple example will illustrate the problem. 3 88
Suppose a retail customer purchases a suit of clothing for $200.
Implied in the sale would be at least a warranty of merchantability,
or fitness for ordinary purposes.38 9 This warranty would probably
at least provide that with normal wear and drycleaning the suit
would last for a year. If the customer took the suit, wore it once,
had it drycleaned, and it fell apart, the warranty would be
breached, giving rise to a variety of remedies under the Code. But,
if our hypothetical customer is meek (and rich), and instead of
complaining returns the following week and purchases another suit,
and this pattern continues, a course of dealing might well be
established with the effect that the implied warranty has been
excluded.
The implied warranty might also be modified in much the
same way. Suppose the suit was worn and drycleaned for six
months before it fell apart. If again our customer failed to complain
and instead purchased another suit, a course of dealing might result
which would modify (shorten) the warranty from one year to six
months.
Finally, there is no reason why the same course of dealing
might not exclude, or at least modify, a limited remedy. Suppose,
for example, that the suit was warranted, expressly or impliedly, to
be fit for use for one year, with the remedy in the event of a defect
exclusively limited to repair or replacement. 390 Suppose further
that the customer returned with a "defective" suit days after he
purchased it and received a refund. If this happened on a number
of occasions, the customer and the retailer might be found to have
established a course of dealing which modified the limited remedy
to include refund. One might even go so far as to say that the course
of dealing has excluded the limitation clause, thereby making
available a whole range of other remedies.
It would also be possible to limit otherwise unlimited remedies
by a course of dealing. Suppose, as would normally be the case,
that the suit was sold with nothing said as to warranty or remedy in
the event of breach. The warranty of merchantability would be
implied, and concommitantly the remedies authorized by the Code
would exist. Suppose further that the suit was defective, and the
buyer returned it and received a replacement. If this becomes an
established pattern, it could easily be urged, and probably correctly
388. The problem ordinarily will not exist when there is a valid written disclaimer.
2
389. U.C.C. 5 2-314(2) (c) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-0 -31(2) (c) (1968)].
390. Since most clothiers do not warrant their products in writing or limit their. liability
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so, that a course of dealing had been established to the effect that
the parties' agreement included this limitation of remedy.3 9 1 This is
3 92
probably similar to what occurred in Country Clubs.
Assuming that the disclaimer of implied warranty in Country
Clubs was invalid, there nevertheless apparently existed a valid
limitation clause. It would therefore have been a simple matter for
the court to find that there existed an implied warranty of
merchantability, but that the remedy for breach thereof was limited
to repair or replacement. Instead, the court held that the parties'
conduct had excluded the implied warranty, and that the buyer,
having acquiesced in the seller's offer to repair or replace, had
adopted this as an exclusive remedy. The fascinating thing about
this result is that, at least in the court's view, the validity of the
93
limitation clause was unimportant.
It might be argued that the Country Clubs decision was either
intentionally vague on this point or unintentionally sloppy. As the
court restates the trial court's holding, it appears that the district
judge had ruled that course of dealing or performance had excluded
implied warranties and that thereafter the limitation agreement was
merely given effect. 394 However, both in its statement of the issue
and in its conclusion
the court uses the word "limit," in addition to
"exclude. ' 395 Elsewhere in the opinion, when dealing solely with
the issue of the existence of the warranty (as opposed to the
remedy), the court rather carefully chose the words "exclusion or
modification. "396 It is arguable that this justifies the conclusion that
the court was applying course of performance to limit a remedy,
based on the acquiescence of the buyer. It is further suggested that
such an analysis is correct, and that the only other case to decide
this issue is in error.
The case, Gates v. Abernathy, 397 involved the purchase of clothes
by plaintiff for his wife from defendant's store, under
circumstances where there arose an implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose. When the clothes did not fit his wife, plaintiff
returned them, was given a credit, and thereafter, when his wife
expressly, this might in fact arise by usage or dealing. Thus, there might be a "policy" on
that the store will repair or replace defective garments, but not return the purchaser's money.
391. The only major stumbling block to this analysis is section 2-719(l) (b): "resort to a
as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case
sole remedy." U.C.C. 5 2-719(1) (b) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-98 (1) (b) (1968)1. One
pressed to assert that by course ofdealing there is created an "express" agreement.
392. See supra notes 377-85 and accompanying text.
393. 430 F.2d at 1397.
394. Id. at 1396.
395. Id. at 1396-97.
396. Id. at 1396.
397. 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 491 (Okla. Ct. App. 1972).
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could find no suitable substitutes, demanded a refund. Defendant
refused, alleging that an agreement had been made which limited
plaintiff's remedy to credit or exchange, and, alternatively, that a
trade usage existed which would so limit plaintiff's remedy.3 98 In
affirming the lower court's judgment for the plaintiff, the court
correctly cited section 2-719(1)(b) to indicate that resort to an
agreed-upon limited remedy is generally optional. The court
further ruled that section 2-316(3) (c) had no application:
Appellant pointed to evidence during the trial which
showed that the custom of specialty shops such as
appellant's is to never make cash refunds. Appellant
reasons that such custom should prevent appellees from
receiving a cash refund. We do not agree with the
contention. Appellant would have the section modify the
remedy for a breach of warranty. The code does not have
any provision for modification of remedy for breach of
warranty due to course of dealing or usage of trade.
Section 2-316(3)(c) goes to the modification of the
warranty itself and not to the remedy.3 99
Concededly, the result of the case is probably correct, either
because of the "optional" rule of section 2-719(1) (b) or because
the plaintiff might not appropriately be held to a trade standard
emanating from a trade in which he was not engaged. 40 0 Moreover,
the court is correct in its literal reading of section 2-316(3) (c), in
that the section clearly does not apply to remedies at all. As has
been seen, however, there is both substantial overlap between
sections 2-316 and 2-719, and the implicit recognition in the latter
of usage, dealing, and performance. Therefore, if in fact the
defendant could have shown a trade usage to which the plaintiff
should be subject and that the limited remedy created thereby was
agreed to be exclusive, the court would have had to rule that a
modification of remedy by usage had occurred. This fact, coupled
with the court's denial of even an opportunity to establish those
requirements, suggests that the ruling was in error.
4. Other Cases Successfully Invoking Usage, Dealing, and
Performance
From what has been said in the preceding pages, it should be
398. Gates v. Abernathy, 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 491 (Okla. Ct. App. 1972).
399. Id. at 495 (emphasis in original).
400. See U.C.C. § 1-205(2) & (3) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-01-15 (2) & (3) (1968)1.
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apparent that the creation, exclusion, or modification of warranties
(or remedies) by usage of trade, course of dealing, or course of
performance is not nearly as simple and problem-free as might be
suggested from a reading of the statute or the paucity of reported
decisions. Lest one leave with the impression that the complexity
outweighs The utility of resort to conduct in the warranty arena, it
is appropriate to give some consideration to the cases in which
usage, dealing, or performance were successfully invoked. In
addition to those already discussed, there are three noteworthy
cases.
The first, R. D. Lowrance, Inc. v. Peterson,40 1 involved the sale by
plaintiff to defendant of a number of cattle. Shortly after delivery
and acceptance of one lot, the cattle showed signs of disease, and
more than half of the lot eventually died. The plaintiff established a
trade usage which provided that the buyer was to inspect the cattle
on delivery, cut out those which were unsuitable, and thereafter,
once the cattle were accepted, the acceptance was final and without
warranty. 40 2 The court held that this custom effectively excluded
any implied warranty of merchantability and that this exclusion
was not unconscionable.4 0 3
The second case, Spurgeon v. Jamieson Motors, 40 4 involved the
sale of used farm equipment by the defendant to the plaintiff. After
delivery, the equipment continually broke down and was repaired
by defendant. After a little more than a year of breakdowns and
repairs, plaintiff sought to rescind the transaction and filed suit
alleging breach of implied warranties. There was a disclaimer
which failed to mention merchantability, and the lower court
therefore held for plaintiff. 40 5 On appeal the decision was reversed,
based primarily upon defendant's contention that the warranty was
40 6
modified by a trade usage.
The record revealed a trade usage to the effect that used farm
machinery was not warranted at all, except that with late model
equipment there was a "50-50 warranty" under which the parties
split repair costs. Moreover, the plaintiff had in fact paid for half
the repair costs after the first several breakdowns. 40 7 The court
ruled that if plaintiff was chargeable with an awareness of this usage
he could not assert the implied warranties except as modified
401. 185 Neb. 679, 178 N.W.2d 277 (1970).

402. R.D. Lowrance, Inc. v. Peterson, 185 Neb. 679, 680-82, 178 N.W.2d 277, 278-79 (1970).
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

Id. at 682-83, 178 N.W.2d at 279.
164 Mont. 296, 521 P.2d 924 (1974).
Spurgeon v.Jamieson Motors, 164 Mont. 296, 298, 521 P.2d 924, 926 (1974).
Id. at 302, 521 P.2d at 928.
Id. at 298,521 P.2d at 926.
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by the usage. Based upon his conduct, the court found plaintiff was
40 8
aware of the usage.
The Spurgeon case clearly demonstrates the availability and role
of usage, and perhaps course of performance, in the warranty
arena. But the case is not without its discrepancies. According to
the court, the "50-50 warranty," the only exception to the
complete exclusion of warranties, applied only to "late model
equipment." The combine at issue was approximately ten years old
at the time of purchase. 40 9 Although "late model" thus apparently
encompassed ten-year-old equipment, it could be argued that, if it
did not, this variation would preclude the trade usage from having
an effect. On the other hand, notwithstanding any argument by the
buyer that the trade usage itself might not apply, it seems clear that
the parties' course of performance would modify any implied
warranty that might otherwise exist. Thus, even assuming that the
plaintiff could have argued that because of the equipment's age the
parties did not contemplate the "50-50" usage, he would be hard
pressed to avoid an exclusion or modification based upon the
course of performance established by virtue of the split repair costs.
Therefore, although the court did not consider the age of the
equipment or whether course of performance rather than usage of
trade might have operated to modify the warranty, appropriate
consideration of these issues would have resulted in the same
conclusion. Finally, it is interesting to note that the "50-50
warranty" was actually a combined modification and limitation,
thereby suggesting both the overlap of the two concepts and the fact
that usage can indeed limit the remedies for breach, and is not
relegated solely to affecting the warranty. In effect, the warranty
given in Spurgeon was one of "field readiness," and the "50-50
warranty" in actuality was a limitation of remedy. It might be
stated as follows: In the event that this equipment is not field ready,
buyer's remedy shall be limited to one-half of the repair costs. 4 10
Spurgeon thus stands for a number of propositions, not the least of
which is that usage and performance are helpful guides to the scope
of warranties.
The final and most recent case, upholding in concrete form the
application of section 2-316(3)(c), is Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v.
Dravo Corp., 41 1 a complex case arising out of Dravo's agreement to
408. Id. at 302, 521 P.2d at 928.
409. Id. at 297, 521 P.2d at 925.
410. By now it should be recognized that a hazard exists in this analysis: unless one is
willing to also assert that the "50-50 warranty" was by trade usage "expressly agreed" to be the
exclusive remedy, see U.C.C. 5 2-719(1) (b) [N.D. CENT. CooE § 41-02-98 (1) (b) (1968)], one might
dig himself into an unfortunate hole. Seesupranote 289.
411. 445 F. Supp. 507 (D. Me. 1977). This portion of the case involves only the third-party
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set up a five-million-dollar operation for plaintiff. Dravo
subcontracted a portion of the contract to a subcontractor, Babcock
& Wilcox [B & W]. After work had progressed there apparently
were defects caused by Dravo's and B & W's negligence, and
Lincoln sued Dravo, which cross-claimed against B & W.412 Both
the Lincoln-Dravo and the Dravo-B & W contracts contained
disclaimer provisions which attempted to insulate Dravo and B &
W, respectively. The court held, however, that, although Dravo
was not effectively insulated from liability for its negligence under
its clause with Lincoln, B & W was so insulated.4 13 The biggest
difference between the interpretations given to the two clauses was
the existence of a trade usage, stipulated to by Dravo. The usage
was evidenced by the following stipulation:
It is an almost universal custom . . . that contracts
between-the parties contain provisions . . . insulating

sellers against liability for consequential damages .
arising under or in connection with the performance [of
these types of contracts].4 1 4
The court was faced with determining whether such custom or
usage would operate to protect a seller from liability for its own
4 15
negligence. The court held that it did.
The Dravo case is of somewhat less importance than the
preceding cases, since it in effect went beyond the rule of section 2316(3)(c). The court had before it a written disclaimer of implied
warranties which it ruled to be valid, and therefore it was
unnecessary to determine whether usage could exclude or modify
implied warranties. 4 16 Nevertheless, the case stands for the broad
propositions raised earlier, that usage will have an impact not only
upon warranties, but also upon remedies. Moreover, Dravo takes
the Code a step further by holding that trade usage (and
presumably course of dealing and performance) can exclude not
only warranties and warranty liability, but also other obligations
and liabilities which would otherwise exist, such as liability for
negligence.
action by Dravo against its subcontractor, B & W. In order to fully appreciate the workings of the
decision, one should consult Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262 (D. Me.
1977).
412. Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 445 F. Supp. 507, 509-12 (D. Me. 1977).
413. Id. at 515.
414. Id. at 512.
415. Id. at 515.
416. Id. at 516 n.8.
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B.

THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR

PURPOSE

In moving from implied warranties created by usage of trade,
course of dealing, and course of performance to those created by
general expectations and particular conduct there is some risk
involved. The Code drafters apparently thought that usage
warranties bore a closer relationship to the implied warranty of
merchantability than to that of fitness for particular purpose, since
they separated the former from the latter. 41 7 Additionally, while
one might be tempted to theorize that the three types of implied
warranties are well-bounded and discrete, in reality they are often
too closely related for separation. Finally, one runs the risk of losing
sight of the fact that in dealing with the warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, no less than with those created by usage or
merchantability, one is dealing with party expectations.
The Code provision concerning fitness for particular purpose,
contained in section 2-315, 418 is far more narrow than those
providing for the other warranties, and, as a result, when this
warranty is invoked the court is faced primarily with a question of
whether the facts alleged fit squarely within the statute. The
concepts embodied by the particular purpose rules have been
recognized in North Dakota since at least 1920.419 The existence of

the warranty is dependent upon both the buyer and the seller, in
the sense that the buyer must have put the seller on notice of his
needs and must himself be relying on the seller to meet those needs.
Unlike the warranty created by usage or dealing, or that embodied
in the concept of merchantability, the particular purpose warranty
is peculiarly suited for a "one-shot deal." This is true primarily
because there is no requirement that the seller be a merchant with
respect to the goods, nor is there any necessity for the buyer and
seller to have dealt before or for them to be engaged in any trade. In
417. Compare U.C.C. S 2-314 [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-31 (1968)1 with U.C.C. 5 2-315 [N.D.
CENT. CODE § 41-02-32 (1968)].
418. Section 2-315 provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose
for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified
under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
U.C.C. S 2-315 [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-32 (1968)].
419. Ward v. Volker, 44 N.D. 598, 176 N.W. 129 (1920). The case involved the sale of lily
bulbs which failed to flower. The court held that when the buyer relied upon the seller's skill or
judgment, and the seller knew the purpose for which the goods were intended to be used, there was
an implied warranty that the goods would be of merchantable quality and fit for the intended use.
Because courts, when discussing merchantability, often speak in terms of "fitness for purpose," it is
difficult to determine whether a true "fitness" case predated Ward.
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fact, while the seller is often a merchant and engaged in "the
.trade," the buyer would almost never be, since by definition he
must be "relying on the seller's skill orjudgment."
The time for determining whether the particular purpose
warranty is created is "the time of contracting," so it is unlikely
that there will often be assertions of warranty existence after the
fact. As will be seen in connection with the warranty of
merchantability, this significantly narrows the buyer's chances of
urging a warranty "created by the sale," for the warranty arises, if
at all, only on the front end of the transaction. While this alleviates
the problem which might otherwise be created by the buyer
asserting reliance after the deal is consummated, 42 0 it causes parol
evidence problems, since almost by definition the particular
purpose warranty will be created at the start of the transaction, and
will often be followed by a disclaimer. It,should therefore be
apparent that the warranty is excludable. Finally, the quantum and
quality of what the parties must know at the time of the sale is
expressly narrowed by the section, for the Code requires only that
421
the seller be put on notice.

1. Creation of the Warranty
The starting point for analysis of the implied warranty of
fitness for particular purpose is the recognition that it is, in the
words of the foremost commentators, "a mature legal doctrine.' '422
In other words, the problems which arise in connection with the
application of the warranty are well-charted and relatively easily
handled. There will be few, if any, surprises.
The Code's initial focus is on the seller, for only he can create
the particular purpose warranty. 423 The seller need not be a

merchant, as is required for the warranty of merchantability, 424
although it would be remiss not to point out that virtually all of the
reported decisions which have imposed liability do in fact involve
merchants.4 25 The reason is clear and simple: while section 2-315
does not require that the seller be a merchant or deal in goods of the
kind, it does require that the buyer rely "on the seller's skill or
420. See U.C.C. S 2-313, Comment 7.
421. Section 2-315 is framed in terms of "reason to know," which is the classic definition of
notice. See U.C.C. S 1-201(25) (c) [N.D. CENT. COoE S 41-01-11(25) (c) (Supp. 1979)1. See also
U.C.C. S 2-315, Comment 1.
422. See WirrE & SUMMERS, supra note 62, at 360. For a discussion of the history of warranty for
particular purpose, see Covington & Medved, The Implied Warrano of Fitnessfor a ParticularPurpose:
Some Persistent Problems, 9 GA. L. REv. 149(1974).
423. See U.C.C. S 2-313(1)(b) & (c) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-30 (1)(b) & (c) (1968)1.
424. See U.C.C. 5 2-314(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-31(1) (1968)1. But see U.C.C. S 2-314,
Comment 4.
425. Cf. Prince v. LeVan, 486 P.2d 959 (Alaska 1971) (sellers were not merchants with respect
to sale of the vessel).
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judgment." The seller must therefore have skill or knowledge with
respect to the goods being sold, and ordinarily such skill or
knowledge would be attributable primarily to merchants. Thus,
while the comment to section 2-315 recognizes that the particular
purpose warranty "can arise as to non-merchants where .
justified

by the particular circumstances,''

"normally

4

26

it suggests that

the warranty will arise only where the seller is a
merchant with the appropriate 'skill or judgment.' 427 Nevertheless, even in the casual sale of goods, where the seller is familiar
enough with the properties of the subject matter to have skill or
judgment relative thereto, the warranty might be found to exist.
Further, one ought not lose sight of the fact that the Code envisions
at least three categories of "merchants," any one of which might
appropriately make the warranty of fitness for particular purpose,
whereas only a merchant who deals in goods of the kind will
4 28
generally be capable of making the warranty of merchantability.
Thus, for example, while an automobile mechanic selling his
personal vehicle might not be held to have impliedly warranted its
merchantability, he might well be in a position to make a warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose.
As indicated, most of the cases imposing liability under section
2-315 involve a merchant seller, 42 9 and the few cases found which
involve a non-merchant seller have, for one reason or another,
denied liability.4 30 In fact, only one case has been discovered in
which a non-merchant seller was held liable, and the seller in that
case might well have been characterized as a merchant, since she
was an interior decorator who made furniture and sold it at a
43
substantial mark-up.

1

From the foregoing, and the additional requirement contained
in section 2-315 that the buyer rely on the seller's skill or judgment,
one might conclude that the buyer would ordinarily not be a
426. U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 4.
427. Id.
428. The warranty of merchantability is implied in any sale by a merchant with respect to goods
of the kind sold. One might, however, be a merchant under the Code definition, section 2-104,
merely by virtue of holding oneself out as having peculiar knowledge or skill, or hiring someone with
such attributes.
429. See, e.g., DeLamar Motor Co. v. White, 249 Ark. 708, 460 S.W.2d 802 (1970); Catania v.
Brown, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 344, 231 A.2d 668 (1967); Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 9 Ill.
App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168 (1972); Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153
Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972); Regina Grape Prods. Co. v. Supreme Wine Co., 357 Mass.
631, 260 N.E.2d 219 (1970); Northern Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. Gates, 196 N.W.2d 70 (N.D.
1972).
430. The term "non-merchant" in the text is intended here to mean one not engaged in selling
goods of the kind. Thus, the following cases would be included: Prince v. LeVan, 486 P.2d 959
(Alaska 1971); Sass v. Spradlin, 66 111. App. 3d 976, 384 N.E.2d 464 (1978); .Janssen v. Hook, 1 111.
App. 3d 318, 272 N.E.2d 385 (1971); Samson v. Riesing, 60 Wis. 2d 698, 215 N.W.2d 662 (1974);
Cagney v. Cohn, 13 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 998 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973).
431. Goldberg v. Ziskin, 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 417 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973).
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merchant. The cases reveal, however, that often the buyer would
also qualify as a merchant, albeit one with significantly less
expertise with respect to the particular goods involved than the
seller. 43 2 This should not be taken to suggest that the particular
purpose warranty has no place in a consumer context, or where the
buyer, though engaged in commercial activity, is not a merchant
with respect to similar goods. 4 33 Furthermore, courts have extended
the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose to the lease of
goods, 434 with one court articulating the following rule:

In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, where the
lessor has reason to know any particular purpose for
which the leased chattel is required and that the lessee is
relying upon the lessor's skill or judgment to select or
furnish a suitable chattel, there is an implied warranty
4 35
that the chattel shall be fit for such purpose.
This extension of the Code rule is fully justified, and comports with
the theories underlying the particular purpose warranty.
As has been seen, the initial focus of section 2-315 is on the
seller, who may or may not be a merchant so long as he has skill or
judgment sufficient to be relied upon by the buyer. The focus then
shifts to what the seller must know about the buyer's needs, and
when he must become aware of these needs. Not only must the
seller be made aware that the buyer has a particular use in mind for
the goods, but he must also realize that the buyer is depending
upon him to supply suitable goods. In order for the warranty to be
created, this awareness must exist at the time of contracting.
As a starting point, the seller need not actually know anything,
for the statute requires only that he have reason to know the buyer's
needs and that the buyer is relying on him. This "reason to know"
432. See,e.g., Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coup. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286
N.E.2d 188 (1972) (sale of chickens to chicken farmer relatively new to egg farming); W & W
Livestock Enterprises, Inc. v. Dennler, 179 N.W.2d 484 (Iowa 1970) (sale of hogs to hog dealer);
Regina Grape Prods. Co. v. Supreme Wine Co., 357 Mass. 631, 260 N.E.2d 219 (1970) (sale of wine
to winemaker); Northern Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. Gates, 196 N.W.2d 70 (N.D. 1972) (sale of pipe
to harrow attachment manufacturer); Slemmons v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 57 OHio App. 2d 43, 385
N.E.2d 298 (1978) (sale of herbicide to farmer); Controltek, Inc. v. Kwikee Enterprises, Inc., 284
Or. 123, 585 P.2d 670 (1978) (sale of electronic equipment to electric step manufacturer).
433. See, e.g., DeLamar Motor Co. v. White, 249 Ark. 708, 460 S.W.2d 802 (1970) (sale of
diesel truck to commercial user); Catania v. Brown, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 344, 231 A.2d 668 (1967) (sale
of paint to homeowner); Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v. Bailey, 154 Ind. App. 632, 291 N.E.2d
92 (1972) (sale of trucks for hauling); Childers & Venters, Inc. v. Sowards, 460 S.W.2d 343 (Ky.
1970); Lane v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 9 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 832 (Mass. App. Ct. 1971) (sale of air
conditioning unit to consumer buyers).
434. W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970). Seealso
Fairfield Lease Corp. v. U-Vend, Inc., 14 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 1244 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974); All-States
Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 538 P.2d 1177 (1975).
435. W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970).
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standard is a standard of notice, as defined by section 1-201(25),
and requires a determination of whether, "from all the facts and
circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason
to know that ' 436 the facts existed. Moreover, this same concept of
notice, as opposed to knowledge, is clearly stated by the comment
to section 2-315. 4 1 7 It is probably sufficient to say that, in most
cases, whether the seller had reason to know the buyer's needs and
that the buyer was relying on him will be fact questions to be
determined in each case. Evidence of discussions leading up to the
sale, of the parties' relative knowledge and expertise, and of the
relationship between the parties will generally be admissible,
barring parol evidence objections.
2. Disclaimers
It should make no difference from which direction the court
analyzes a particular case: whether the analysis proceeds from a
discussion of whether the warranty was created to whether a
disclaimer is valid, or whether it proceeds from a discussion of the
validity of the disclaimer to the existence of warranty. Because the
statute explicitly permits the exclusion or modification of the
implied warranty in accordance with section 2-316, one would
expect the result to be the same regardless of the analytical
approach. On the other hand, one may make the grammatical
argument that section 2-315 requires inquiry into the existence of
the warranty, and only then may the question whether it has been
excluded or modified be addressed. 438 This argument may not be as
weak as it initially appears. There are at least two good reasons why
the drafters might have chosen to view any discussion of disclaimers
as secondary to a discussion of the existence of the warranty. First,
unlike the implied warranty of merchantability, which arises in all
mercantile sales, the particular purpose warranty is less often
invoked, and is peculiarly dependent upon the buyer's particular
expectations. Therefore, since its existence is less common, it
should not be as easily disclaimable. Second, any specific
disclaimer under section 2-316(2) 4 1 9 must be in a conspicuous
436. U.C.C. S 1-201(25) (c) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-11(25) (c) (Supp. 1979)]. See also
U.C.C. S 2-315, Comment 1. But seeNobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.
1977) (specific knowledge).
437. SeeU.C.C. 5 2-315, Comment 1.
438. The statute appears to be drafted to require a result favorable to the existence of the
warranty where the facts demonstrate such a warranly. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE §
41-02-31(1)(1968)] beginning with the "unless exluded or modified" language).
439. Once again the distinction between specific disclaimers and general disclaimers must be
made. Specific disclaimer refers to a section 2-316(2) written disclaimer, as opposed to a section 2316(3) disclaimer by general words, inspection, or usage. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) & (3) [N.D. CENT.
CODE S 41-02-33(2) & (3) (Supp. 1979)].
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writing, although, because of the unusual nature of the warranty, it
need not mention fitness for a particular purpose. 44 0 It would
therefore make sense in the ordinary case to first address the issue
of creation of this unusual warranty, and only then ask whether it
had been effectively disclaimed. Not surprisingly, the courts which
have followed this approach have usually upheld the warranty. 44 1
3. ParolEvidence Considerations
In connection with the validity of disclaimers and their effect
on what the seller had reason to know at the time of contracting,
there is a built-in problem caused by the preceding considerations.
If there is a disclaimer provision, and if the contract of the parties is
viewed as integrated, parol evidence as to what the seller should
have known at the time of contracting would be barred. The
problem has already been discussed in the context of express
warranties,

44 2

and the basic problems will not be reiterated.

Primarily, the discussion here will focus on the questions raised by
the requirement that the seller know the buyer's needs and that the
buyer is relying on him at the time of contracting.
Although the seller need only have notice of the buyer's needs
and the buyer's reliance, and these things are to be divined from
all the facts and circumstances, it is obvious that in the normal case
the best evidence of what the seller knew will be testimony
concerning negotiations between the parties. When a court is
confronted with a disclaimer provision and a merger clause,
however, testimony as to prior agreements would be inadmissible
to contradict the express terms of the writing. The assertion of an
implied warranty would be directly contradictory to the disclaimer
and would therefore theoretically be barred. There are, however,
four potential ways around the dilemma.
The first is to employ usage, dealing, or performance to
establish that in the context of the agreement the disclaimer was not
intended to bar the particular warranty. 44 3 In the usual case this is
not satisfactory because, although it accords with the parol
evidence rule of the Code, it subverts the ability to disclaim
440. Compare the corresponding rule of section 2-316(2) for merchantability, requiring that
merchantability be specifically mentioned. U.C.C. S 2-316(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-33(2)
(Supp. 1979)].
441. See, e.g., Boeing Airline Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964); Shofner v.
Williams & Pearson Furniture Co., 8 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970); cf. MasseyFerguson, Inc. v. Utley, 439 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1969) (court examined disclaimer first but held
warranty existed); Thorman v. Polytemp, Inc., 2 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 772 (Westchester County Ct.
N.Y. 1965) (court examined warranty first, then applied disclaimer).
442. See supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
443. SeeU.C.C. S 2-202(a) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-09(1) (1968)1.
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warranties, specifically allowed by section 2-316. A second
possibility is to allow the evidence to displace the disclaimer. This,
however, also subverts the ability to disclaim warranties under the
Code. The third means of avoiding parol evidence problems
involves a recognition that the implied warranty arises with
reference to the parties' actions, but is not an "agreement," or
reflection of "agreement," as that term is employed in section 2202. Thus, testimony of what the buyer made known to the seller
before the sale is not to be considered a prior agreement, and is
therefore admissible. In a sense, the assertion that it is not an
agreement is valid, for no one is attempting to show that the seller
agreed to anything. Rather, what is being shown is merely that the
buyer and the seller engaged in certain activity, which, if shown,
would justify an expectation. On the other hand, to the extent that
(agreement" is defined as "the bargain of the parties in fact,' 4 it
is clear that these actions at least imply an agreement prior to
integration. Moreover, there is the additional problem that, once
the relevant pre-sale actions are admitted, it is uncertain what effect
they will have. Even if the testimony would clearly show
circumstances which would imply the warranty, if the warranty has
been disclaimed it nevertheless does not retain validity. Unless one
takes the position that any time the buyer establishes the existence
of the particular purpose warranty a disclaimer is ineffective (which
flies in the face of section 2-316), merely admitting the evidence
solves only half of the problem.
If these three options were the only ones available, one would
be forced to conclude that the Code allows the particular purpose
warranty only in the extraordinary case where it is both
convincingly shown to have existed and where it has not been
disclaimed. But a fourth option exists which subtly changes the
forced conclusion: this extraordinary warranty exists only where it
has been convincingly proved and where it has not been effectively
disclaimed. To the extent that an effective disclaimer must be both
written and conspicuous, this seeks to balance legitimate buyer
expectation with\ legitimate seller protection. Unfortunately, the
ideal sought is seldom realized. A cynic might have difficulty
accepting the proposition that a buyer who makes known to the
seller his needs and his inexperience would thereafter be fully
apprised of the seller's limited responsibility by a contract clause
which conspicuously points out that "[t]here are no warranties
which extend beyond the description on the face hereof. ' 445
444. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-11(3) (1968)].
445. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33(2) (Supp. 1979)].

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

However, the ideal remains.
The problem, both from a parol evidence standpoint and the
standpoint of disclaimer validity, is illustrated well by Thorman v.
Polytemp, Inc. 446 Thorman presented the standard particular purpose
warranty situation. Plaintiff and defendant had a contract for the
sale and installation of a heater unit which was to be used in
plaintiff's drycleaning establishment. The heater was installed and
connected to plaintiff's existing steam boiler. When the heater was
on, the steam was insufficient to operate the cleaning and pressing
unit. Defendant was alleged to have known plaintiff's particular
needs and that plaintiff relied upon defendant's expertise, and
plaintiff did in fact rely upon defendant. The contract also
contained a disclaimer which excluded "all statutory or implied
warranties." 44 7 Although the court found that plaintiff had met the
burden of establishing the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, it held that because of the disclaimer plaintiff
had "waived" the benefit of the warranty. Furthermore, because
of a merger clause, evidence of "discussion, survey and
negotiations" was excluded by the parol evidence rule.
Other courts have not been so receptive to disclaimers. 4 8 For
example, in Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 449 the court, applying
the 1954 version of the Code,4 50 which required a disclaimer to use
"specific language" of exclusion to be effective, held that the
following clause was not specific enough: "The foregoing warranty
is given and accepted in lieu of any and all other warranties,
expressed or implied, arising out of the sale of the helicopter. "451
The court buttressed its result by noting that, had the case been
decided under the 1959 version of the Code, the clause would have
452
been deemed inconspicuous and therefore ineffective.
Boeing dealt with the sale of a helicopter under circumstances
where the court had no trouble finding the creation of the particular
purpose warranty. The difficulty was in deciding whether the
warranty had been disclaimed by the preceding clause, and was
further compounded by the fact that there was evidence that the
sale was "as is - where is. '' 53 Nevertheless, the court had little
446.2 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 772 (Westchester County Ct. N.Y. 1965).
447. Thormanv. Polytemp, Inc., 2 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 772, 774 (Westchester County Ct. N.Y.
1965).
448. See infra notes 449-54 and accompanying text.
449. 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964).
450. The 1954 version of section 2-315 is identical to the current version. The 1954 version of
section 2-316 differs from the current version in that exclusion could occur only through "specific
language." There was no requirement of conspicuousness or a writing.
451. Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585, 588 (8th Cir. 1964).
452. Id. at 593.
453. Id. at 588-89.
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trouble declaring that neither mode of disclaimer had the desired
4

effect.

45

4. Conspicuousness
Section 2-316(2) provides that a disclaimer of the particular
purpose warranty must be in writing and conspicuous to be
effective. No seller would be foolish enough to assert the disclaimer
by other than a writing,4 5 5 so the question of validity will often turn
upon whether the disclaimer is conspicuous. 456 In theory, if the
disclaimer is conspicuous the buyer will at least be aware of it.
Therefore, if he understands it, and if he has not been lulled into a
false sense of security by the seller's actions so that he realizes its
impact, he can effectively object to it before signing. Many courts,
however, have construed the conspicuousness requirement strictly.
Whether a clause is conspicuous 457 depends on whether, as a matter
of law, a reasonable person ought to have noticed it. The Code
definition provides specific guidelines as to what is conspicuous,
but when a clause does not fall squarely within these guidelines the
court is left with few aids in making the determination. Often the
determination has been made on the basis of whether the clause
meets the guidelines for conspicuousness. If the disclaimer is "in
larger or other contrasting type or color," or is under a "printed
heading in capitals," it is conspicuous; otherwise it is not. 458 This,
however, clearly perverts the underlying rationale of sections 1454. Id. at 589, 592-93.
455. The oral disclaimer, even if it were not literally proscribed, would almost certainly be
invalid due to inconsistent action, and would likely die in any event from the pro-warranty bias. One
ought not forget the availability of other, non-written forms of disclaimer, however, such as those
embodied in section 2-316(3). An oral "as is" disclaimer is likely to meet the same fate as that in
Boeing. Usage, dealing, and performance might work here, but, if the buyer can prove his reliance on
the seller and his own lack of expertise, resort to usage, dealing, and performance is not likely to avail
the seller. The provision for inspection in section 2-316(3) (b) is another matter; if the buyer in fact
examines the goods, he may be held not to have relied on the seller's expertise, at least if the
examination would reveal that the goods are not suitable for his particular purpose. On the other
hand, to the extent that the buyer lacks sufficient skill or judgment to make a meaningful
examination, his examination should not preclude subsequent reliance on the seller. U.C.C. § 2316(3) (b) N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33(3) (b) (Supp. 1979)1.
456. The buyer could always assert that the clause was unconscionable, but attempts in this
direction have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Thorman v. Polytemp, Inc., 2 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 772
(WestchesterCounty Ct. N.Y. 1965).
457. Section 1-201(10) provides:
"Conspicuous": A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed
heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous.
Language in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or other contrasting
type or color. But in a telegram any stated term is "conspicuous." Whether a term or
clause is "conspicuous" or not is for decision by the court.

U.C.C. S 1-201(10) [N.D.

CENT. CODE S 41-01-11(10)(Supp. 1979)].
458. Id. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Pike, 249 Ark. 1026, 466 S.W.2d 901 (1971);
Koellmer v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 478, 276 A.2d 807 (1970); Orange Motors of
Coral Gables, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So. 2d 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Glenn
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201(10) and 2-316(2). The test is not whether the seller can fall
within specific guidelines, but rather whether the clause ought to be
noticed by the buyer. To suggest that the guidelines of section 1201(10) provide the exclusive means of making a clause
45 9
conspicuous is to ignore the policy underlying the requirement.
The decisions, however, do point out a clear pro-warranty bias,
and, to the extent that the courts mean only to suggest that the
requirement of conspicuousness will be taken seriously and strictly
enforced, resort to an exclusivity analysis may be justified.
It therefore should be apparent that courts which are faced
with a clear conflict between the warranty and the disclaimer, and
all of the parol evidence problems which accompany it, have a
ready-made escape hatch. What's more, it probably is justifiable
that they avail themselves of it, for, except where the clause is truly
conspicuous, there is a risk that the buyer will indeed be surprised.
Thus, for example, in Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v.

Utley, 460 the

court ruled that a disclaimer contained on the back side of the
contract was not conspicuous, and therefore was ineffective to
exclude the warranty of particular purpose which was found to have
been implied. 461 Other cases which hold that language on the back
of forms is inconspicuous are legion,4 62 although there are a few
which look more to the type of printing than to the placement of the
disclaimer.4 6 3 Fewer still fall into the Utley category, which dealt
primarily with the issue of a clear particular purpose warranty
followed by an equally clear, albeit inconspicuous, disclaimer.
Because of the inconspicuousness, in Utley the warranty was given
precedence.
In a similar vein, the court in DeLamar Motor Co. v. White 4 64
Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184(1975); Overland Bond & Inv.
Corp. v. Howard, 9 Il. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168 (1972); Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley, 439
S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1969); Nassau Suffolk White Trucks, Inc. v. Twin County Transit Mix Corp., 62
A.D.2d 982, 403 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1978); Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150,
324 N.E.2d 583 (1974); P.E.A.C.E. Corp. v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 568 P.2d 1273 (Okla.
1977).
In several cases courts have held the clause to be inconspicuous, even though one of the
guidelines was met. See DeLamar Motor Co. v. White, 249 Ark. 708, 460 S.W.2d 802 (1970) (clause
in italics); Dorman v. International Harvester Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 11, 120 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1975);
Volvo of America Corp. v. Wells, 551 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. 1977) (slightly different print).
459. See Valez v. Craine & Clarke Lumber Corp., 41 A.D.2d 747, 341 N.Y.S.2d 248, rev'd on
othergrounds, 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 350, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973).
460. 439 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1969).
461. Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley, 439 S.W.2d 57, 58-59 (Ky. 1969).
462. See Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Chrysler
Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co., 132 Ga. App. 435, 208 S.E.2d 321 (1974); Jerry Alderman Ford
Sales, inc. v. Bailey, 154 Ind. App. 632, 291 N.E.2d 92 (1972); Hunt v. Perkins Mach. Co., 352
Mass. 535, 226 N.E.2d 228 (1967) (although language was printed in appropriate-size type);
P.E.A.C.E. Corp. v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 568 P.2d 1273 (Okla. 1977).
463. See, e.g., Rye v. International Harvester Co., 16 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 966 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1975).
464. 249 Ark. 708, 460 SW.2d 802 (1970).
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found that an implied warranty had been made and then
ineffectively disclaimed. Presented with a disclaimer which was
italicized, and therefore in "contrasting type,"
the court
nevertheless found that it was not conspicuous. The court reasoned
that, although italicized, the disclaimer "was in smaller and lighter
type than much of the rest of the printed form." ' 46 5 Again, the
"loophole" of conspicuousness saved a buyer from surprise.
Those courts which have been squarely faced with a conflict
between a disclaimer and a particular purpose warranty have
responded with a justifiable bias in favor of the warranty. Some, as
in Boeing, have based their holding on the lack of clear language,
buttressed by inconspicuousness. Others, as in Utley and DeLamar,
have relied exclusively on the conspicuousness escape hatch.
However, the lengths to which a court might go do not end there,
as demonstrated in Shofner v. Williams & PearsonFurnitureCo. 466
In Shofner, the plaintiffs had purchased a television set,
expecting to receive a good color picture, 46 7 and were sorely
disappointed when the set failed to work properly. Accompanying
the set, on the back of the instruction booklet, was a disclaimer of
all warranties other than an express warranty. Faced with the
dealer's claim that no implied warranty could therefore apply, the
court could have played the conspicuousness game. Instead, it
reasoned that the disclaimer was placed in the booklet solely for the
protection of the manufacturer, not the seller. 468 Thus, by the terms
of the Code itself, the dealer could appropriately make other
warranties which would affect only his duties. Therefore, the only
question was whether the warranty had in fact been created.
The approach of the Shofner court seems consistent with the
Code, at least when it is the particular purpose warranty which is
asserted. Ordinarily, the particular purpose warranty will be
dependent upon what the immediate parties say and do, as opposed
to, for example, the warranty of merchantability, which emanates
both from remote and immediate sellers. 469 It therefore seems fair
to require the immediate seller to disclaim any warranties he might
have made if the disclaimer is to be given effect.4 70
465. DeLarnar Motor Co. v. White, 249 Ark. 708,
,460 S.W.2d 802, 804 (1970).
466. 8 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970).
467. Shofner v. Williams & Pearson Furniture Co., 8 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 48, 50 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1970).
468. Id. at 51.
469. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 62, at 357-60, for a discussion of the distinctions
between the particular purpose warranty and the warranty of merchantability.
470. It is clear that section 2-318 makes warranties made by the manufacturer applicable to
remote purchasers. By the same token, if the manufacturer properly excludes warranties in the sale
of the goods, the warranty would not extend to the remote purchaser. Thus, for example, if the
action in Shofnir were based on an implied warranty of merchantability, the Shofners might have lost
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The foregoing cases suggest that courts will not take kindly
either to disclaimers of particular purpose warranties or to parol
evidence defenses, at least where it is more likely than not that the
circumstances were such that a particular purpose warranty
existed. Thus, most courts, when examining what the seller knew
at the time of contracting, will give substantial leeway in an effort to
promote the existence of the warranty, notwithstanding that to do
so will often exacerbate the conflict between the warranty and the
disclaimer.
Before considering other aspects of the particular purpose
warranty, it should be reiterated that awareness by the seller must
occur at the time of contracting, and not at some later point. Thus,
for example, in Jacobson v. Benson Motors, Inc.,4 7 1 the plaintiff
purchased an automobile from the defendant for the purpose of
drag-racing. There was no evidence that, at the time of sale, the
defendant had reason to know the particular purpose for which the
car had been purchased. Thereafter, the defendant learned of
plaintiff's drag-racing activity, and even offered to sponsor the
plaintiff. The court held that there was no particular purpose
warranty created, since at the time of contractingno particular purpose
was made known to the seller.4 72
5. The Buyer's ParticularPurpose
Once the timing requirement of section 2-315 is met, the
inquiry shifts to the extent of the seller's knowledge. Stated simply,
he must be made aware of the particular purpose that the buyer has
in mind for the goods. This statement, while retaining its simplicity
in the ordinary case, becomes obscured at the fringes. Suppose, for
example, that the buyer's particular purpose is one of the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used. Will an implied warranty
of fitness for particular purpose exist, or is it subsumed in the more
general warranty of merchantability? Further, how great an
awareness of the buyer's particular purpose must the seller have?
As to these questions, the Code itself offers little help. The
unless they could have convinced the court that the defendant had not made a valid disclaimer. To
the extent that each seller is capable of making a warranty, the Shof'ner analysis probably retains
vitality. Therefore, arguably, the only effect of the disclaimer in Shofner would be to preclude direct
action against the manufacturer, and only if the disclaimer was deemed conspicuous. U.C.C. S 2318 [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-35 (1968)].
471. 216 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1974).
472. jacobson v. Benson Motors, Inc., 216 N.W.2d 396, 404 (Iowa 1974). After the car broke
down plaintiff returned to the defendant, who contended that the warranty had been voided due to
abuse. A compromise was reached, which in part included complete replacement of the engine. By
this time, of course, the defendant did know of the particular purpose. The court nevertheless ruled
that even as to the replacement engine there was no particular purpose warranty. This portion of the
ruling was arguably incorrect, as it failed to take into account what the defendant actually knew.
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comment to section 2-315 of the Code suggests that the buyer's use
need only differ in degree, not in kind, from the ordinary purpose
giving rise to a general warranty of merchantability.4 73 Thus, the
comment provides the example of a shoe customer purchasing a
pair of shoes for mountain climbing, and suggests that such a
particular purpose would be sufficiently outside the normal or
customary purpose to justify the warranty. 474 Left unanswered is
the question whether, if the buyer's particular purpose is the
ordinary purpose, an implied warranty of fitness for particular
purpose is made. Since the two warranties are often disclaimed by
one disclaimer provision, it often will not matter. However, to the
extent that the methods of disclaimer differ, the question must be
answered. This, of course, initially depends upon whether the two
warranties are mutually exclusive, or whether they can coexist.
Section 2-317 specifically answers this question in the affirmative:
"Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as
consistent with each other and as cumulative. ''47 Furthermore, a
number of cases have held that both warranties are capable of
arising out of a single fact setting. 4 76 In fact, it is this capacity for
cumulation which may often lead courts to fail to distinguish
between the two warranties. Instead, many courts lump the two
together into a general warranty of fitness. Because of their
differences, however, such lumping is often a critical mistake.
The difficulty created by lumping the two warranties together
is that a good may be capable of being merchantable, yet might not
be fit for a particular purpose. Thus, for example, an automobile
might well be fit for ordinary driving, yet might not be fit for
racing. 477 By the same token, a good might be fit for a particular
purpose yet unfit for ordinary purposes.4 78 Finally, a good might be
473. U.C.C. 5 2-315, Comment 2.
474. Comment 2 to section 2-315 provides in relevant part:
A "particular purpose" differs from the ordinary purpose for which the goods are used
in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his
business whereas the ordinary purposes for which goods are used are those envisaged
in the concept of merchantability and go to uses which are customarily made of the
goods in question. For example, shoes are generally used for the purpose of walking
upon ordinary ground, but a seller may know that a particular pair was selected to be
used for climbing mountains.
U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 2.
475. U.C.C. § 2-317 [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-34 (1968)] (emphasis added).
476. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286
N.E.2d 188 (1972); Jacobson v. Benson Motors, Inc., 216 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1974); Madison Silos
v. Wassom, 215 N.W.2d 494 (Iowa 1974); Nelson v. Wilkins Dodge, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 472 (Minn.
1977); Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C. 423, 196 S.E.2d 711 (1973).
477. SeeJacobson v. Benson Motors, Inc., 216 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1974).
478. This would occur less frequently, but it is possible. Thus, a buyer of a television set who
bought for the particular purpose of UHF reception might receive a set with acceptable UHF
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both unmerchantable and unfit for a particular purpose, based
upon separate defects. 4 79 Thus, we are brought full circle to the
question of whether there can be a breach of both warranties based
upon a single defect, or based upon a purpose which, although
articulated as particular, is merely an ordinary use. In other words,
how particular must a particular purpose be?
The cases are apparently split over the issue, but those which
allow assertion of both warranties represent the better rule, for
several reasons. First, such reasoning fully comports with the
comment to section 2-315, which suggests that the difference may
be one merely of degree. Second, in the occasional case where only
one warranty is disclaimed, allowance of the dual warranty may be
the only means of protecting legitimate expectations. Third, in
many cases the use contemplated by the buyer, although known to
the seller to be an ordinary use, is thought by the buyer to be a
48 0
particular use.
In fairness to the courts which have indicated that the implied
warranty of fitness for particular purpose is dependent upon some
known purpose outside the ordinary use of the goods, it should be
pointed out that in all of these cases the assertion is made through
dictum. Thus, in Falcon Equipment Corp. v. Courtesy Lincoln Mercury,
Inc.,48 1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
expressed its doubt that a request for "a quiet, dependable and
comfortable automobile which would be suitable for long distance
trips on interstate highways ' 4 8 2 would qualify as a particular
purpose.4 83 It should be n6ted, however, that the court was
applying Iowa law, which has not yet determined this issue,
although there are Iowa cases which suggest that other than
4 84
ordinary purpose is required.
Similarly, in Janssen v. Hook,4 85 the court, in ruling that the
trial court's finding of fact that no particular purpose warranty
reception, but with less than acceptable VHF reception. There would, in theory, be a breach of the
warranty of merchantability since the set would be unfit for ordinary purposes, yet it would be fit for
the buyer's particular purpose.
479. For example, an automobile purchased for racing might be unmerchantable because its
engine capabilities are not suitable for ordinary driving, and also unfit for its particular purpose
because its tires are standard.
480. This arises often in consumer transactions and in highly specialized commercial
transactions. For example, the consumer with poor eyesight might consider it a particular purpose
that a television set receive a sharp picture, whereas most people would consider it a characteristic
common to all television sets. Or the purchaser of sophisticated computer equipment might consider
"on line" capability a particular purpose, while the seller considers it an ordinary use.
481. 536 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1976).
482. Falcon Equip. Corp. v. Courtesy Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 536 F.2d 806, 809 (8th Cir.
1976).
483. Id.
484. See Jacobson v. Benson Motors, Inc., 216 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1974); Madison Silos v.
Wassom, 215 N.W.2d 494 (Iowa 1974).
485. 1111. App. 3d 318, 272 N.E.2d 385 (1971).
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existed was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, noted
that, although the seller was aware of the buyer's purpose, there
was "nothing to show that such use would differ from the ordinary
use of [such goods] in general. "486 Again, the inference is clear that
since the ordinary use and particular use were the same, no
particular purpose warranty could be created. However, in
mitigation of that inference is the fact that at least two other Illinois
cases, decided after Janssen, have indicated that the ordinary
48
purpose can readily become a particular purpose. 1
4 88
To the same effect is Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co.,
involving a contract for the production and sale of hair wiglet cases.
When the cases failed to meet the plaintiff's expectations, plaintiff
sued, alleging breach of an implied warranty of fitness for
particular purpose. In finding that no such warranty had been
created, the court stated:
A particular purpose envisages a specific use of the
product which is peculiar to the buyer . . . . The wiglet
cases were never intended for any purpose other than the
ordinary purpose of carrying hairpieces and accessories.
Thus the court finds that the warranty of fitness for a
4 89
particular purpose does not apply.
This is perhaps the clearest expression of the rule in the abstract,
and it clearly implies that, so long as the ordinary purpose and the
particular purpose are the same, no particular purpose warranty
will be found. The same general premise was part of the basis for
the court's decision in Bruce v. Calhoun First National Bank. 490 In
Bruce, the court, although acknowledging that the seller knew that
the buyer's particular purpose in purchasing certain carpets was for
resale, held that this did not constitute a particular purpose under
4 91
the Code.
Without considering the correctness of the results of the
foregoing cases, it is apparent that some courts are, perhaps
justifiably, uneasy in declaring that some goods' ordinary purpose
486.janssen v. Hook, 1 I11.App. 3d 318, 321, 272 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1971).
487. See Sauers v. Tibbs, 48 11. App. 3d 805, 363 N.E.2d 444 (1977); Overland Bond & Inv.
Corp. v. Howard, 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168 (1972). Overlandwill be discussed infra at notes
502-03 and accompanying text.
488. 402 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Conn. 1975).
489. Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017, 1025 (D. Conn. 1975)
(citations omitted).
490. 134 Ga. App. 790, 216 S.E.2d 622 (1975).
491. Bruce v. Calhoun First Nat'l Bank, 134 Ga. App. 790,
-,
216 S.E.2d 622, 625
(1975).
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might nevertheless reach the status of a particular purpose in the
contemplation of a given buyer. Taken to the extreme, it is possible
that failure to recognize the distinction between the two warranties,
at least insofar as there seems to be required a difference in degree,
might result in a court charging a factfinder that "'there is an
implied warranty in every sale that the product will perform the
purpose for which it was purchased.

'

"492

Such a charge would

clearly be in derogation of the statutory requirements, and it is
perhaps out of fear that such results will occur that courts have
demonstrated some reluctance to equate ordinary use with
particular purpose. The majority of courts which have considered
the question, however, have managed to suppress the fear, and,
while paying lip service to the need for more specificity to invoke
the particular purpose warranty, have allowed particular purpose
recovery when an ordinary purpose was at issue. As indicated
earlier, it is believed that this analysis is correct, and, so long as the
facts justify the decisions, the fine line being drawn is workable.
This fine line is perfectly illustrated in Shofner v. Williams &
Pearson Furniture Co., 493 which was discussed earlier in connection

with disclaimers of implied warranties. 494 Plaintiffs had purchased
a color television set from defendants, complete with a special
antenna. The "particular purpose" of the plaintiffs was "to receive
a good color picture." When the set did not produce a good color
picture defendant attempted several times to repair it, but
plaintiffs finally purchased another set, refused to take redelivery of
the repaired set, and sued. The lower court held that there was an
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, 495 and the
appellate court affirmed.4 96 It is apparent, however, that the
particular purpose found was the ordinary purpose for which a
497
color television set is purchased: to receive a good color picture.
One can imagine circumstances in which reception of a good
color picture might amount to a particular purpose, as, for
example, when the set was being purchased for use in an unusual
place (e.g., a mobile home or a rural area without transmitting
facilities), 498 or where the buyer had poor eyesight and needed an
492. Drilling Accessory & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 7 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1177, 1178 (Okla. Ct. App.
1970) (reversing the lower court decision because of this charge).
493. 8 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970).
-494. See supra notes 466-70 and accompanying text.
495. Shofner v. Williams & Pearson Furniture Co., 8 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 48, 49 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1970).
496. Id. at 53.
497. Id.at 51.
498. Although the facts of the case do not indicate where the plaintiffs lived, their attorney was
from Madison, a suburb of Nashville. If it can be assumed that they too were from that area, it would
clearly not qualify as an "unusual" place.
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especially clear picture. However, there is nothing in Shofner to
suggest such circumstances. It is hard to imagine a case where there
could be a closer connection between ordinary use and particular
purpose.
Oddly, the Tennessee court apparently did not realize that it
had elevated an ordinary use to particular purpose status. Other
courts have at least done this much, and their opinions suggest that
the fine lines drawn are purposeful. In Tennessee Carolina
Transportation, Inc. v. Strick Corp.,4 99 the court refused to even draw
the line, holding that when the particular purpose warranty is
asserted as having been made even though the particular purpose
and the ordinary purpose are the same, "ftjhat warranty also
protects a buyer when his particular purpose is the general or
ordinary purpose." 50 0 In other words, there exists clear authority
for the proposition that both warranties can exist by virtue of
common characteristics of the goods. Thus, it has been held that a
funeral home breaches the particular purpose warranty when it
supplies a vault too small to house a child's casket, since the funeral
home knows of the particular purpose and knows that the
50 1
purchasers are relying on the funeral home's skill or judgment.
By the same token, to the extent that the ordinary purpose of an
automobile is to provide dependable transportation, it is hard to
imagine how the seller's knowledge that it is to be used by a
traveling businessman somehow converts that into a particular
purpose. Yet this was precisely what the court found in Overland
Bond & Investment Corp. v. Howard,502 thereby again converting a
50 3
clearly ordinary purpose into a particular one.
The foregoing cases amply support the proposition that an
ordinary use can, because of a buyer's communication to the seller,
become a particular purpose, thereby creating warranties in
addition to merchantability. These cases are the clearest examples,
for almost everyone would agree that the particular purpose
asserted in each case was actually the sole ordinary purpose of the
goods involved. But other examples abound where, although the
particular purpose asserted is not the exclusive ordinary purpose, it is
certainly one of the ordinary purposes of the goods.
For example, at least three cases have held that the seller's
499. 283 N.C. 423, 196 S.E.2d 711 (1973).
500. Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C. 423,
-,
196 S.E.2d 711,
717 (1973) (emphasis in original) (North Carolina court applying Pennsylvania law).
501. Caldwell v. Brown Funeral Serv. Home, 345 So. 2d 1341 (Ala. 1977).
502.9 11. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168 (1972).
503. Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 9 Il1. App. 3d 348, 354, 292 N.E.2d 168, 173
(1972).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

awareness of the buyer's need to haul various items created a
50 4
particular purpose warranty with respect to the sale of trucks.
While not all trucks are ordinarily going to be used for "hauling,"
"hauling" is clearly an ordinary use of a truck. Therefore, to find
that a particular purpose warranty was created is to admit the
probability of overlap, and to accept, at least in theory, that
ordinary purpose can, without more, become particular purpose.
It also takes little imagination to realize that an ordinary
purpose of a mobile home is use as a residence. Nevertheless, when
bugs infested a newly purchased mobile home, the court, in
affirming the trial court decision, found that the use of a mobile
home as a residence was a "particular purpose," and that bug
infestation breached the particular purpose warranty. 50 5 Again, it is
clear that the particular purpose warranty may exist even though
the particular purpose is also one of the ordinary purposes of the
goods.
A closer case, and one more reflective of the difference-indegree analysis, is illustrated in Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau
CooperativeAssociation. 506 In Woodruff, the buyer's particular purpose
for purchasing chickens was egg production, clearly an ordinary
use but sufficiently distinct from other ordinary uses tojustify, even
under a restrictive reading of the Code, the implication of the
particular purpose warranty. 50 7 If ever a case paralleled the "shoehiking" hypothetical of comment 2 to section 2-315, Woodruff did,
and the court found that the particular purpose warranty had been
created. 508
The discussion of the previous cases has shown that very often
a buyer's particular purpose will be one of the ordinary purposes
for which the specific goods are intended, and that therefore both
the particular purpose warranty and the more general
merchantability warranty will be invocable. 50 9 Less frequently,
when the goods are specially manufactured, for example, the
ordinary purpose and the particular purpose will almost of
necessity coincide.5 10 It is therefore a mistake to "pigeonhole" the
504. Jerry Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v. Bailey, 154 Ind. App. 632, 291 N.E.2d 92 (1972)
(rock); Childers & Venters, Inc. v. Sowards, 460 S.W.2d 343 (Ky. 1970) (coal); Roupp v. Acor, 253
Pa. Super. Ct. 46, 384 A.2d 968 (1978) (timber).
505. Sauers v. Tibbs, 48 111. App. 3d 805, 363 N.E.2d 444 (1977).
506. 153 Ind. App. 31,286 N.E.2d 188 (1972).
507. Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31,
, 286
N.E.2d 188, 195 (1972).
508. Id.
509. See also Nelson v. Wilkins Dodge, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1977) (both warranties can
accompany sale of automobile).
510. See, e.g., Valley Iron & Steel Co. v. Thorin, 278 Or. 103, 562 P.2d 1212 (1977).
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particular purpose and merchantability warranties into any kind of
mutually exclusive categories. By the same token, it is obvious that
to fail to distinguish between the two at all will potentially result in
their total merger, which would also be an unfortunate mistake.
The solution seems to be to attempt to draw a very fine line, but
with an awareness that when the line is crossed the availability of
both warranties is to be favored.
The original questions posed, whether the warranty of
merchantability should subsume that of fitness for a particular
purpose and how particular the buyer's purpose must be, have thus
been answered. Although section 2-315 requires a particular
purpose, the buyer's particular purpose may in fact be the ordinary
purpose or one of the ordinary purposes for which the goods are
used. If facts are presented which lend themselves to implication of
both merchantability and particular purpose warranties, both
warranties should be held to exist. There is nothing in the Code
which prevents it, and there are sound reasons for such a result.
6. The Buyer's Reliance
In addition to having reason to know of the buyer's needs, the
seller must also have reason to know that the buyer is relying on his
skill or judgment to meet those needs. The inquiry concerning
reliance is directed at two distinct, although interrelated, activities.
First, the seller must be on notice that the buyer is relying on him,
and second, the buyer must in fact rely on him. The first inquiry,
whether the seller had reason to know of the buyer's reliance, is
explicitly required by section 2-315, and in a sense focuses on the
relative expertise of the parties. The second requirement is implicit
in the first, and depends on a factual determination of whether,
once the buyer is shown to be less astute than the seller, he in fact
relies on the seller's skill orjudgment.
The cases reveal few problems related to the reliance
requirements, and one is tempted to explain this phenomenon on
the basis that at issue are fact questions, to be resolved on a case by
case basis. 5 11 Thus, review at the appellate level will ordinarily be
limited to whether the record reveals testimony which would
support a factual conclusion that the seller had sufficient expertise
511. See Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Hydrotex Indus., Inc., 440 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1971); Turnbough
v. Schien, 26 11. App. 3d 88, 325 N.E.2d 5 (1975); El Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto-Flex Oven Co., 199
Neb. 697, 261 N.W.2d 358 (1978); Fulwider v. Flynn, 90 S.D. 527, 243 N.W.2d 170 (1976).
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to provide skill and judgment 51 2 vis-a-vis the buyer, 513 and whether
the buyer relied on that skill or judgment. 1 4 Yet, even on such
limited review, certain significant factors emerge.
For example, it is probably not too bold to assert that a quasipresumption in favor of reliance arises when the seller is an expert
with respect to the goods and the buyer is not. This is true in spite
of language in some cases which demands that the reliance be
affirmatively shown. 515 The presumption, however, is rebuttable,
and will be effectively countered by showing that the buyer was
substantially familiar with the particular goods at issue; 51 6 that the
buyer either prepared or required conformity with detailed
specifications or descriptions, 1 7 although there is some
disagreement as to how detailed the specifications must be;5 18 that
512. See.[etero Constr. Co. v. South Memphis Lumber Co., 531 F.2d 1348 (6th Cir. 1976);
Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 537 (D. Mass. 1977);
Donald v. City Nat'l Bank of Dothan, 295 Ala. 320, 329 So. 2d 92 (1976); Prince v. LeVan, 486
P.2d 959 (Alaska 1971); Catania v. Brown, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 344, 231 A.2d 668 (1967); Acme Pump
Co. v. National Cash Register, Inc., 32 Conn. Supp. 69, 337 A.2d 672 (C.P. 1974).
513. Althoughi relatively few cases have articulated well the comparative nature of the expertise,
it is implicit in the decisions cited in note 512, supra. For cases specifically discussing relative
expertise, see Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Conn. 1975); Prince v.
LeVan, 486 P.2d 959 (Alaska 1971); Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 359 Mass. 474, 269
N.E.2d 664 (1971); Valiga v. National Food Co., 58 Wis. 2d 232, 206 N.W.2d 377 (1973). Not
surprisingly, in the majority of the cases where the buyer's expertise is discussed at any length the
warranty is held not to be created.
514. See Plasco, Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging Corp., 547 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1977); Falcon Equip.
Corp. v. Courtesy Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 536 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1976); Fear Ranches, Inc. v.:
Berry, 470 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1972); Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp., 451 F.2d
1115 (10th Cir. 1971); Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Hydrotex Indus., Inc., 440 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1971);
Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977); United States Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor& Schwartz,
Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Klipfel v. Neill, 30 Colo. App. 428, 494 P.2d 115 (1972);
Acme Pump Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 32 Conn. Supp. 69, 337 A.2d 672 (C.P. 1974);
Sieman v. Alden, 34 III. App. 3d 961, 341 N.E.2d 713 (1975); Garner v. S & S Livestock Dealers,
Inc., 248 So. 2d 783 (Miss. 1971); El Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto-Flex Oven Co., 199 Neb. 697, 261
N.W.3d 358 (1978); Bastiste v. American Home Prod. Corp., 32 N.C. App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269
(1977); Hobson Constr. Co. v. Hajoca Corp., 28 N.C. App. 684, 222 S.E.2d 709 (1976); Fulwider
v. Flynn, 90 S.D. 527, 243 N.W.2d 170 (1976); Layne-Atlantic Co. v. Koppers Co., 214 Va. 767,
201 S.E.2d 609 (1974); Lewis & Sims, Inc. v. Key Indus., Inc., 16 Wash. App. 619, 557 P.2d 1318
(1976); Valiga v. National Food Co., 58 Wis. 2d232, 206 N.W. .2d 377.
515. See United States Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich.
1972); Turnbough v. Schien, 26 111.App. 3d 88, 325 N.E.2d 5 (1975).
516. Trax, Inc. v. Tidmore, _
Ala.
, 331 So. 2d 275 (1976), rev'don other grounds,
___
Ala.
, 349 So. 2d 597 (1977).
517. See, e.g., Klipfel v. Neill, 30 Colo. App. 428, 494 P.2d 115 (1972); Axion Corp. v. G.D.C.
Leasing Corp., 359 Mass. 474, 269 N.E.2d 664 (1971); Mohasco Indus., Inc. v. Anderson
Halverson Corp., 90 Nev. 114, 520 P.2d 234 (1974); Hobson Constr. Co. v. Hajoca Corp., 28 N.C.
App. 684, 222 S.E.2d 709 (1976); Layne-Atlantic Co. v. Koppers Co., 214 Va. 467, 201 S.E.2d 609
(1974); Lewis & Sims, Inc. v. Key Indus., Inc., 16 Wash. App. 619, 557 P.2d 1318 (1976). As to
descriptions, see Standard Packaging Corp. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 378 F.2d 505 (3d Cir.
1967); Consolidated Supply Co. v. Babbitt, 96 Idaho 636, 534 P.2d 466 (1975).
By the same token, however, if it is the seller who prepares or recommends the specifications,
the seller cannot avoid liability when the buyer subsequently adopts those specifications. SeeSinger
Co. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 579 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1978).
518. Thus, for example, in Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp., 451 F.2d 1115
(10th Cir. 1971), the defendant buyer explained its needs to the plaintiff seller by rather specific
language: it needed an aluminum floor that was "rigid and lightweight" with "a smooth surface
with minimal joints" that would "conduct low-voltage electricty," that had to be "assembled into
nine feet by forty feet panels" which would operate both as floors and as side panels. Id. at 1117.
When the product did not function as desired, defendant refused to pay, seller sued, and buyer
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the buyei engaged in independent testing to determine whether the
goods would meet his needs, 5 19 although, again, the tests or
inspections would have to be truly independent of the seller;5 20 or
52 1
that the buyer had a predisposition toward the particulargoods.
The fact that the buyer selects a particular seller based upon
another buyer's success with a product is not dispositive of the
issue, 522 and the fact that a buyer selects a "trade name" item
should not impede the warranty, so long as he does not insist upon
523
the trade name.
If there is a presumption of reliance, it seems reasonable to
allow the seller to rebut the presumption on the basis of the
foregoing "exceptions." Each of the tools for rebuttal shares a
common characteristic: if proven, each will in effect demonstrate
that the buyer, rather than the seller, was exercising skill or
judgment, and was in fact making the selection of goods. Thus it
seems clear that anytime the buyer actually does the selecting
(without prodding or inducement by the seller) no particular
524
purpose warranty should attach.
One of the reasons the quasi-presumption exists is that the
commercial seller of goods is presumed to have skill or knowledge
with reference to the goods, whereas the buyer does not. The
exceptions listed earlier suggest that when, for one reason or
countered. Alcoa attempted to escape liability by asserting that the buyer's specifications had been
detailed, and that therefore no particular purpose warranty was created. The court responded by
calling the foregoing "general terms," and not specifically detailed plans. Id. at 1119.
See also Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971). Plaintiff had specified an oil
without additives, at the same time telling defendant for what purposes the oil was required. The
court held that particular purpose warranty could exist.
519. See Plasco, Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging Corp., 547 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1977) (buyer made
own "admittedly inadequate tests"); Donald v. City Nat'l Bank ofDothan, 295 Ala. 320, 329 So. 2d
92 (1976); Valiga v. National Food Co., 58 Wis. 2d 232, 206 N.W.2d 377 (1973) (buyer conducted
his own tests, but failed to administer one which would have shown defect).
520. See, e.g., Gellenbach v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 59 Mich. App. 339, 229 N.W.2d 443 (1975)
(independent report made by factory but supplied by seller to buyer; held implied warranty exists).
521. See Falcon Equip. Corp. v. Courtesy Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 536 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1976)
(buyer's predisposition toward particular model suggests no reliance on seller); Bickett v. W.R.
Grace Co., 12 U .C.C. REP. SERv. 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972) (designation by trade name coupled with no
evidence of particular purpose suggests absence of reliance); Sieman v. Alden, 34 Il. App. 3d 961,
341 N.E.2d 713 (1975) (buyer attempted to get goods from manufacturer, but when they were
unavailable there, buyer purchased same items from private party; held since plaintiff buyer had,
before contacting defendant seller, decided on the particular goods, no warranty of particular
purpose was created); Engelbrecht v. W.D. Brennan & Sons, 501 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973).
522. See, e.g., El Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto-Flex Oven Co., 199 Neb. 697, 261 N.W.2d 358
(1978) (buyer of oven chose seller on basis of friend's recommendation because a similar oven had
worked well for friend; held, factual question of reliance not foreclosed).
523. Comment 5 to section 2-315 specifically disavows the validity of any "trade name"
exception, stating that the use of a trade name or other designation by the buyer is only one fact to
consider. See Thompson Farms v. Corno Feed Prods., 173 Ind. App. 682, 366 N.E.2d 3
(1977). But seeFalcon Equip. Corp. v. Courtesy Lincoln Mercury, Inc.. 536 F.2d 806 (8th Cir.
1976); Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972); Engelbrecht v.
W.D. Brannon& Sons, Inc., 501 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
524. See, e.g., Fear Ranches, Inc. v. Berry, 470 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1972); Garner v. S & S
Livestock Dealers, Inc., 248 So. 2d 783 (Miss. 1971).
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another, the buyer's skill or knowledge is equal or superior to the
seller's, the presumption is rebutted. This raises at least the
possibility that a seller will urge his own lack of skill in order to
escape liability. Ordinarily, such contentions should be ignored,
but special circumstances might arise which would justify a finding
that the seller is on a par with the buyer, and no warranty therefore
attaches. Thus, for example, where the goods involved are so
experimental as to be beyond the seller's experience,5 25 or the use
intended by the buyer is so unique that the seller expressly disavows
any knowledge as to whether the goods will work, 526 the seller
should not be held liable. On the other hand, in the ordinary case,
even where the seller is custom-manufacturing an item for the
buyer, liability should generally attach.5 27 The distinction is one of
degree, and non-liability should exist only where the seller is, in
effect, out of his field of expertise.
One other facet of reliance bears particular note. As we have
seen, it is the seller's skill or knowledge which must be relied upon
by the buyer, so that if the buyer requests a particular product or is
following the recommendation of one other than the seller, no
warranty attaches. This has had a particularly interesting impact in
the area of prescription drugs, where at least two cases have held
that the pharmacist who fills the prescription is not liable for breach
of the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. 528 The
theory behind non-liability, of course, is that the buyer is relying
not on the seller's skill or judgment, but on the skill of the
prescribing physician. Stated in the abstract, these decisions make
a great deal of sense, as the pharmacist probably lacks the authority
to make substitutions. It is suggested, however, that no blanket rule
should exist to shield pharmacists (or others similarly situated) from
making the implied warranty, even with respect to prescription
drugs. Responsibility should be imposed on the pharmacist, in
spite of the presence of the prescription, anytime the pharmacist,
aware of the buyer's needs and the drug's attributes, fails to inform
the buyer of potential problems. While it is generally just not to
hold the pharmacist responsible, when it appears that the
525. SeeAxion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 359 Mass. 474, 269 N.E.2d 664 (1971) (goods
were semi-experimental, with buyer and seller sharing in design).
526. SeeGilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 537 (D. Mass.
1977).
527. SeeAluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp., 451 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1971) (even
though the development of a new system was at issue, since it was within the seller's field of
expertise, particular purpose warranty existed); Northern Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. Gates, 196
N.W.2d 70 (N.D. 1972) (plaintiff seller, although he never sold pipe for harrow attachments before,
was an expert in pipe; held, the warranty attaches).
528. See Batiste v. American Home Prods. Corp., 32 N.C. App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269 (1977);
Bichler v. Willing, 58 A.D.2d 331, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977).

WARRANTY LAW

619

pharmacist meets the other requirements of section 2-315 it seems
unreasonable to allow him to shield himself completely from
liability. At the same time, it is recognized that this analysis may
529
more properly be framed in tort than in contract.
7. Used Goods and Fitnessfor ParticularPurpose
Having discussed at length the particular purpose warranty,
there remain only two relatively minor points to be made before
analyzing the North Dakota contributions to the area. One, largely
implicit in the whole concept of fitness for particular purpose, is the
warranty's applicability to used goods. Unlike the warranty of
530
merchantability, which makes explicit reference to used goods,
the particular purpose warranty is silent on the issue. However, the
fact that the seller need not be a merchant to make the particular
purpose warranty suggests that used goods can appropriately be the
subject of the warranty. Moreover, the cases have rather
consistently allowed used goods to be covered by the warranty,
either expressly recognizing that such coverage is proper 53 1 or
ignoring the question but imposing liability. 532 It would therefore
be surprising, and probably unjustified, for courts not to allow used
5 33
goods to carry the particular purpose warranty.
8. Express Warranty of Fitnessfor ParticularPurpose
The final consideration before discussing the North Dakota
cases is largely pragmatic. Thus far, the particular purpose
warranty has been considered from the perspective that the Code
suggests, as an implied warranty. Although the cases treat it as
implied, as a practical matter it is difficult to imagine circumstances
529. In actuality this is a case of dual reliance, primarily on the doctor and secondarily on the
pharmacist. In that sense, it is analogous to the buyer who purchases goods from a seller, relying on
both the seller and a third party. If the seller is aware of the buyer's purpose, it may be justifiable to
impose a duty on the seller to inform the buyer (and the third party) that the chosen goods will not
likely be suitable.
530. Comment 3 to section 2-314 provides: "A contract for the sale of second-hand goods,
however, involves only such goods for that is their contract description." U.C.C. S 2-314, Comment
3. Furthermore, comment 4 makes explicit references to "second-hand" goods. U.C.C. § 2-314,
Comment 4.
531. See Knipp v. Weinbaum, 351 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Brown v. Hall, 221
So. 2d 454 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (comparing pre-Code law with section 2-315); Overland Bond
& Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168 (1972); Natale v. Martin Volkswagon,
Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 1046, 402 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1978); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Vic Tanny Int'l ofToledo,
Inc., 46 Ohio App. 2d 137, 346 N.E.2d 330 (1975).
532. See, e.g., DeLamar Motor Co. v. White, 249 Ark. 708, 460 S.W.2d 802 (1970); Jerry
Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v. Bailey, 154 Ind. App. 632, 291 N.E.2d 92 (1972); Childers &
Venters, Inc. v. Sowards, 460 S.W.2d 343 (Ky. 1970).
533. Although the North Dakota courts have not discussed the issue recently, pre-Code case law
suggests that used goods are covered by the particular purpose warranty. See WJ. Dyer & Bro. v.
Bauer, 48 N.D. 396, 184 N.W. 809 (1921) (second-hand fotoplayer sold to defendant who had never
seen one, and who relied on the seller's representations; held that there was an implied warranty that
the fotoplayer should be fit for the purpose of providing adequate orchestral music for a movie
theater).
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in the real world where the particular purpose warranty, if it exists,
could not be characterized as express. To the extent that the seller,
after being made aware of the buyer's needs, so much as utters a
word (e.g., "this should do it," "try this," or "what you need is
this"), he will in effect have promised or affirmed that the goods the
seller selects will meet the buyer's needs. To that extent, the seller
will have made both an express and an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose.5 34 Similarly, if the seller furnishes
specifications for goods to meet the buyer's needs, both an express
and an implied warranty will exist. 535 The point, of course, is that
in most cases where an implied particular purpose warranty would
exist there would also be an express warranty, with all its
concomitant protections. The buyer will therefore almost always be
able to allege at least two bases of recovery. Whether characterized
as express or implied, the warranty will be created when the buyer
makes known a particular purpose and evidences his dependence
on the seller, and the seller responds accordingly.
9. Fitnessfor ParticularPurpose: North Dakota Cases
The North Dakota cases dealing with the particular purpose
warranty are rather atypical and deserve discussion. The first case
to discuss section 2-315 was NorthernPlumbing Supply, Inc. v. Gates, 536
which involved the sale of some pipe from the plaintiff to the
defendant. Apparently after payment was due, plaintiff and
defendant jointly borrowed the purchase price from a bank, cosigning a note to evidence the loan, and plaintiff received the
proceeds. When the note became due, defendant refused to pay it,
claiming breach of warranty; the plaintiff paid it and sued the
defendant. The lower court held for the plaintiff, and the North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed. 537
The defendant was both a farmer and a manufacturer of
harrow attachments, and in the manufacturing process he made
substantial use of pipe. 538 The plaintiff was a pipe supplier. The
plaintiff seller was aware of the purpose for which defendant was
buying the pipe, 539 and, although the buyer had given the seller a
"sample" of pipe and had requested the same type of pipe, 540 his
534. See, e.g., DeLamar MotorCo. v. White, 249 Ark. 708, 460 S.W.2d 802 (1970).
535. SeeU.C.C. § 2-313(l) (b) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-30(1) (b) (1968)].
536. 196 N.W.2d 70(N.D. 1972).
537. Northern Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. Gates, 196 N.W.2d 70, 74 (N.D. 1972).
538. Id. at7I.
539. Id.at 71, 73.
540. Id. at 72. At this juncture it is probably appropriate to point out that, as indicated above,
an express warranty might have been created. To the extent that the seller undertook to supply pipe
according to the "sample" (albeit the buyer's sample), an express warranty that it would comply

WARRANTY LAW

order was for "standard" pipe. Unknown to the buyer,
"standard" pipe could vary in wall thickness from .116 to .133
inches, and the plaintiff supplied pipe with a wall thickness of. 120
inches, clearly within the definition of. "standard," but not
sufficiently thick for the buyer's needs. 5 4 1 The seller, however,
knew of the variations within the definition, and knew that pipe of
the thickness supplied was more appropriate for jobs which
54 2
generated internal, as opposed to external, pressure.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff asserted that since the goods supplied
met the contract definition of "standard" there could be no breach
543
of warranty. The court disagreed.
Ignoring the possibility that an express warranty might have
been created by the sample, 5 44 the court cited North Dakota's
version of section 2-315 and noted that the seller knew of the
buyer's particular purpose. 545 Furthermore,
the parties'
comparative knowledge with respect to pipe made it clear that the
delivery of pipe "wholly unfit for such purpose" 54 6 constituted both
the existence and breach of the implied warranty of fitness for
particular purpose. 54 7 Thus, the judgment was reversed.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Teigen suggested that the
seller should not have been found to have made the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, for two reasons. 54 8
First, the buyer, as a manufacturer who dealt with pipe, had
knowledge and experience with respect to pipe, had specified a
particular type of pipe ("standard" according to sample), and had
therefore not relied at all upon the seller's skill or knowledge to
supply appropriate pipe. 54 9 Second, the buyer made no allegation
of breach of the implied warranty, but had countered on the ground
that he had ordered standard pipe and received substandard
pipe. 550 Therefore, the dissent felt that no implied warranty was at
5
issue. 51
At least two aspects of the dissent's view are worthy of
consideration. As noted earlier, the buyer must make the seller
therewith might have existed. Since the defect complained of amounted to a failure to meet the
sample, liability could have rested on express warranty grounds as well.
541. Id.
542. Id. at 73-74.
543. Id. at 74.
544. Id. See supra note 540.
545. 196 N.W.2d at 74.
546. Id.
547. Id.
548. Id. at 74 (Teigen, J., dissenting).

549. Id. at 75.
550. Id.
551. Id. at 75-76.
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aware of his needs and.that he is relying on the seller's expertise. To
the extent that the dissent based its argument on non-reliance and
equivalent expertise, it bears closer scrutiny. The facts of the case
clearly demonstrate that the defendant ordered a particular type of
pipe, and, unless other circumstances suggest that the warranty
should nevertheless be implied, the dissent would be correct.
However, other circumstances justifying the implication did exist.
The dissent's view of the transaction is summarized as follows:
[Tlhe defendant showed [the plaintiff's representative]
through his factory and . . . he looked at some of the
attachments being manufactured. There is, however, no
evidence
that the defendant
sought
[plaintiff's
representative's] opinion or his recommendation in
regard to the type, quality, size or grade of pipe which
should be used in the manufacturing process. . . . I find
no evidence whatever that the defendant relied on or
sought the benefit of whatever skill or knowledge
[plaintiff's representative] might have in this field. He
certainly did not rely on [plaintiff's representative's] skill
552
in making a choice for him.
The dissent, however, overlooked two factors. First, there is
no requirement that the buyer be completely ignorant with respect
to the transaction, and none that the buyer rely completely on the
seller's skill or judgment. Where, as in this transaction, the buyer
has been using a good which suits his needs, and the seller is asked
to provide a good which will also suit the buyer's needs, the
warranty should apply in spite of the fact that the buyer requests
similar goods (based on his own experience) and furnishes the seller
with the general specifications of the goods which currently meet
his needs. The reason for the "specification exception" (that the
buyer by giving specifications is requesting goods based entirely on
his own expertise) has no application when the specifications are
given only as an example of what will meet the buyer's needs.
Arguably, this is what occurred in Gates, although it would be
possible to view the transaction more literally.5 5 3 Second, and more
importantly, section 2-315 by its literal terms implies the warranty
552. Id. at 75.
553. If the transaction is viewed literally, the specification would readily supply the basis for an
express warranty. Thus, if the buyer gave the seller specifications, as in Gates, of"standard pipe with
a wall thickness of .133," and the seller supplied standard pipe with a lesser thickness, an express
warranty would be breached.
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where the seller knows "that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill
or judgment to select orfurnish suitablegoods. ",54 The dissent entirely
ignored the emphasized portion of the statute. Although the facts of
Gates may indicate that the buyer did not rely on the seller to select
or choose the product, they equally indicate that the buyer was
relying on the seller to furnish suitable pipe. Therefore, the
particular purpose warranty was properly invoked in Gates.
Furthermore, the dissent's narrow construction of section 2315 would largely eviscerate the section's applicability in all but a
handful of commercial transactions. In all sales where particular
purpose is at issue, the buyer clearly knows his own needs. In
many, as in Gates, he will know what is currently meeting his needs,
and yet be seeking a less expensive or otherwise more attractive
alternative. To allow a seller who is specifically requested to furnish
or supply that alternative, and who undertakes to do so, to avoid
particular purpose liability on the basis of the buyer's knowledge or
expertise is to undercut severely the buyer's legitimate
expectations, and in effect deprives the buyer of the benefit of his
bargain.
A year later the North Dakota Supreme Court, in a different
context, addressed clearly the question of the specificity of buyer
specifications, and what would and would not prevent the
implication of a particular purpose warranty. Dobler v. Malloy555
dealt not with the sale of goods but with the construction of a house.
Notwithstanding that major distinction, the rule adopted by the
court clearly demonstrates the direction which the implied
warranty will take in the context of a sale of goods.
The plaintiff in Dobler had contracted to construct a house for
the defendant, the defendant anticipatorily repudiated the contract
on the basis of certain defects, the plaintiff sued, and the defendant
counterclaimed. 556 A first trial resulted in a verdict for defendant,
and a new trial was ordered when the supreme court determined
that the defendant had indeed anticipatorily breached the
contract. 557 On retrial, defendant was allowed to amend his
pleadings to include defects discovered after the first trial, and, to
the chagrin of the plaintiff, was awarded an even greater sum on his
counterclaim in the second action. 558 Plaintiff appealed, alleging
that defendant had caused his own damages by furnishing
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.

U.C.C. § 2-315 [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-32 (1968)] (emphasis added).
214 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1973).
Dobler v. Malloy, 214 N.W.2d 510, 513 (N.D. 1973).
Id.
Id.
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inadequate plans and specifications for the house.5 59 Further,
plaintiff asserted that because the defendant owner had provided
the plans there could be no warranty liability on the plaintiff's
560
part.
The court had no trouble in countering plaintiff's arguments.
The court first noted that the builder had undertaken to build
according to the written plans and specifications, and others which
were to be orally agreed upon. 561 If those plans and specifications
were inadequate, the plaintiff-builder, as the experienced party,
"should have been aware of the facts and should have declined to
enter into the contract. "562 Next, the court recognized the existence
of an express warranty on the basis of the contract language, and
indicated its belief that the use of less-than-detailed specifications in
a home building contract was the norm. 563 The court then
considered the issue of whether "an implied warranty of fitness for
purpose" 564 existed, and what effect the buyer's specifications
would have on it. The court stated:
[Tjhe doctrine of implied warranty of fitness for [a
particular] purpose applies to construction contracts
under circumstances where (1) the contractor holds
himself out . . . as competent to undertake the contract;
and the owner (2) has no particular expertise in the kind
of work contemplated; (3) furnishes no plans, designs,
specifications, details, or blueprints; and (4) tacitly or
specifically indicates his reliance on the experience or skill
of the contractor, after making known to him the specific
5 65
purposes for which the building is intended.
One can readily see that this test encompasses all of the elements of
a section 2-315 implied warranty under the Code, including
reliance, prior notice of purpose, and comparative skill or
expertise. It is equally apparent that the test differs significantly.
With specific reference to the third element, and the fact that the
defendant buyer had furnished certain plans, the court continued:
The owner here furnished a floor plan to an architect,
559.
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
issue.
565.

Id. at 516.
Id.
Id.
Id. See supra notes 528-29 and accompanying text.
214 N.W.2d at 516.
Id.From what follows in the opinion it is clear that the particular purpose warranty was at
Id. (citing Robertson Lumber Co. v. Stephen Farmers Coop. Elevator Co.. 274 Minn. 17.

143 N.W.2d 622 (1966)).
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who drew expanded floor plans of the first floor and the
basement. Such floor plans were submitted to contractors
for the purpose of securing bids .... [Plaintiff] was one of
those who submitted such a bid, and his bid was accepted.
The furnishing of a floor plan is not the furnishing of
5 66
plans, designs, specifications, details, or blueprints.
The court elaborated no further, but it is clear that it ruled as
it did because the plans in Dobler, like the pipe in Gates, did.not
reflect the essence of what the buyer was buying. Rather, the plans
reflected the buyer's expression of what would meet, or had met,
his needs. Such an expression of expectation by the buyer should
foster an impression of reliance, not of non-reliance. Although the
buyer clearly knows his own particular needs, he is still depending
upon the seller to meet them.
The final case in the North Dakota trilogy is Air Heaters, Inc. v.
Johnson Electric, Inc., 56 7 an unremarkable case except in one respect.
The case involved the sale and installation of an electrical system by
the defendant in the plaintiff's building. A subsequent fire was
allegedly caused by either the negligence of the defendant or a defect in the components. 568 The plaintiff was awarded damages
based on breach of warranty, and the North Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed. 56 9 Initially, the court confronted the issue of
whether section 2-315 applied, since the contract was both for the
sale of goods and the performance of services. 570 The court adopted
the test espoused by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in Bonebrake v. Cox. 5 71 Briefly stated, the issue
hinges upon whether the predominant factor or thrust of the
transaction is for goods or services, with the other merely
incidental. 57 2 The court concluded that, since the plaintiff had
failed to demonstrate that the contract at issue had involved
573
predominantly a sale of goods, it could not rely on section 2-315.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff could invoke the non-sale of goods
particular purpose warranty earlier made a part of North Dakota
law in Dobler.57 4 Thus, to the extent that the evidence indicated that
566.214 N.W.2d at 516.
567. 258 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1977).
568. Air Heaters, Inc. v.Johnson Elec., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 649, 651 (N.D. 1977).
569. Id. at 656-57.
570. Id. at 651. Ironically, the North Dakota court had a year earlier missed the opportunity to
address this question in a case more clearly raising the issue. See Eichenberger v. Wilhelm, 244
N.W.2d 691 (N.D. 1976).
571. 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974).
572. Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 957 (8th Cir. 1974).
573. Id. at 958.
574. Dobler v. Malloy, 214 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1973).
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the plaintiff had met the Dobler test, plaintiff was entitled to prevail.
Oddly, the importance of Air Heaters lies not so much in the
recognition of the sales-service dichotomy (although that is clearly
important) as in the extension of the implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose to a non-goods, non-construction contract.
Although perhaps a majority of courts willingly imply a warranty of
habitability in construction contracts for dwellings, 57 5 and although
the North Dakota court was careful to emphasize that the
5 76
defendant's undertaking was "part of the construction process,"
the Air Heaters case establishes nothing less than the availability of
the particular purpose warranty in any type of transaction, whether
it be sale, service, or construction. In this respect, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has been more innovative than its counterparts in other states. It is therefore probably safe to predict that a
North Dakota court, when confronted with any transaction which
raises an opportunity for implication of the warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, will enthusiastically -imply it. This, it is
suggested, is how it should be.
C.

THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY

The final warranty to be considered, and by far the most
important of the implied warranties, is the warranty of
577
This is
merchantability embodied in section 2-314(1) and (2).
perhaps the most familiar warranty to attorneys. The warranty
arises by implication in any sale of goods by a merchant unless it is
disclaimed by appropriate words or conduct. For the purposes of
section 2-314, both food and drink are specifically included within
the scope of the warranty.
575. See, e.g., Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Schipper v. Levitt &
Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154
N.W.3d 803 (1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Moore v. Werner, 418
S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
576. 258 N.W.2d at 654.
577. Section 2-314(1) provides:
Unless excluded or modified (section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink
to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
U.C.C. 5 2-314(l) [N.D.CENT. CODE 5 41-02-31(l)(1968)1.
Section 2-314(2) provides:
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description;
and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
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Section 2-314(2) sets forth minimum standards5 78 for
merchantability. The most important and basic minimum
standard, embodied in subsection (2) (c), is that the goods "are fit
for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." 5 79 Two
points deserve special mention at this juncture: First, the six
minimum standards are stated in the conjunctive, indicating that
all standards appropriate under the circumstances must be met.
Thus, for example, the warranty would be breached if the goods
are fit for ordinary use but are inadequately packaged. Second,
ordinary purpose is determined not by what the seller or
manufacturer envisions, but by what the ordinary (reasonable)
person would consider an ordinary use. Thus, while a wooden
chair might be intended to be used for sitting, an ordinary purpose
might include standing on it, so that if it collapsed when used in
that manner the warranty would be breached. One of the most
common misstatements in warranty law is to equate
merchantability with "intended" use. It is not the intention which
controls, but the ordinary use to which like goods are put.
The warranty of merchantability may be disclaimed, in
accordance with section 2-316, and as a practical matter all
standard form contracts will contain disclaimers, which have
generally been given effect. As indicated earlier, inroads
occasioned by recent federal legislation 580 have had and will
continue to have an impact in this area.
1. Merchantsand Merchantability
One of the most significant differences between the particular
purpose warranty and the warranty of merchantability is that for
the former there is no requirement that the seller be a merchant,
whereas for the latter the statute specifically requires mercantile
status. Although it has been noted that generally a seller held liable
for breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality
and quantity within each unit and among allunits involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if
any.

U.C.C.

5 2-314(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-31(2)(1968)].
578. The introductory language to section 2-314(2) specifies that merchantable goods "must be
at least such as," thereby suggesting that higher standards might apply and that the enumerated
standards are not exhaustive of the concept of merchantability. U.C.C. § 2-314(2) [N.D. CENT.
CODE § 41-02-31(2) (1968)]. The comments indicate that other factors to be considered include usage
and conduct. See U.C.C. 5 2-314, Comment 6.
579. U.C.C. 5 2-314(2) (c) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-31(2) (c) (1968)]. See Erling v. Homera,
Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478, 480-81 (N.D. 1980), for a recent discussion of section 2-314(2) (c) by the
North Dakota Supreme Court.
580. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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purpose will be a merchant, 5 1 it was also noted that section 2-315
does not require merchant status. Conversely, section 2-314
explicitly requires that the seller be "a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind,'' 5 8 2 and, although the comment suggests
circumstances in which a non-merchant might be held to have
made a warranty of merchantability,5 83 the cases are uniform in
requiring that the buyer demonstrate the seller's merchant status.
The initial question, of course, is who qualifies as a merchant
for purposes of section 2-314, a question both complicated and
simplified by the Code. It is simplified by the fact that merchant is
defined in section 2-104 of the Code:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the
kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as
having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or
goods involved in the transaction or to whom such
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment
of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his
occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or
skill .584
The question is complicated by the fact that section 2-314(1)
specifies that the merchant must be "a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind. "585 The question therefore arises whether
581. See supra notes 418-21 and accompanying text.
582. U.C.C. S 2-314(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-31(1)(1968)1.
583. U.C.C. 5 2-314, Comment 4. As indicated, merchant status is generally considered a
prerequisite to merchantability recovery. It would therefore be an easy matter to ignore the
possibility that a non-merchant could be held to have made the warranty. However, three reasons
compel the recognition that the possibility of non-merchant merchantability should not be
overlooked. First, from an adversarial standpoint, it may often occur that in dealing with a "nonmerchant" seller a buyer would, absent implication of the warranty, have no remedy. Thus, cases
may arise where it becomes important, in order to vindicate a client's rights, to explore the
possibility ofarguing the warranty of merchantability in a non-traditional context. Second, comment
4 to section 2-314 indicates that there are times when even a non-merchant should be held to have
made the warranty:
Although a seller may not be a "merchant" as to the goods in question, if he states
generally that they are "guaranteed" the provisions of this section may furnish a guide
to the content of the resulting express warranty. This has particular significance in the
case of second-hand sales, and has further significance in limiting the effect of fineprint disclaimer clauses where their effect would be inconsistent with large-print
assertions of "guarantee."
U.C.C. 5 2-314, Comment 4. Because of this language, one would expect courts to be sympathetic to
claims of merchantability "guarantees" even though no merchant is involved. Third, the fact that
the Code is to be liberally construed has led some courts to conclude that a warranty may be found by
stretching the definition of merchant, thereby doing indirectly what they perceive cannot be done
directly. However, it arguably is better to expand the concept of merchantability than to emasculate
the definition of merchant.
584. U.C.C. S 2-104(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-04(1) (1968)].
585. U.C.C. S 2-314(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-31(1) (1968)1.
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section 2-314 is intended to include all merchants or only those
merchants who "deal in goods of the kind" under section 2-104.
Unfortunately, the cases do little to clarify the question, and an
examination of the Code and its policies is therefore helpful.
At the outset, it would have been a simple matter to draft
section 2-314 to reflect an intention that it apply only to merchants
who deal in goods of the kind, a particular subcategory of the
general category of merchants. Since section 2-314(1) by its terms
does not so limit itself, but rather includes in its coverage
merchants with respect to goods of that kind, it is probable that the
drafters meant to include not only merchants who regularly deal in
such goods, but also those with skill or knowledge as to such goods.
Thus, for example, the manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer,
who would ordinarily be thought of as "merchants," would clearly
be held to imply the warranty. However, by the same token, the
'expert" with respect to such goods could also make the warranty,
so that even in an isolated sale by an expert the warranty would
exist. Thus, for example, the car dealer or mechanic selling his
personal car might be held to have made the warranty, since he is
presumably sufficiently skilled and knowledgeable with respect to
cars, even though it is a casual sale. The yachtsman who is
knowledgeable with respect to boats might be held to have made the
warranty in the sale of a personal boat. While this accords well with
the broad definition of merchant and with the Code's directive for
liberal administration, 586 it goes substantially beyond the
commonplace application of the concept. However, as long as
courts require a literal reading of the "with respect to goods of that
kind" language, even this broad reading of the term "merchant"
in section 2-314 is probably too narrow to incorporate the third subcategory of merchants, those held to be merchants because of their
587
employment of skilled persons.
Cutting against a construction of section 2-314 which broadly
applies the definition of "merchant" is the phrase "with respect to
goods of that kind." While it is true that the drafters did not use the
words "who deals in goods of the kind," the expression in section
2-314 comes close enough to suggest that only merchant-dealers
were intended to be covered. Moreover, had the intent been to
construe the phrase broadly, it would have been a simple matter to
omit the modifying phrase entirely and imply the warranty
whenever a seller was a merchant, with an appropriate cross586. U.C.C. 5 1-106 [N.D. CENT. GODE 5 41-01-06(1968)].
587. See U.C.C. 5 2-104, Comment 2.
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reference to section 2-104(1). Further, the warranty developed
588
primarily in a commercial context, where the seller was a dealer,
and that fact, coupled with the concepts of the trade suggested by
the comments to section 2-314, suggests that the merchant seller
must be a dealer in goods of the kind. Finally, the somewhat cryptic
comment to section 2-104 supports this view, explaining the
various types of merchants and detailing when each aspect of the
definition is likely to apply:
[[1n Section 2-314 on the warranty of merchantability,
such warranty is implied only "if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind." Obviously this
qualification retricts the implied warranty to a much
smaller group than everyone who is engaged in business
and requires a professional status as to particular kinds of
58 9
goods.
Thus, the narrow interpretation of merchant under section 2-314
has support as well.
It is suggested that, notwithstanding the reasons just
enumerated, courts should read section 2-314 to include at least the
first two types of merchants, those who deal in goods of the kind
and those who are knowledgeable or skillful with respect to such
goods. In addition, those who are classified as merchants only
because they employ someone with skill or knowledge should be
included in appropriate circumstances. North Dakota has already
begun to move in this direction, 590 and such a movement is
justifiable both in terms of policy (liberal administration of
remedies, party expectations, and logical development of case law)
588. Comment 2 to section 2-104 states:
The term "merchant" as defined here roots in the "law merchant" concept of a
professional in business. The professional status under the definition may be based
upon specialized knowledge as to the goods, specialized knowledge as to business
practices, or specialized knowledge as to both and which kind of specialized knowledge
may be sufficient to establish the merchant status is indicated by the nature of the
provisions.
U.C.C. 5 2-104, Comment 2. See also Annot., 91 A.L.R.3d 876 (1979).
Historically, the implied warranty of merchantability was imposed on the merchant seller, as it
was the commercial merchant who possessed superior skill and knowledge regarding the goods
themselves. See Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 34, 6974 (1978). However, the warranty of merchantability has been implied in non-sales transactions
which are considered analogous to the sale of goods, such as the bailment for hire, the contract for
services or for work, labor, and materials, and the exchange of goods for services. See Farnsworth,
Implied Warrantiesof Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 653, 667-69 (1957).
589. U.C.C. S 2-104, Comment 2.
590. See Eichenberger v. Wilhelm, 244 N.W.2d 691 (N.D. 1976).
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and in terms of literal construction of the Code. 59 1

The cases exploring the above question are interesting, and
predictably reflect judicial uncertainty in dealing with what is.
facially a simple problem but which upon examination becomes
complex. Initially, there is clearly a requirement that the seller be a
merchant of one kind or another; if he is not, no merchantability
warranty attaches to the sale. 5 92 Thus, the isolated or casual sale
will ordinarily not create a warranty of merchantability, provided
that the seller has no peculiar skill or knowledge that might
otherwise create the warranty. 593 However, the mere fact that the
seller can be classified as a merchant for some purposes will not
automatically cause him to be classified as a merchant for purposes
of creating the warranty of merchantability. Thus, a bank, which
might qualify as a merchant under some circumstances, 594 is clearly
not a merchant when it sells a repossessed boat, and therefore
595
makes no warranty of merchantability with respect to the boat.
Similarly, a cattle dealer who always sold to packers would be a
merchant as to that type of cattle, but would not qualify as a
merchant when he sold cattle for breeding purposes, since each type
596
of cattle is considered a different good.
591. Probably the largest impediment to the broad construction is the comment language set out
in text, supra at note 589. In context, however, the comment reflects an intention by the drafters to
broaden the definition of merchant to include virtually all enterprises, under certain circumstances.
Thus, the comment suggests that banks and universities might be deemed merchants, and cases have
gone even further, indicating, for example, that governmental units and hospitals would qualify as
merchants in appropriate circumstances. See Milwaukee v. Northrop Data Sys., 602 F.2d 767
(7th Cir. 1979). With specific reference to section 2-314, however, this breadth must be tempered
with a realization that the merchant must be one with respect to the goods at issue. Thus, although a
hospital might qualify as a merchant under certain circumstances, unless it was knowledgeable with
respect to goods being sold by it, it would not be held to have created a warranty of merchantability.
In Seattle Flight Serv., Inc. v. City of Auburn, 24 Wash. App. 749, 604 P.2d 975 (1979), the
city was held to be a merchant for purposes of the warranty of merchantability. Id. at 751, 604 P.2d
at 977. The city owned and operated the sole fuel service available at the city airport. The court held
that because the city was in the business of selling aircraft fuel it was a merchant. Id.
As a practical matter, the problem is likely to be avoided by disclaimers, but when it is not
courts should focus on policy and expectations. For example, a hotel or motel selling used televisions
or bedding would clearly be a merchant under section 2-104, but, largely because of expectations,
would not make a section 2-314 warranty. However, compare comment 3 to section 2-314:
A person making an isolated sale of goods is not a "merchant" within the meaning of
the full scope of this section and, thus, no warranty of merchantability would apply.
His knowledge of any defects not apparent on inspection would, however, without
need for express agreement and in keeping with the underlying reason of the present
section and the provisions on good faith, impose an obligation that known material but
hidden defects be fully disclosed.
U.C.C. S 2-314, Comment 3.
592. See Prince v. LeVan, 486 P.2d 959 (Alaska 1971) (isolated sale of boat); Downs v. Shouse,
18 Ariz. App. 225, 501 P.2d 401 (1972) (seller arguably not a merchant could not be held to implied
warranty, but capable of making express warranty).
593. See Prince v. LeVan, 486 P.2d 959 (Alaska 1971); Cagney v.Cohn, 13 U.C.C. REP. SRV.
998 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973).
594. See U.C.C. 5 2-104, Comment 2. See also supra note 591.
595. Donald v. City Nat'l Bank ofDothan, 295 Ala. 320, 329 So. 2d 92 (1976).
596. Fear Ranches, Inc. v. Berry, 470 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1972), aff'don rehearing, 503 F.2d 953
(10thCir. 1974).
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The foregoing cases suggest, and the statute clearly requires,
that the test is whether the seller can be classified as a merchant as
to the particular transaction at issue. Because this determination
will of necessity depend upon the facts surrounding the transaction,
it will generally be determined by the factfinder 597 and subject to
reversal only if clearly erroneous. 598 However, just as the mere fact
that a seller is a merchant for some purposes does not automatically
create the warranty, the mere fact that he does not ordinarily deal
in goods of the kind should not automatically preclude the
warranty. Courts which have considered this issue have disagreed,
but probably the better view would be to impose the warranty,
notwithstanding the fact that the seller did not regularly sell goods
of the kind, as long as he was skilled or knowledgeable with respect
to the goods sold.
Courts which have suggested unavailability of the warranty
when the seller was not one who customarily sold goods of the kind
have apparently done so on the ground that the transaction at issue
was outside the ordinary course of the seller's business. While this
appears to be a serious misreading of the Code, the decisions are
not terribly surprising. In fact, if they are to be criticized, it is
primarily because their rules are framed broadly, so that their
impact is likely to be felt in later cases in which the facts do not as
readily support non-liability.
For example, in Sieman v. Alden, 5 99 the Court of Appeals of

Illinois held that the seller of a multi-rip saw was not a merchant
with respect to saws for purposes of implying the warranty of
merchantability, notwithstanding the seller's skill and knowledge
relative to saws. He had never before sold a saw, and his expertise
was the product of his engagement in the sawmill business. 60 0 The
facts of the case support the result, since the seller was not in the
business of selling saws, the buyer approached the seller only after
being unable to procure the Saw from a regular source, the saw at
issue was both old and inoperable, and the buyer probably
recognized these factors at the time of sale. 60 ' On the other hand, it
was undisputed that the seller was knowledgeable and skillful with
respect to saws generally, and would therefore qualify as a
597. Storey v. Day Heating & Air Conditioning Co., 56 Ala. App. 81,

-,

319 So. 2d 279,

281 (1975).

598. Findings of fact in a bench trial will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. A
finding is clearly erroneous only when, although there is some evidence to support it, the reviewing
court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See In re Estate of
Elmer, 210 N.W.2d815,820, (N.D. 1973); N.D.R. Civ. P. 52(a).
599. 34 111. App. 3d 961, 341 N.E.2d 713 (1975).
600. Siemanv. Alden, 34 111. App. 3d 961,963, 341 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1975).
601. Id. at 964, 341 N.E.2d at 715.
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merchant under section 2-104. The court, confronted with the
buyer's assertion that the seller had therefore made a warranty of
merchantability, reasoned that sellers who were merchants by
virtue of their skill and knowledge were not included in the
meaning of section 2-314:602
This test .

.

. is not the standard for determining who is a

merchant within the meaning of § 2-314. [The Code
comments] make it clear that the definition of merchant
within § 2-314 is a narrow one and that the warranty of
merchantability is applicable only to a person who, in a
professional status, sells the particular kind of goods
03
giving rise to the warranty. 6
The court concluded that, because this was an isolated sale, section
604
2-3 14 did not apply.
Although the Sieman court may have reached the correct result,
its articulation of the policy behind section 2-314 was clearly too
narrow. The Code rather liberally imposes warranty responsibility,
rather than narrowly restricting it. Additionally, if the Sieman
court's language were taken literally, only professional sellers of a
particular kind of goods could create the warranty. Finally, Sieman
appears to be inconsistent with an earlier decision of the same
court.

605

Courts which adhere to the Sieman approach, that a sale
removed from the ordinary course of the seller's business should
not imply a merchantability warranty, will generally justify their
decisions by resort to the language of comment 3 to section 2-314,
which purports to exempt from the section's coverage "isolated"
sales. 60 6 Such reliance is misplaced for two reasons. First, the
comment applies only in the very narrow case (perhaps presented
in Sieman) where the sale is characterizable only as a casual sale,
and by no stretch of the imagination could the seller be deemed to
602. Id.
603. Id. The language is drawn from comment 2 to section 2-104.
604. 34 111. App. 3d at 964, 341 N.E.2d at 715.
605. Mutual Serv. of Highland Park, Inc. v. S.O.S. Plumbing & Sewerage Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d
257, 235 N.E.2d 265 (1968). The report of this case is abbreviated, and it is therefore difficult to
draw too many inferences from it. What can be gleaned from the brief ruling is that the plaintiff was
a building materials supplier who regularly sold products manufactured by a particular
manufacturer. Id. Among the products he did not ordinarily sell were a particular type of hammer
and bit. On the occasion in question he sold this particular type of hammer and bit, and it was
defective. The appellate court summarily affirmed the holding that an implied warranty of
merchantability existed. Id.
606. See Donald v. City Nat'l Bank of Dothan, 295 Ala. 320, 329 So. 2d 92 (1976); Prince v.
LeVan, 486 P.2d 959 (Alaska 1971).
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deal in the goods. 60 7 Second, and more importantly, the comment
language supports, rather than precludes, warranty responsibility:
A specific designation of goods by the buyer does not
exclude the seller's obligation that they be fit for the
general purposes appropriate to such goods. A contract
for the sale of second-hand goods, however, involves only
such obligation as is appropriate to such goods for that is
their contract description. A person making an isolated
sale of goods is not a "merchant" within the meaning of
the full scope of this section and, thus, no warranty of
merchantability would apply. His knowledge of any
defects not apparent on inspection would, however,
without need for express agreement and in keeping with
the underlying reason of the present section and the
provisions on good faith, impose an obligation that
608
known material but hidden defects be fully disclosed.
A careful reading of the comment suggests that liability could easily
have attached in Sieman, and, since Sieman is clearly one of the most
difficult cases likely to arise under the section, liability would
ordinarily arise in a case less reflective of a casual sale.
Initially, although it is not fully clear, comment 3 appears to
cover sales of used goods, such as the saw in Sieman. The first
sentence of the comment, directed at specific designation by the
buyer, is apparently intended to refer to the warranty of fitness for
particular purpose, and indicates that in spite of such specificity the
seller warrants fitness for general purposes. 60 9 The second sentence,
specifically directed at used goods, makes it clear that they need
only meet the standard of similar used goods; for example, a saw
should cut wood without injury to the person using it. The scope of
liability is in essence dependent on the "contract description,"
which reflects not only the used nature of the goods, but also their
age, character, and the price at which they were sold. In Sieman, the
saw was sold for $2,900, and the likely expectation was that, for
that price, the buyer would get a saw which would work after any
61 0
necessary repairs.
The third sentence is the crux of the comment, purporting as it
607. Compare the Sieman case with Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co. v. Thermice Corp., 352 F.
Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1971), and All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 538 P.2d 1177 (1975).
608. U.C.C. S 2-314, Comment 3.
609. It is likely that such designation by the buyer would preclude the existence of the warranty
offitness for a particular purpose. See supra notes 417-576.
610. Sieman v. Alden, 34 111. App. 3d 961,962,341 N.E.2d 713, 714 (1975).
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does to exempt the isolated sale. The careful reader will note that
the purported exemption is from "the full scope of" the section. 611
The casual (but skillful and knowledgeable) seller should perhaps
be exempted from the entire section except for subsection (2) (c),
which provides that goods sold must be fit for their ordinary
purpose. In other words, if the sale is an isolated one by a seller who
does not deal in goods of the kind but who is nevertheless a
merchant, the full scope of section 2-314 is not invoked. The more
limited scope of only section 2-314(2) (c), however, should apply.
The final sentence suggests that if defects are known to even the
casual seller he must reveal them. Thus, a careful reading of the
Code and its comments indicates that liability probably should
have attached in Sieman.
As indicated earlier, one can readily understand the Sieman
court's reluctance to impose liability upon the seller. No such
justification exists, however, for two other cases which relied on the
"non-ordinary course," "isolated sale" analysis. The two cases
are Rock Creek GingerAle Co. v. Thermice Corp. 612 and All-States Leasing
Co. v. Bass, 6 3 each holding that no warranty of merchantability
6 4
could be implied with respect to clearly commercial transactions.
Thermice involved the sale of approximately 20,000 pounds of
liquid carbon dioxide, used in carbonated beverage production,
from Schaefer, a beer brewer, to Thermice, which resold it to a soft
drink producer.6 1 5 The carbon dioxide was surplus in Schaefer's
hands, and Schaefer had sold 700,000 pounds to Thermice over a
period of time. This particular shipment was defective, and
produced a foul-smelling soft drink which could not be sold. The
soft drink producer sued Thermice, which in turn sued Schaefer for
breach of express and implied warranties. 61 6 As to the implied
warranty of merchantability, the court ruled that Schaefer was not
a merchant with respect to carbon dioxide and therefore made no
such warranty. 61 7 Furthermore, the court held that Thermice's
failure to inspect the carbon dioxide precluded the existence of the
618
warranty.
The court cited comment 3 to section 2-314, and indicated
that, although Schaefer had sold more than 700,000 pounds of
611. See U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 3.
612. 352 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1971).
613.96 Idaho 873, 538 P.2d 1177 (1975).
614. Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co. v. Thermice Corp., 352 F. Supp. 522, 528 (D.D.C. 1971); AllStates Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873,
, 538 P.2d 1177, 1183 (1975).
615. 352 F. Supp. at 523.
616. Id.
617. Id. at 528.

618. Id.
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carbon dioxide, it was not a merchant for purposes of the sale of
20,000 pounds. 61 9 There is no indication that the court considered
whether Schaefer might have qualified under the skill or knowledge
test. However, given the fact that Schaefer, in the course of its own
brewing business, dealt with carbon dioxide, it would clearly have
qualified as a merchant under either merchant test. Moreover, if
20,000 pounds was a representative delivery, at least thirty-five
sales would have occurred. Even if fewer than thirty-five sales took
place, surely this was not an isolated transaction. The court's
conclusion is therefore unsupportable.
If Thermice presents a clear picture of a court misinterpreting
the Code, All-States Leasing demonstrates judicial caution in an
uncertain area. All-States Leasing involved a lease transaction
between the defendant and the plaintiff which was arranged
through the manufacturer of a car wash system. 620 The
manufacturer, through a pre-arranged plan with the defendant,
sold the car wash system to the plaintiff, which in turn leased it to
the defendant. 6 21 The plaintiff was a lessor financer, in the business
of purchasing equipment for its lessees and thereafter leasing it to
them. When the car wash system did not generate the profits
anticipated, the defendant failed to pay the rental fee and the
plaintiff sued. 622 The defendant counterclaimed, alleging that the
system was defective and that the plaintiff was responsible under an
implied warranty of merchantability. 62 3 The lower court held for
the defendant, finding that the implied warranty had been made
6 25
and breached. 624 The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed.
Initially, the court faced the question of whether the Code
warranty provisions should apply in a lease transaction. The court
626
held that extension of the Code by analogy was appropriate.
However, the court then held that the implied warranty of
merchantability should not apply in this case, since the plaintiff627
lessor was not a merchant as to the leased equipment.
At first glance, the ruling is compatible with notions of party
expectation and fairness. The equipment lessor is in effect a
financer, an entity which purchases equipment for the sole purpose
of leasing it to those who prefer not to purchase it themselves. In
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.

Id.
96 Idaho at
Id. at . . _538
..
Id. at-__ ,538
Id.
Id.
Id. at . . ..538
Id. at . . _538
..
Id. at
538

,538 P.2dat 1179.
P.2d at 1179-80.
P.2d at 1180.
P.2d at 1185.
P.2dat 1181.
P.2d at 1185.
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some respects it thus serves the function of a lender, and should no
6
more be held liable than a bank or other financial intermediary. 1
Unlike a bank, however, the lessor is the owner of the property,
and not merely the financer of its acquisition. Therefore, the
appropriate questions to ask are whether the lessor engages in
leasing a specific type of goods with sufficient frequency to
constitute dealing in like goods, or whether the leasing activity is so
highly specialized as to justify a conclusion that the lessor possesses
the requisite skill or knowledge. 62 9 If the answer to either question
is yes, the lessor should be deemed a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind for the purpose of implying the merchantability
warranty.
The All-States Leasing court did not ask either question. Rather,
it analyzed the lessor's role according to a traditional sales model,
notwithstanding that it had earlier recognized that in this case
leasing was merely analogous to selling. Thus, the question
propounded was whether the lessor built, manufactured, or sold
any equipment or machines.

63 0

The question, however, presumes

the answer. A lessor, by definition, leases rather than builds,
manufactures, or sells. Although it is clear that what the court was
attempting to do was distinguish the "pure lessor" (whose only
business is leasing) from the "convenience lessor" (whose business,
depending on the client, may be to lease, sell, or manufacture the
product), 631 there is probably no basis for making the distinction. If
the fear is that a novice lessor will be trapped in the merchantability
web, the two-question test proposed above probably affords
sufficient protection. Moreover, the distinction affords too much
protection: the lessor in All-States Leasing had "handled between
forty to fifty transactions over a period of six to eight months,
concerning the same" product. 63 2 Therefore, the lessor clearly
dealt in goods of the kind, and should have been held to be a
628. But cf Federal Trade Commission holder in due course rules, Preservation of Consumers'
Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. S 433.2 (1980). These rules tend to place the burden on lenders for
the action of their borrowers, in the sense that buyers are able to assert claims and defenses valid
against their sellers as against assignees of sellers.
629. The former question is directed at the number of transactions in which the lessor engages,
as well as the type of goods. The latter is directed primarily at the type of goods. The reason for the
distinction is simple. Courts might balk at imposing responsibility on a "general lessor" (one who
will acquire virtually any product for a client) on the basis of one or two leases dealing with such
goods. If, however, the lessor leases a substantial number of goods of like kind, he should be deemed
to deal in them. Similarly, if the leasing activity is relatively narrow, such as computer equipment,
the fact that this transaction is the first one dealing with a particular type of computer should not
insulate the lessor from responsibility because, through prior leasing, the lessor has become skilled or
knowledgeable with respect to computer equipment generally.
630. See 96 Idaho at __,

538 P.2d at 1184.

631. Examples of "convenience lessors" might include automobile dealers who also lease goods
and typewriter or copy machine manufacturers who will lease or sell.
632.96 Idaho at
,__,
538 P.2d at 1184.
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merchant for merchantability purposes.
The dissent in All-States Leasing recognized the difficulty with
the majority's opinion. 633 Since the court was split 3-2, it is hoped
that other courts will be hesitant in adopting the All-States Leasing
view. Certainly, if that view is adopted, it should only be after the
most thoroughly reasoned and articulated analysis. Upon such
analysis, the view denying liability under similar circumstances will
not stand up.634
It is tempting to consider the foregoing cases as aberrations,
both because of their relatively unique facts and because of their
holdings. That there are a number of contrary decisions makes the
temptation even greater. 635 The fact that the North Dakota
Supreme Court has read section 2-314 broadly makes the
636
temptation almost overwhelming.
The first case to consider whether a "casual" merchant could
exist was Regan Purchase& Sales Corp. v. Primavera.63' Regan involved
the sale of used restaurant equipment by the plaintiff, an auction
house, to the defendant. The defendant failed to pay the price,
plaintiff sued, and defendant counterclaimed on the basis of breach
of warranty. 638 Among the questions discussed by the court were
whether an auctioneer could qualify as a merchant for purposes of
making the warranty of merchantability, and, if so, what the scope
of that warranty would be. 639 As to the first question, the court felt
compelled to subdivide auctioneers into two categories: those who
"gregularly [sell] merchandise of a particular kind" and those who
"sell different kinds of goods on an ongoing basis under
circumstances that imply the likelihood of repetition with regard to
633. Id. at__
,538 P.2d at 1185 (Shepard,.J., dissenting).
634. One other case, denying liability, deserves mention. In Storey v. Day Heating & Air
Conditioning Co., 56 Ala. App. 81, 319 So. 2d 279 (1975), the court affirmed a jury decision in favor
of the defendant, who had sold and installed a heating and air conditioning system with a
condensation pump for the plaintiff. Id. at __
, 319 So. 2d at 280. The pump was defective and
malfunctioned, resulting in water damage to the plaintiff's house. The record failed to indicate
whether the defendant had ever sold condensation pumps before, and the court ruled that the jury
was therefore entitled to find either that other sales had occurred, or that this was an isolated sale. Id.
at __
, 319 So. 2d at 281. Since the jury found for the defendant, the court concluded that they
must have found the sale to be isolated and the defendant not to be a merchant. Id. Although the case
may stand narrowly for the proposition that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving
merchant status, it may have been appropriate for the court to rule that the jury's finding was clearly
erroneous. Whether defendant had ever sold a like pump before would not matter if he possessed skill
or knowledge relative to it. That the court did not reverse suggests a willingness to restrict merchant
status under section 2-314. It also provides a warning to buyers' counsel that the question of
merchant status is one of fact, and will not readily be overturned on appeal.
635. See infra
notes 637-59 and accompanying text.
636. See infia
notes 660-76 and accompanying text for a comprehensive discussion of the North
Dakota Supreme Court's holding in Eichenberger v. Wilhelm, 244 N.W.2d 691 (N.D. 1976).
637. 68 Misc. 2d 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972) (consideration of the individual
transaction was tangential to the issue).
638. Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858,
,328 N.Y.S.2d 490,
491 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972).
639. Id. at __,
328 N.Y.S.2d at 492, 493.
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the goods in question. "640 The test applied by the court to
determine whether an auctioneer is a merchant is quite similar to
that suggested earlier for lessors.

641

Applying that test, the court

had no trouble finding that the plaintiff auctioneer qualified as a
merchant and thus could have made the warranty .of
merchantability.

642

Regan correctly suggests that even one who does not regularly
deal in goods of the kind may qualify as a merchant for section 2314 purposes, as long as there is some basis upon which to premise
mercantile responsibility.

643

To the same effect is McHugh v.

Carlton,6 44

which held that a service station operator who sold
recapped tires to a customer, at the customer's specific request, was
a merchant for merchantability purposes, even though he
ordinarily did not deal in recapped tires. 645 In McHugh, plaintiffs
were involved in an automobile accident, allegedly caused by driver
negligence and a defect in the recapped tires. They sued the owner
and operator of the vehicle, as well as the manufacturer and the
seller of the recapped tires. 646 The seller of the recapped tires denied
that he was a merchant as to them, and therefore asserted that no
warranty of merchantability had been made. The seller reasoned
that since he did not stock recaps, but only procured them at
specific customer request, he did not deal in them and could not be
considered a merchant with respect to them. Rather, argued the
seller, this was an isolated sale of used goods. The court
disagreed.

647

The court reasoned that, since the seller dealt in tires,
batteries, and accessories, he was therefore broadly characterizable
as

a merchant. 6 48 Further,

the court specifically noted that,

although the seller did not ordinarily sell or even stock recaps, he
did sell and stock new and used tires. 649 Most compelling, however,
was the fact that the seller, even though he claimed to sell recaps
solely as a customer service, made a profit on the sale. Therefore he
-640. Id. at _
, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
641. Seesupra note 629 and accompanying text.
642. 68 Misc. 2d at _
, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 492. As to the scope of the warranty, the court
retreated somewhat from its broad reading of section 2-314, indicating that with used goods of a
commercial nature, purchased at substantial discount, the fact that they did not work on delivery did
not establish breach. Id. at
__,
328 N.Y.S.2d at 493. In the context of the case, such an
observation might have merit; but even used goods, to be merchantable, would presumably have to
work when purchased.
643. Id. at _
, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
644. 369 F. Supp. 1271 (D.S.C. 1974).
645. McHugh v. Carlton, 369 F. Supp. 1271, 1277 (D.S.C. 1974).
646. Id. at 1272.
647. Id. at 1277,
648. Id.
649. Id.
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was within the scope of section 2-314.650
McHugh may go further than is necessary or desirable in
relying so heavily upon the seller's profit as a criterion for
determining merchant status, for even non-merchants, in truly
isolated transactions, might realize a profit from the sale of goods.
Although an expansive reading of section 2-314 is preferable and
the result in McHugh is justifiable, profit alone, although clearly
relevant, should not be the controlling factor. Rather, the fact that
the seller was a dealer in tires, coupled with the fact that he
occasionally would upon request supply recaps, should be sufficient
to warrant the imposition of responsibility.
It should be apparent that even a casual seller, under some
circumstances, may qualify as a merchant. In both Regan and
McHugh, however, the sellers might have qualified as merchants
under a liberal reading of the "deals in goods of the kind"
definition. It becomes necessary to consider the cases which have
indicated that, even though one does not deal in goods of the kind,
he will nevertheless qualify as a merchant for section 2-314
purposes under the "skill or knowledge" definition.
Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co. 651 was discussed earlier in
connection with the particular purpose warranty. 652 The plaintiff
had contracted with the defendant for the production of wiglet
cases, and the cases turned out to be unsatisfactory. Plaintiff sued,
alleging breach of warranty, and one of defendant's defenses was
that no warranty of merchantability was implied, since it was not a
merchant with respect to wiglet cases. Defendant's principal
argument was that it had never produced wiglet cases before, and
was a merchant only with respect to plastic blow-molding
equipment and only for custom molding purposes. 653 The court,
relying on the broad definition of merchant contained in section 2104, rejected defendant's contention:
The implication ... is that manufacturers who produce a
variety of goods would never fall within the broad scope
intended for [Section 2-3141. That contention must be
rejected where unmerchantability results from defects in
the production process with which the manufacturer is
familiar. This conclusion is implicit in the Code's
definition of "merchant" . . . . The term "practices"
650. Id.
651. 402 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Conn. 1975).
652. See supra notes 488-89 and accompanying text.

653. Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017, 1025 (D. Conn. 1975).
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indicates that one may be a merchant of goods by virtue
of his involvement in the process by which those goods are
produced as well as by sale of the finished goods from
654
inventory.
Blockhead, then, establishes that the broad definition of merchant
contained in section 2-104 should have some undefined
applicability under section 2-314.655 So long as the seller can be said
to have the requisite skill or knowledge, he should be capable of
creating the warranty of merchantability.
The Supreme Court of Oregon reached a similar result in
Valley Iron & Steel Co. v. Thorin, 656 holding that the plaintiff,
although it had never before manufactured a particular product,
could be held to have implied a warranty of merchantability. 657 The
product, hoedad collar castings, was one with which the plaintiff
had no familiarity whatsoever. Nevertheless, since the plaintiff was
skilled with metal castings and had previously assisted customers in
selecting types of metals for jobs, the court held plaintiff to be a
merchant with respect to goods of the kind. 6 58 The presumed
expertise justified application of the stricter merchant standard. 659
Blockhead and Thorin represent what is believed to be the clearly
preferable view that one who is skilled or knowledgeable with
respect to goods should be held to imply the warranty of
merchantability, notwithstanding that the sale represents the first
or only transaction in such goods. The Supreme Court of North
Dakota has apparently adopted this view, and taken it a step
further, in Eichenbergerv. Wilhelm. 660
The Eichenberger case deserves special consideration for three
reasons. First, it demonstrates that merchants, for purposes of
section 2-314, can be so characterized either by dealing in goods or
by virtue of their skill or knowledge. 6 61 Second, it establishes
without question the liberality of the North Dakota Supreme Court
with respect to warranty law. 662 Finally, it presented the court with
the opportunity to discuss and settle the sales-service dichotomy
question, an opportunity which the court failed to grasp until a year
later in Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Electric, Inc. 663
654.
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.

Id.
See id.
278 Or. 103,562 P.2d 1212(1977).
Valley Iron & Steel Co. v. Thorin, 278 Or. 103,
,562 P.2d 1212, 1215 (1977).
Id. at __
,562 P.2d at 1215-16.
Id.
244 N.W.2d 691 (N.D. 1976).
Eichenberger v. Wilhelm, 244 N.W.2d 691, 696 (N.D. 1976).
Id. at 696-97.
258 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1977).
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In Eichenberger, the plaintiff was a farmer who contracted with
the defendant to spray his wheat crop to rid it of wild oat
infestation. At the time of contracting plaintiff expressed concern
that, since his crop had emerged more than fourteen days earlier,
664
Carbyne, the only herbicide available, might damage the wheat.
Defendant allayed plaintiff's fears, partly by his own words and
partly by referring plaintiff to another farmer for whom defendant
had applied Carbyne as a post-emergant herbicide. 665 The plaintiff
then agreed to the spraying, the field was sprayed, and the wheat
crop was allegedly damaged. The yield was six bushels per acre,
compared with sixteen bushels per acre from plaintiff's other fields.
Plaintiff sued defendant, alleging negligence. 666 The trial court
apparently determined that the cause of the damage was not late
spraying, but rather a defect in the Carbyne. 66 7 The court
nevertheless found for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of North
Dakota affirmed .668
The supreme court reviewed the evidence, concluded that the
trial court had found no negligence, and affirmed that
conclusion. 669 Because the plaintiff had alleged only negligence and
not breach of warranty, however, the supreme court first had to
determine whether breach of warranty, proven though not pleaded,
could serve as the basis of the decision. The court, in an
extraordinarily liberal pronouncement, applied rule 15(b) of the
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure to enable plaintiff to, in
effect, amend his pleadings to conform to the evidence. The court
ruled that, since the defendant was not prejudiced or surprised by
the breach of warranty issue and had failed to object to trying the
issue, he had impliedly consented to it.670 Therefore, the court
treated the issue as if it had been properly raised. 671 It therefore
seems clear that the North Dakota Supreme Court has adopted a
rational, expansive view of warranty law in the merchantability
area.
664. 244 N.W.2d at 693.
665. Id.
666. Id. at 694.
667. Id. at 695.
668. Id. at 698.
669. Id. at 695.
670. Id. at 696.
671. Id. The Uniform CommercialCode Reporting Service editorial comment to the case indicates that
"only by a liberal construction of the North Dakota rules of procedure did the court transmute [the
action from one in negligence] into a breach of warranty action." 20 UC.C. REP. SERV. at 64. The
tone of the editorial comment is disparaging. The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, should be
commended, not criticized, for its forward-looking approach to warranty law. Too many courts
would have summarily reversed the trial court, thereby either denying plaintiff the deserved relief or
contributing further to judicial inefficiency by requiring a new trial.
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Once the determination had been made that the case was
appropriately before the court, the focus should have turned to
whether the Uniform Commercial Code governed the transaction.
The defendant was engaged to perform a service, crop spraying,
and not to sell goods. The question was clearly presented and
ignored. Furthermore, given the test set forth in Air Heaters a year
later, it seems fairly clear that the conclusion would likely have
been that a service, not a sale, was involved. Although factors not
known might have suggested that the transaction was a sale coupled
with a service (for example, if defendant's bill had set forth the
herbicide as a separate item), the overall indication was that the
Code should not have applied. That the court did apply the Code
suggests that North Dakota will not only liberally construe its
procedural rules in favor of warranty, but also that it will apply the
Code either directly or by analogy in non-sales transactions.
Although it is not entirely clear, one is tempted to assert that
Eichenbergerestablishes that there is a general, non-sales warranty of
merchantability in North Dakota, applicable to any transaction
where one with expertise is involved. 672 In other words, when an
experienced individual deals with another he warrants that his
product, be it goods or services, will be fit for ordinary use or
purposes. If this is true, North Dakota's interpretation of the
Code's warranty provisions would be among the most liberal in the
country. Unfortunately, one can only speculate as to its truth, since
the court failed to address directly the sales-service dichotomy.
The court instead considered whether the plaintiff had met his
burden under the Code of proving the existence of the warranty of
merchantability, its breach, and damage caused thereby. 673 To do
this, the plaintiff was required to establish that the defendant was a
section 2-314 merchant, for only such a merchant may create the
warranty of merchantability. The court apparently assumed that
dealers in goods and those who are merchants by virtue of their skill
or knowledge are capable of making the warranty, for it stated:
"By his own testimony relating to his decades of experience in
aerial spraying, his licensing by state and federal authorities, and
his training in the use of Carbyne, Wilhelm established himself as a
' 674
'merchant."'

Thus, in North Dakota expertise translates into

the ability to make the implied warranty of merchantability. To
that extent, Eichenberger stands as an example of the better, more
expansive reading of section 2-314. As a caveat, however, one
672. 244 N.W.2d at 696.
673. Id. at 697.
674. Id. at 696.
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should not read Eichenbergeras establishing a complete relaxation of
the Code rules or requirements governing merchantability. This is
evident in the court's language expressing discontent with the
ambiguous theories upon which the case was pleaded. 6 75 Although
it may be safe to rely on Eichenberger with regard to its liberal
reading of section 2-314, counsel should take care to ensure that
their pleadings and proof correspond more closely to the required
elements.
2. Goods andMerchantability
The foregoing cases involved the threshold question in
merchantability analysis: Who qualifies as a merchant? A related
issue is whether the goods themselves are appropriate to the
determination of merchantability. After it is determined that the
seller in a given case is a merchant, the question becomes whether
the warranty should attach if the goods at issue are of an unusual
nature. In North Dakota, unlike other jurisdictions, the answers
are relatively clear. 67 6 Although the North Dakota courts have
exhibited liberality, however, the legislature has been far more
conservative in dealing with these unusual goods. 677 In general, the
controversial items have been food and drink, animals, and human
678
products, primarily blood.
At the outset, it is clear that all three types of products may be
considered "goods" under the Code definition, which includes
"all things . . . movable at the time of identification to the
679
contract" other than money, securities, and things in action.
Also included are "the unborn young of animals and growing
crops.", 68 0 It should be noted that food and drink which is served for
value and meant to be consumed either on the premises or
elsewhere is explicitly considered a sale. 68' This provision was
675. Id. at 697. The court stated:
We note ... that this claim might also be sustained on grounds of strict liability in
tort. . . . We also advise that complaints in the future make clearer reference t the
alternate theories of negligence, warranty, and strict liability, where the claim for
relief may be predicated upon one or more of these theories. Such reference alerts the
opposing party to the nature and sequence of evidence ... and allows the trial court to
better categorize its findings. In turn, as an appellate court, we will be presented with
more orderly, less scattered findings.

Id.
676.
677.
678.
679.
680.
681.

U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (d) & (e) [N.D. CENT. CODE S41-02-33(3) (d) & (e) (Supp. 1979)1.
Id.
See infra notes 692-704 and accompanying text.
U.C.C. 5 2-105(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-05(l)(1968)1.

Id.
U.C.C. § 2-314(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-31(l) (1968)1.
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specifically included because of pre-Code difficulty in determining
the proper classification of these items. 682 The role of animals and
human products has been somewhat less clear, but the majority of
courts have held that the implied warranty attaches to them as
well. 68 3 The difficulty with animals is that in certain areas of the
country there is a reluctance to saddle sellers with liability for
diseases unknown to them at the time of sale. With human
products, there is a dual reluctance at work. First, to characterize
blood, tissue, or organs as goods is to demean and dehumanize
them. Second, to impose seller liability upon medical practitioners
may be perceived as equating the rendition of professional services
with mere merchandising. Because the three types of products raise
distinct problems, they will be discussed separately. The reader
should keep in mind, however, that the central issue in each case is
whether the warranty of merchantability should attach.
a. Foodand Drink
On its face, food and drink present the easiest type of product
with which to deal. The statute expressly provides coverage, 684 and
one would expect that the courts would merely have to apply the
merchantability standard. However, one perceives a judicial
reluctance to be too critical with respect to food when the defect is
not substantial. The Code clearly makes the seller of food or drink
liable when the food or drink is adulterated, spoiled, poisonous, or
otherwise not fit for human consumption. 685 However, when the
defect is not as serious the results are not as clear. A number of
courts have considered the problem, and the results break down
into the application of two tests, the "foreign versus natural
substance" test and the "reasonable expectation" test. 686 As their

names suggest, the tests determine merchantability by asking
682. See U.C.C. S 2-314, Comment 5. See also Ray v. Deas, 112 Ga. App. 191, 144 S.E.2d 468
(1965); Sofman v. Denham Food Serv., Inc., 37 N.J. 304, 181 A.2d 168 (1962).
683. See, e.g., Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 694 (1978) (implied warranty attaches to "merchantable"
goods).
684. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE §41-02-31(1) (1968)].
685. Id. See also Scanlon v. Food Crafts, Inc., 2 Conn. Cir. 3, 193 A.2d 610 (1963) (food not fit
for human consumption).
686. See Nadeau v. Bostonian Fishery Inc., 30 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 119 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1980)
(reasonable expectation); Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mass. 421, 198 N.E.2d 309
(1964) (foreign versus natural substance); Martell v. Duffy-Mott Corp., 15 Mich. App. 67, 166
N.W.2d 541 (1968) (reasonable expectation); Woods v. Cabash Restaurant Inc., 8 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (foreign versus natural substance); Stark v. Chock Full O'Nuts, 77
Misc. 2d 553, 356 N.Y.S.2d 403 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (reasonable expectation); Coffer v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 30 N.C. App. 134, 226 S.E.2d 534 (1976) f'oreign versus natural substance); Williams
v. Braun Ice Cream Stores, Inc., 534 P.2d 700 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974) (reasonable expectation);
Hunt v. Ferguson-Paulus Enterprises, 243 Or. 546, 415 P.2d 13 (1966) (reasonable expectation);
Jeffries v. Clark's Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 20 Wash. App. 428, 580 P.2d 1103 (1978)
(reasonable expectation).
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whether the food or drink was fit for human consumption according
to either the nature of the defect or the extent of compliance with
the buyer's reasonable expectation. The reasonable expectation test
represents the majority approach, and will more often result in
implication of the warranty. Facially, however, the tests are quite
similar. Thus, under the natural-foreign substance test, the
existence of a turkey bone in a turkey sandwich, 687 a fish bone in a
bowl of fish chowder, 688 or an unshelled nut in a jar of shelled
nuts 68 9 would all be natural substances. They would therefore not
result in a breach of the warranty of merchantability, since one
might assume that a buyer could reasonably expect those
substances to exist in those products. However, most of the courts
applying the reasonable expectation analysis have not viewed the
question so narrowly. 690 Rather, they have framed the question in
terms of general expectation, for example, whether a buyer of food
would reasonably expect it to be edible without the need for
examination. Framing the issue in this manner has two effects:
First, it almost certainly precludes summary judgment, since the
question will almost always be one of fact. Second, and partly as a
result of the first effect, it makes liability significantly more likely.
The liberality engendered by the reasonable expectation test is
justified both because food is at issue and because the Code
specifically includes food and drink in its coverage. 691 To the extent
that the foreign versus natural test makes liability dependent not
upon the existence of the defect but upon its nature, it is not
acceptable.
b. Animals
The remaining two types of unusual products, animals and
human products, must be analyzed in a slightly different manner.
With respect to animals, the vast majority of courts would probably
imply the warranty of merchantability in their sale, and a number
of courts have already done so. Thus, for example, the warranty
has been held to be implied in the sale of livestock generally, 692
sheep, 693 chickens, 694 cattle, 695 hogs, 696 dogs, 697 and horses. 698
687. Woods v. Cabash Restaurant, Inc., 8 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
688. Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mass. 421, 198 N.E.2d 309 (1964).
689. Coffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 30 N.C. App. 13.4, 226 S.E.2d 534 (1976).
690. See,e.g., Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 694 (1978), and cases cited therein.
691. U.C.C. S 2-314(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-31(1) (1968)].
692. S-Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Monier & Co., 509 P.2d 777 (Wyo. 1973) (sheep).
693. Id.
694. Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188
(1972).
695. Fear Ranches, Inc. v. Berry, 470 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1972), aff'd on rehearing, 503 F.2d 953
(I0th Cir. 1974).
696. Ruskamp v. Hog Builders, Inc., 192 Neb. 168, 219 N.W.2d 750 (1974).
697. Salcetti v. Tuck, 27 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 679 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1979).
698. Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'dmem,, 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978).
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Moreover, there is every reason to believe that under appropriate
circumstances courts will imply the warranty as to any animal,
domestic or not. The only question which remains concerns the
scope of the warranty. In the broad middle ground, the general
merchantability definition may be applied to determine the scope of
the warranty. Thus, an animal is merchantable if it is fit for the
ordinary purposes for which like animals are used. For example,
this would require delivery of animals generally free from
debilitating disease, 699 and, if the purpose is narrower, such as
packing cattle, free from diseases which would render them unfit
for human consumption. By the same token, an animal purchased
as a pet would carry with it some warranty of fitness, so that if it
became sick or died the warranty would be breached. At the
fringes, however, the warranty's scope is blurred. For instance,
would a dog be unmerchantable if it attacked its owner or if it failed
to perform watchdog functions? The answer probably depends
upon party expectations, and this may explain why so few cases
have been decided concerning the question. To the extent that the
expectations of the buyer are made known, the warranty involved
would probably shift from a general merchantability warranty to
either an express warranty or to a warranty of fitness for particular
purpose.
c. Human Products
As indicated earlier, the major problems in the area of implied
warranties as they pertain to human products seem to be a
reluctance to equate human organs with goods, and a further
reluctance to equate medical professionals with merchants. The
history of the disputes governing the provision of human products
is far too cumbersome to be detailed fully here. 70 0 It is sufficient to
note that the vast majority of states which have considered the issue
have held either that the provision of human products is not a
sale, 7 1 or that the provider is not a merchant.7 02 The reasoning has
been based primarily upon the professional service nature of the
transaction. Many states have, however, distinguished between the
699. Id. (horse with tendonitis and claudication still merchantable since in spite of diseases it
won three of thirteen races).
700. See generally Brams, Transplantable Human Organs: Should Their Sale be Authorized by State
Statutes?, 3 Am. J.L. & MED. 183 (1977-78); Note, Pricing Bad Blood: Reassessing Liability ./or PostTransfusion Hepatitis, 15 HARV.J. LEOLS. 557, 588 (1978).
701. See Foster v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 219 S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1975), and cases cited
therein; cf Reilly v. King County Central Blood Bank, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 172, 492 P.2d 246 (1971)
(sale of blood by blood bank is a sale).
702. SeeSchuchman v.Johns Hopkins Hosp., 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 637 (Md. Super. Ct. 1971).
and cases cited therein.
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supply of human products by a commercial donor bank and the
supply of those products by a hospital to a patient, treating the
former as a sale and the latter as a service. 70 3 While most of the
cases have dealt with blood, it is likely that other human products
would be analyzed in the same manner.
One of the problems with broad preclusion of the warranty on
the basis that the provider is not a merchant, or on the basis that a
professional service is at issue, is that non-human commodities will
likely be covered by analogy. Thus, for example, a New York court
recently held that a physician who furnishes a defective intrauterine
device is not a merchant but rather one who renders a professional
service. 70 4 Although it is probably appropriate to insulate
furnishers of human products from warranty responsibility, the
medical professional rubric should not foster wholesale freedom
from responsibility in non-human product cases.
d. Unusual Goods in North Dakota
The foregoing discussion, both with reference to animals and
human products, has special significance in North Dakota. The
North Dakota enactment of section 2-316, the exclusion of
warranties section, is non-uniform. Implied warranties will not be
applicable to the sale of certain animals or human products. While
several other states have similarly excluded human products from
coverage, 70 5 few have done so with animals. 70 6 Furthermore, the
human products exclusion in North Dakota is exceedingly broad.
The two provisions, sections 41-02-33(3) (d) and (e) of the North
Dakota Century Code, provide:
d. The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness
shall not be applicable to a contract for the sale of
human blood, blood plasma, or other human tissue or
organs from a blood bank or. reservoir of such other
703. See cases cited in notes 701-02 supra.
704. Ruybe v. Gordon, 18 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 889 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
705. ALASKA STAT. S 45.02.316 (e) (1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1151 (1974); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 85-2-316(3) (d) (Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. S 13-22-104 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. Vi,
5 2-316(5) (1975); FLA. STAT. S 672.2-316 (5) (Supp. 1980); GA. CODE § 109A-2-316 (5) (Supp.
1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, S 2-316(5) (West Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. S 71-4001
(1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 24-10-5 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-33(3) (d) (Supp. 1979); S.C.
CODE § 44-43-10 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. S 57A-2-315.1 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2316(5) (1979); TEX. Bus. AND COM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, S 2.316(e) (Vernon 1968); UTAH CODE ANN. S
26-29.1 (1976); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 146-31 (West Supp. 1980); Wvo. STAT. § 34-21-233(c) (iv)
(1979).
706. IND. CODE ANN. S 26-1-2-316(3)(d) (Burns Supp. 1980) (cattle, hogs, or sheep); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 30-2-316(3) (d) (1979) (cattle, hogs, and sheep); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-33(3)
(e) (Supp. 1979) (cattle, hogs, sheep, and horses): OR. REv. STAT. § 72.3160(3) (1979) (livestock,
meaning equines, cattle, sheep, goats, and swine): TEX. Bus. & Com. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 2.316(0
(Vernon Supp. 1980) (livestock or its unborn young).
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tissues or organs. Such blood, blood plasma, or tissue
or organs shall not for the purposes of this chapter be
considered commodities subject to sale or barter, but
shall be considered as medical services.
e. With respect to the sale of cattle, hogs, sheep, and
horses, there shall be no implied warranty that cattle,
hogs, sheep, and horses are free from sickness or
disease at the time the sale is consummated,
conditioned upon reasonable showing by the seller that
all state and federal regulations pertaining to animal
health were complied with.7 07
Although there have been no cases decided under either
provision, a few observations are in order. Initially, under both
sections express warranty responsibility can still attach. In the case
of animals, express warranty provisions are fairly common. The
same, however, cannot be said with respect to human products.
Furthermore, whereas many jurisdictions have distinguished
between commercial blood or organ banks and non-commercial
ones 708 and imposed liability only on the former, the North Dakota
provisions explicitly cover contracts for sale "from a blood bank or
reservoir of such other tissue or organs. ''709 While it might be
possible to argue that non-commercial suppliers, such as a hospital,
would be covered, such an argument hardly seems plausible in view
of the second sentence of section 41-02.-33(3) (d). Thus, in North
Dakota the sale of human products is not subject to implied
warranties.
It is somewhat curious that only the four listed animals are
included in subsection (e). Presumably, the court would not extend
the section's coverage to the sale of other animals, including, for
example, domestic pets, chickens, and honey-producing bees.
Furthermore, a strict reading of the statute reveals exclusion of the
warranty only insofar as sickness or disease is concerned. Animals
listed which are sold for relatively special purposes and which fail to
meet those purposes for reasons other than sickness or disease
might still be the subject of implied warranties. Thus, breeder
cattle which fail to breed would be unmerchantable, unless the
failure is attributable to sickness or disease. This, of course, may
create other problems, including categorization of defects as
°

707. N .D. CENT. CODE j 41-02-33(3) (d) & (e) (Supp. 1979).
708. See Note, Pricing Bad Blood: Reassessing Liability For Post-Transfusion Hepatitis, 15 HARV. ,
LEGIS. 557 (1978) (the strong correlation between the use of blood from paid donors and the
occurrence of hepatitis in the recipients of that blood has prompted increased federal involvement in
blood banking).
709. N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-33(3) (d) (Supp. 1979).
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emanating from sickness or disease.71 0 Finally, an allegation of
breach of implied warranty would place the burden on the seller to
demonstrate that he had complied with relevant federal and state
health regulations, thereby precluding summary judgment.
Many of the questions raised by the North Dakota provisions
will have to await judicial clarification. It is hoped that when such
cases arise, the courts will construe the exclusions strictly, since
they may be in derogation of the parties' expectations. If that
course is followed, the approach to warranty law can remain
rational in spite of a legislative aberration.
3. Criteriafor Merchantability
The foregoing discussion has focused on the seller, the buyer,
and the type of goods involved in the transaction. However, while
it is one thing to determine that the warranty has been made, it is
quite another to define its content. This section of the article will
consider the scope of the undertaking when the seller is held to have
implied that the goods are merchantable.
As indicated earlier, the Code itself does not define
merchantability. Rather, it sets minimum requirements which the
goods must meet in order to qualify as merchantable. 7 11 The most
important of these is contained in section 2-314(2)(c), which
requires that the goods must be fit for ordinary purposes. In order
to understand the full impact of this requirement on the entire
section, it will be useful to first consider the other criteria briefly.
a. Passing Without Objection.
Section 2-314(2)(a) provides that in order for goods to be
considered merchantable they must, at the least, be capable of
passing without objection in the trade under the contract
description. 712 This first minimum criterion incorporates two
factors for determining merchantability: the trade and the
"contract description." A court confronted with a case questioning
merchantability under this subsection would have to consider both
the contract description and its meaning in the particular industry
involved. If the factfinder is satisfied that the goods described in the
contract would be acceptable in the trade, the threshold level of
merchantability is met.
710. One might question whether sterility is a sickness or disease. Also unclear is whether
contamination by a chemical rendering cattle sold for packing unfit for human consumption would
qualify as a sickness or disease. The better view would be to construe the statute strictly, so that the
warranty would be made.
711. It is worth repeating that the mere fact that the goods at issue meet one or more of the
minimum standards does not of itself ensure a finding of merchantability.
712. U.C.C. S 2-314(2) (a) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-31(2) (a) (1968)1.
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Because the operation of the subsection is dependent upon a
contract description, ordinarily both an express warranty and an
implied warranty will exist. 7" 3 The warranties, although they may
coexist, will not necessarily be coextensive. Thus, the express
warranty will ordinarily be that the goods conform to the
description, while the implied warranty of merchantability will be
that the goods are fit for ordinary use or would pass without
objection in the trade., Two cases will illustrate the operation of the
subsection.
Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 7 14 decided under the Uniform Sales

Act, involved the sale of tomato seeds described in the contract as
715
"VF-36," an early maturing seed according to trade meaning.
The seed, as delivered, contained a significant amount of non-early
maturing seed ("rogues"), and plaintiff suffered crop loss as a
result. 716 Applying the forerunner of section 2-314(2) (a), the court
ruled that both express and implied warranties were breached,
since the product neither corresponded to the description nor would
pass without objection within the seed trade under the contract
description. 71 7 Although a very small percentage of rogue seeds
might be tolerable under the contract description, a large
718
percentage would not be. Hence, the seed was not merchantable.
The second case, Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Association v.
S.S. Sovereign Faylenne,719 better illustrates the thrust of section 23 14(2) (a). The plaintiff had purchased a large quantity of Calcium
Ammonium Nitrate (CAN) fertilizer from one of the defendants.
The fertilizer was shipped by another defendant. 720 The contract
description called for "agricultural grade" CAN. 721 According to

trade usage, agricultural grade meant CAN in granular form,
capable of being machine spread or applied.

722

. The calcium is

included to prevent moisture from causing the fertilizer to
agglomerate or become a solid mass. 723 When the CAN arrived it
was in an agglomerated condition, and plaintiff sued, alleging
breach of express and implied warranties. 724 The court ruled for the
713. See Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966) (pre-code);
Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n v. S.S. Sovereign Faylenne, 24 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 74
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
714. 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966).
715. Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966).
716. Id. at__
717. Id. at__

718. Id. at__,

, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 615-17.

54 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20.

719. 24 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).

720. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n v. S.S. Sovereign Faylenne, 24 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 74,
77 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
721. Id.
722. Id. at 79.
723. Id.
724. Id. at 77-78.
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plaintiff, applying sections 2-314(2) (a) and (c) and holding that,
since the contract description required the CAN to be in granular
form, it would not pass without objection and was not fit for
7
ordinary purposes.,

25

It was therefore unmerchantable.

6

That there have been only a handful of cases7 27 which rely
upon section 2-314(2)(a) is readily explainable through the
preceding decisions. The implied warranty created under the
section is always accompanied by an express warranty which will
almost always be breached as well, making resort to the implied
warranty unnecessary or superfluous. Furthermore, if the goods
are objectionable in the trade, it is probably because they are unfit
for ordinary purposes under section 2-314(2)(c), and courts,
familiar with equating merchantability with fitness for general
purpose, tend to prefer to apply section 2-314(2)(c). Nevertheless,
the implied warranty embodied in section 2-314(2)(a) may, on
occasion, be invoked independently. In those cases it remains a
72 8
useful guide to the scope of the warranty.
The foregoing observation, that goods might be fit for
ordinary purposes yet not be merchantable because they fail to pass
without objection under the contract description, points up an
important, yet easily overlooked, aspect of section 2-314(2). The
minimum standards are, as indicated earlier, stated in the
conjunctive.7 29 Therefore, it is possible that goods might meet one
or several of the minimum standards, yet not meet another, and for
that reason fail the merchantability test. The practitioner faced
with a merchantability case should therefore consider all of the
relevant standards to determine whether the goods involved are, in
fact, merchantable.

7 0
1

725. Id.
726. Id. at 80.
727. See alsojetero Constr. Co. v. South Memphis Lumber Co., 531 F.2d 1348 (6th Cir. 1976);
Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 359 Mass. 474, 269 N.E.2d 664 (1971) (no "trade" as to
experimental goods); Ambassador Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel Co., 33 Mich. App. 495, 190 N.W.2d
275 (1971) (amalgam of warranties).
728. The facts of.Jetero Constr. Co. v. South Memphis Lumber Co., 531 F.2d 1348 (6th Cir.
1976), may provide an example of the independent use of section 2:314(2)(a). In that case the
contract called for "No. 2 spruce studs," to be used by plaintiff in a construction project in
Memphis. Id. at 1349. A substantial quantity of the studs "warped," "twisted," and "buckled"
after being used, and therefore did not pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description. Id. at 1350. Although the court found that the goods were also unfit for ordinary
purposes, id. at 1353, the studs might have been deemed generally fit for ordinary purposes and still
have been unmerchantable under § 2-314(2)(a). In other words, if they could have been used in
other construction projects the studs would have been generally fit for ordinary purposes and yet still
have been unmerchantable under section 2-314(2) (a).
729. See supra notes 578-80 and accompanying text.
730. There is language in at least one case, Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F.
Supp. 1017 (D. Conn. 1975), which suggests that goods can be merchantable if they pass without
objection even if they are not fit for ordinary purposes. To the extent that that suggestion is made, it
is believed to be erroneous. One might nevertheless pause to consider whether a court might not be

WARRANTY LAW

653

b. Fungible Goods: FairAverage Quality
The second general minimum standard to be considered is
embodied in section 2-314(2) (b), and requires that, at a minimum,
fungible goods must be of fair average quality (FAQ) within the
contract description.73 1 The official comment indicates that sections
2-314(2) (a) and (b) are to be read together, and that the FAQ
reference is particularly applicable to agricultural bulk products,
requiring that the goods center "around the middle belt of quality,
not the least or the worst ... in the particular trade ... but such as
can pass 'without objection.' ",732 The comment further buttresses
what has already been said about the conjunctive nature of the
minimum standards, and points out the particular applicability of
this subsection in agricultural areas.7 33 Somewhat surprisingly, the
cases discussing FAQ have not generally dealt with agricultural
products; in fact, they have not, on the whole, dealt with what
would commonly be considered "fungible goods. "73
This may be a reflection of the Code's very broad definition of
fungible goods, which provides:
"Fungible" with respect to goods ... means goods.
of which any unit is, by nature or usage of trade, the
equivalent of any other like unit. Goods which are not
fungible shall be deemed fungible for the purposes of this
Act to the extent that under a particular agreement or
73 5
document unlike units are treated as equivalents.
The effect of this definition is to make parts of the Code such as
section 2-314(2) (b) applicable, even though by their terms they do
not apply, when the parties' agreement manifests that non-fungible
units are treated as equivalents. Goods as diverse and technically
non-fungible as steel, 73 6 sheetrock, 73 7 and linoleum 73 8 have all been
the subject of an FAQ analysis, the courts reasoning that the
products delivered have not centered around an acceptable belt of
justified in creating a hierarchy of criteria. Such a creation has initial appeal. since it would reflect
party expectations, but may in the long run be unacceptable.
731. U.C.C. 5 2-314 [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-31 (1968)1.
732. U.C.C. S 2-314, Comment 7.
733. Id.
734. See, e.g., Robert H. Carr & Sons v. Yearsley, 1 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 97 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1963).
735. U.C.C. 5 1-201(17) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-01-11(17) (1968)1.
736. Ambassador Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel Co., 33 Mich. App. 495, 190 N.W.2d 275 (1971).
737. Tractor, Inc. v. Austin Supply & Drywall Co., 484 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
738. Mindell v. Raleigh Rug Co., 14 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1124 (Mass. HousingCt. 1974).
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quality, but have fallen below it. Given the broad definition, one
can hardly quarrel with the analysis, either originally or by
analogy. Furthermore, if one keeps in mind the fact that the
standards are minimum acceptable thresholds, and not the only
possible guidelines, it becomes clear that merely because goods are
not fungible is no reason to preclude FAQ analysis. Finally, it
should be noted that few, if any, of the cases discussing FAQ have
relied solely on subsection (2) (b), suggesting that courts are
reading "fair average quality within the description" more as a
component of merchantability than strictly as a standard of FAQ
analysis.
Beyond the fungibility aspect discussed above, application of
the subsection appears to involve little difficulty. Whether the
goods are of fair average quality within the descrip'tion depends, of
course, upon the description. It may also to a large extent depend
upon trade usage, which will give additional substance to the
parties' expectations. Determination of fair average quality will
raise a factual question to be decided by the trier of fact, and one
would expect to see few appellate reversals when the decision is
based upon FAQ analysis.
739
Of the cases which have employed an FAQ analysis, three
have equated fair average quality with a general understanding of
merchantability and have not considered the fungibility of the
goods at all. The focus of those cases has been on whether the goods
were acceptable in the trade under the contract description. A
fourth case, which deals with what appears to be a fungible
product, 74 0 applied a scattergun approach to the facts, holding that
coal delivered under the contract description was merchantable
since it was fit for ordinary purposes (fuel), met the contract
description, was within the variations permitted by the agreement,
was of fair average quality, and was of even kind, quality, and
quantity. 74 1 It is thus apparent that, although the subsection causes
few problems, it will not often be expressly invoked, and even less
often will be independently applied.
c. Even Kind, Quality, and Quantity
The third minimum standard to be discussed is that contained
in section 2-314(2) (d), that merchantable goods must at least be of
even kind, quality, and quantity within each unit and among all
739. See supra cases cited in notes 736-38.
740. Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co., 436 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (bulk
coal).
741. Id. at 95.
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units. 7 42 This may be varied within limits permitted by the
agreement, and will include usage, course of dealing, and course of
performance. If few cases have dealt with the FAQ concept of
merchantability, fewer still have discussed section 2-314(2) (d). In
fact, other than cases which apply a scattergun approach to
merchantability, no case has been found which directly discusses
the subsection. This is unusual in light of the official comment to
the section, which indicates that the provision "follows case
law. "' 74 However, given the relatively narrow confines of the
standard, one can readily understand the scarcity of judicial
opinions referring to it.
This standard is one of the least complex of the warranty
standards, in the sense that what it requires is governed almost
exclusively by the agreement. Once the contours of the agreement
are known, it becomes a matter of merely asking whether each unit
and all of the units fit within those contours in terms of quality,
quantity, and kind. If they do, the goods have met the standard; if
not, they are unmerchantable. It is difficult to imagine a case which
would focus precisely on the subsection. It is suggested, however,
that the section may be employed in a manner similar to the fair
average quality (FAQ) approach discussed earlier. The section may
be particularly useful in determining whether non-fungible goods
are merchantable, if one reads the "evenness of kind, quality, and
quantity within variations of the agreement" to be equivalent to an
FAQ analysis. Thus, the issue is whether, within the contours of
the agreement, each unit and all the units represent a fair middle
belt of kind, quality, and quantity. To this extent, the warranty
would be breached if the goods delivered, although "even,"
centered at the lowest variation permitted. The warranty would
also be breached if the goods, although averaging out at the middle
of the agreement's variation, were "uneven." In short, this
standard seems to require both "evenness"
and "fair
averageness." If the foregoing discussion seems confusing, it might
well indicate why the standard has been little used.
d. Adequacy of Containers, Packages, andLabels
The next minimum standard applies to the packaging and
labeling of the goods. If goods are to be merchantable, they must,
at a minimum, be adequately packaged and labeled.7 44 Again,
742. U.C.C. S 2-314(2)(d) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-31(2)(d) (1968)].
743. U.C.C. S 2-314, Comment 9.
744. U.C.C. S 2-314(2)(e) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-31(2)(e) (1968)].
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what will be adequate is dependent upon the parties' agreement,
which in turn will encompass usage, dealing, and performance.
The majority of cases which have addressed this subsection
have, not surprisingly, involved exploding bottles, usually
containing carbonated beverages. 7 45 If a bottle explodes under
normal circumstances, the warranty of merchantability is
breached, even though the product contained in the bottle is
most
merchantable. This is clearly the intent of the Code,74 and
6
standard.
the
applying
in
difficulty
little
had
courts have
There are, however, certain observations which are worthy of
mention. Initially, the subsection is by no means limited to bottles.
Thus, for example, the warranty of adequate packaging has been
invoked with respect to a package of automobile parts, 747 to a
chemical reactor, 748 to the packaging of calcium ammonia nitrate
fertilizer,7 4 9 and to cartons which hold beverage bottles. 750 An
attempt has also been made to invoke the warranty with respect to
steel tension straps surrounding a package which, when cut, flew
up and injured the cutter. 751 Although the court denied liability, it
did so without reference to the Uniform Commercial Code and on
the basis of prior state law. 752 The case might well have been
decided differently under the Code. Other fact settings exist in
which the warranty, although not directly applicable, might
nevertheless be applied. 753 In short, the section will have
applicability whenever the container, package, or label is
inadequate under the circumstances. Adequacy is thus a factual
question to be determined on the basis of the surrounding
745. See, e.g., Schuessler v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 279 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973);
Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976); Sheeskin v. Giant Food,
Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874 (1974), aff'd sub nom. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington CocaCola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975); Harris v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 23
Mass. App. Dec. 159 (1963) (milk); Lucchesi v. H.C. Bohack Co., 8 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 326 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1970); Gillispie v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 14 N.C. App. 1, 187 S.E.2d 441
(1972).
746. See infra notes 757-74 and accompanying text.
747. Pugh v.J.C. Whitney & Co., 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (employee who
opened package and cut himself on a sharp projection could recover on breach of warranty theory).
748. Standards Brands Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 1029,
319 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1971) (glass-lined vessel with metal agitator; impliedly warranted that packaging
would be adequate to prevent glass from being struck by metal).
749. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n v. S.S. Sovereign Faylenne, 24 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 74
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (packaging should prevent agglomeration caused by moisture).
750. Schuessler v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 279 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
751. Stubblefield v. Johnson-Fagg, Inc., 379 F.2d 270 (10th Cir. 1967).
752. Id. at 273.
753. One such setting may be illustrated by Anderson v. Associated Growers, Inc., 11 Wash.
App. 774, 525 P.2d 284 (1974). The decedent had been bitten by a "banana spider" while reaching
for a carton of radishes which was under a carton ofbananas. Id. at 775, 525 P.2d at 284. His wife, as
administratrix of the estate, sued for breach of warranty, and summary judgment was granted for the
defendant. Id. at 775-76, 525 P.2d at 285. Although the court indicated that neither the product nor
the container was defective, it spent little time discussing whether proper packaging included the
absence of dangerous insects. Id.
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circumstances. Therefore, summary judgment without submission
to the jury of the question of adequacy would be improper. 114
The packaging standards of section 2-314(e) may also affect
the other merchantability criteria. Thus, the fact that the container
is inadequate has been held to render the product itself unfit for
ordinary purposes. 755 This is an important tenet, particularly when
a court is confronted with a defendant who contends that the
product itself was merchantable or that the plaintiff failed to show a
defect in the product. It should be sufficient for the plaintiff to
merely demonstrate that the container was inadequate in order to
recover.
Additionally, it should be remembered that the warranty of
merchantability is generally applicable only to contracts for the sale
of goods. Two problems arise in connection with this requirement:
First, the sale may be viewed as encompassing only the product
itself, and not its container. Second, the timing of the transaction
may be critical in determining the existence of the warranty. For
example, a question may arise as to whether the warranty attaches
prior to the actual sale when a potential purchaser is injured by an
exploding bottle while carrying it to the checkout counter.
Theoretically, no sale has occurred, and the warranty might
therefore have not yet attached.
As to the first issue, whether the contract for sale encompasses
the container or only the contained item, the Code itself would
seem to include the container within the contract. 756 Thus, the
merchantability of the goods is to be tested not only by their
quality, but also by the adequacy of the container. Nevertheless,
two cases exist which contradict this conclusion.
The first, McKone v. Ralph's Wonder Market, Inc., 757 appears to
be inconsistent with an earlier case decided in the same
jurisdiction, 758 and its precedential value is therefore questionable.
The case involved a glass bottle of milk which exploded after the
milk had been purchased and was being carried to the purchaser's
car. 759 A piece of glass became imbedded in the purchaser's
forehead and she sued.7 60 The lower court held for the plaintiff on
the theory of breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and on
appeal the case was reversed. 761 The appellate court held that there
754. Schuesslerv. Coca-Cola BottlingCo., 279 So. 2d901, 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
755. See, e.g., Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976).
756. See U.C.C. 5 2-314(2) (e) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-31(2) (e) (1968)].
757.27 Mass. App. Dec. 159 (1963).
758. Harris v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 23 Mass. App. Dec. 169 (1963).
759. McKone v. Ralph's Wonder Mkt., Inc., 27 Mass. App. Dec. 159, 160 (1963).
760. Id. at 162.
761. Id. at 164-65.
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had not been a sale of the bottle as required by section 2-314, and
therefore no implied warranty of merchantability attached.7 62 The
dissent, stressing subsection (2)(e), would have held that the
warranty was created and breached, since the goods were not
"proper goods, properly contained. "763 Clearly, the dissent's view
is more consistent with the Code.
One can speculate as to why the majority ruled as it did and
suggest two justifications, both advanced in the opinion. First, milk
is not an inherently dangerous product, 764 in the sense that it is not
generally packaged under pressure, as are other soft drinks.
However, the likelihood of explosion should not enter into the
consideration. The fact that the explosion occurred should control.
Second, the court believed that the seller should not be deemed an
insurer of its customers. 765 Such logic would preclude liability for
sellers of carbonated soft drinks, however, and since it ordinarily
does not, the court was apparently again focusing on the nature of
the bottle's contents. It thus appears that the court was unwilling to
impose liability primarily because a relatively harmless product,
milk, was involved. As the plaintiff discovered, however, the milk
was by no means harmless.
The second case, Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 766 presented a
more fascinating and far more difficult fact setting. The plaintiff
had ordered a glass of wine from the defendant's restaurant, and
while he was drinking it the glass shattered in his hand, allegedly
causing injury. 76 7 Plaintiff sued, and raised the issue of
merchantability. 768 The court dismissed his breach of warranty
claim, and plaintiff appealed. 769 The appellate court affirmed,
holding that the wine glass was not part of the sale of food or drink,
since title to it did not pass. 770 Again, it is believed that the result is
incorrect, although not as clearly so as in the preceding case.
The plaintiff in Shaffer argued that, since the serving of food
and drink is a sale under section 2-314(1), accompanying the sale
was a warranty that the food or drink would be adequately
packaged or contained. 771 The court referred to the argument as
"creative . . . [but] illogical," ' 772 since it would require that the
762.
763.
764.
765.
766.
767.
768.
769.
770.
771.
772.

Id.
Id. at 168 (Allen,J., dissenting).
27 Mass. App. Dec. at 165.
Id.
18 Wash. App. 816, 572 P.2d 737 (1977).
Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 18 Wash. App. 816,817, 572 P.2d 737, 738 (1977).
Id. at 818, 572 P.2d at 739.
Id. at 817, 572 P.2d at 738.
Id. at 818, 572 P.2d at 739.
Id. at 822, 572 P.2d at 739.
Id. at 822, 572 P.2d at 740.
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glass be considered part of the sale. 7 73 One need only ask whether
the sale of the wine could have been accomplished without a
container to see the fault with the court's reasoning. Had the wine
been brought to the table in a bottle which exploded, the court
probably would not have ruled that the wine itself was
merchantable merely because the bottle was not sold. The fact
is that the goods sold, here food or drink, must be contained or
packaged. Therefore, when the container, be it a glass or a bottle,
shatters, the goods are not adequately contained and the warranty
7 74
is breached. 1
If the cases which deny liability on the ground that the product
and not its container is the subject of sale are in error, they at least
arise with relative infrequency. Far more important are the cases
involving the second question previously raised: whether the
plaintiff is barred from recovery when the container explodes,
causing injury, before payment. The majority of cases indicate that
7 75
the plaintiff will not be barred.
One method of reaching the conclusion that the plaintiff may
recover, albeit an unacceptable one, is to ignore the question of
whether a sale has occurred. 776 Two other methods exist which
have been used by the courts. The first is to read the Code
provisions governing "contract for sale " "offer and acceptance,"
and "termination" 777 literally. This analysis interprets the Code as
implying the warranty of merchantability whenever there is a
contract for the sale of goods. A "contract for sale" includes, under
773. Id.
774. A cynic might suggest two "policy" reasons for the Shaffer decision. First, the court might
have felt that to allow recovery would have created an impossible standard for future cases. While in
the bottle cases the plaintiff's observable activities in handling the container will be clear (e.g., did the
plaintiff shake the bottle, drop it, or handle it roughly), his actions as to a wine glass may be unclear
(e.g., a not-so-gentle squeeze could result in breakage, and hence injury and liability). Unobservable
actions by the plaintiff might lead a court to fear "staged" or intentional breakage, enacted for the
purpose of lawsuits. The short but unsatisfactory response is that this will be a matter of proof. In this
regard, the case suggests that the court disbelieved the plaintiff. Second, if liability is imposed here, a
difficult question arises as to the further scope of liability. For example, would the adequate
packaging warranty extend to food served on a hot metal plate which burned the restaurant patron?
775. See infra notes 776-84 and accompanying text.
776. See, e.g., Schuessler v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 279 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
See also Lucchesi v. H.C. Bohack Co., 8 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 326 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
777. It is necessary to define the term "contract for sale" because the warranty of
merchantability is implied only "in a contract for.., sale." U.C.C. § 2-314(1) [N.D. CENT. COOE S
41-02-31(1) (1968)]. Under the Code, a "contract for sale includes both a present sale of goods and a
contract to sell goods at a future time." U.C.C. S 2-106(1) IND. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-06(l) (1968)]
(formation of contract in general); U.C.C. § 1-201(11) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-01-11(1) (1968)1
(defining "contract").
For Code provisions defining "offer and acceptance," see U.C.C. § 2-206 [N.D. CENT. CODES
41-02-13 (1968)1 (offer and acceptance in formation of contract), and U.C.C. S 2-606 [N.D. CENT.
CODE S41-02-69 (1968)1 (what constitutes acceptance ofgoods). See also U.C.C. § 2-607 [N.D. CENT.
CODE 5 41-02-70 (1968)] (effect of acceptance); U.C.C. S 2-608 [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-70
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section 2-106, both a present and a future sale of goods. 778 In
determining when the contract for sale arises, one must view the
transaction from a traditional contract perspective, in terms of offer
and acceptance as embodied in the Code. When the merchant
retailer places goods on the shelf he is offering them for sale, to be
accepted by the buyer under section 2-206 in any reasonable
manner. When the buyer selects goods from the shelf, or when he
brings them to the checkout counter, he impliedly promises to pay
for them, thereby accepting the retailer's offer. Therefore, the
"contract for sale" is entered into as soon as the buyer selects the
goods, and the warranty attaches at that time. Moreover, the fact
that the buyer can return the goods if he changes his mind amounts
only to an implied right of termination, and does not indicate that
the contract had not yet been entered into. The two cases which
have applied this analysis 779 have, not surprisingly, found for the
buyer.
This highly formalistic reading of the Code is neither without
objection nor entirely laudable, since it depends upon attenuated
analysis and is largely result oriented. On the other hand, it is
probably justifiable, since to deny the existence of a warranty
merely because the buyer has yet to complete payment is to allow
form to govern over substance.
The other method of dealing with the issue is also highly
formalistic, and is subject to criticism because its validity is
based upon the passage of "title," a concept which the Code
drafters attempted to de-emphasize. 78 0 The one case which has
applied a "title" analysis78 1 reached the conclusion that a sale had
occurred when the buyer picked up the bottles, reasoning that the
seller's delivery had occurred at that time and title had therefore
passed. 7 82 Furthermore, even though the buyer could change his
mind, the contract was considered to have been entered into at the
time of selection, since the change of mind would merely revest title
78 3
in the seller.
The foregoing cases suggest that the courts which address the
question of whether a sale has occurred will strive to find a sale, and
its concommitant warranty, when it accords with the commercial
(1968)] (revocation of acceptance in whole or in part). The definition of "termination" is set forth in
U.C.C. S 2-106(3) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-06(3) (1968)1.
778. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-06(l)(1968)1.
779. Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976); Sheeskin v.
Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874 (1974), aff'd sub nom. Giant Food, Inc. v.
Washington Coca-Cola BottlingCo., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1(1975).
780. SeeU.C.C. S 2-401 [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-46 (1968)1.
781. Gillispie v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 14 N.C. App. 1, 187 S.E.2d 441 (1972).
782. Id. at _
, 187 S.E.2d at 444.
783. Id. (citingU.C.C. S 2-401(4)).
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realities of the setting in order to ensure a fair, just result. The
results of the cases are apparently correct, but one might hope that
such results could in the future be achieved in a more
straightforward manner. It is suggested that some form of strict
warranty liability, either judicial or legislative, might be applied to
cover the exploding bottle cases to avoid the exacting requirement
that there be a contract for the sale of goods. Such an approach
would be dually advantageous, as it would preclude the necessity
for formalistic interpretation, and at the same time extend coverage
to injured parties who are clearly beyond even the most attenuated
7 84
contract for sale analysis.
Incidental to the preceding observations, and of more than
passing interest, is the fact that when the adequacy of the container
is at issue the plaintiff may not have a cause of action against the
remote seller. Generally, under the Code a seller's warranty, once
given, extends to those persons "who may reasonably be expected
to use, consume or be affected by the goods,'' 78 5 even in the
absence of privity of contract. Both the retailer and the remote
seller are ordinarily liable for any breach of warranty of
merchantability. In the exploding bottle cases, however, the
buyer's cause of action will generally be limited to the immediate
seller, primarily because of problems of proof associated with
demonstrating a breach at the time of the remote sale. 786 Since the
question will turn upon whether the container was inadequate at
the time the remote supplier initially sold the goods, and since there
will have been a significant break in the chain of control, the
ultimate purchaser will have difficulty demonstrating the causal
connection required. As long as the buyer has a remedy against the
immediate seller there is little difficulty with this interpretation.
Furthermore, when the buyer can demonstrate the causal
connection the remote seller should be held liable as well.
One final observation about section 2-314(2)(e) is in order.
The section makes merchantability dependent in part upon the
adequacy of the package, container, or label. 787 The focus thus far
has been exclusively on packages and containers. The fact that
goods may be unmerchantable if they are inadequately labeled
784. For example, consider a buyer in the process of reaching for a bottle when the bottle
explodes. Although clearly no contract for sale has been entered into, arguably some warranty
protection or something similar ought to exist. But cf Lane v. Barringer,
Ind. App.
407 N.E.2d 1173 (1980) (court assumed a sale but held no breach of warranty absent privity).
785. U.C.C. S 2-318 (alt. c). This is the alternative adopted by North Dakota, and is the most
liberal of the alternatives available. See N .D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-35 (1968).
786. See, e.g., Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d
1 (1975); Lucchesi v. H.C. Bohack Co., 8 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 326 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
787. U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (e) [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-31(2) (e) (1968)].
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would seem to be equally important. Surprisingly, relatively few
cases have considered adequacy of labeling as a basis for
determining merchantability. This may, however, be more the
result of the fact that there are more easily invoked theories of
liability than that courts are unwilling to interpret section 2-314(2)
(e) to impose responsibility.
A careful reading of the section reveals that, at a minimum,
goods to be merchantable must be adequately labeled as
determined by the agreement. 78 8 The comment indicates that the
warranty arises "where the nature of the goods and of the
transaction require a certain type of . . . label. ' 789 If this means
anything, it should mean that certain goods, particularly inherently
dangerous ones, require adequate labels indicating their dangerous
propensities. Courts should have no hesitancy in reading the
section to provide that goods are not merchantable if they do not
have adequate labels which give the buyer appropriate warnings as
to what the goods can and cannot do, and as to dangers which
might be expected.
As indicated, few courts have employed the section for the
above suggested purpose, and have instead relied upon a strict
liability or a duty to warn analysis. 790 The fact that few courts have
made use of the section should not, however, lead one to the
conclusion that it should not be so used. Furthermore, it may be
particularly useful in those circumstances where strict liability is
not available, as where the product is not "in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user.' 791 Thus, -for example, a
bottle of poison, even though in no way defective, might be
unmerchantable if it were not adequately labeled. Likewise, cattle
feed, not unreasonably dangerous to the user, might be
unmerchantable if it contained a chemical which caused bred cattle
to abort or breeder bulls to become sterile, and was not adequately
labeled. 92 The point, of course, is that within the contours of an
agreement the goods may require appropriate labels to make them
merchantable, and the practitioner who fails to raise label adequacy
as an issue may invite the denial of recovery in a case which does
not readily fit within an alternative theory.
788. Id.
789. U.C.C. 5 2-314, Comment 10.
790. See, e.g., Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 1977); Wolfe v. Ford
Motor Co., __
Mass. App.
-,
376 N.E.2d 143 (1978) (cases cited therein).
791. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS 5 402(A)(1) (1965).
792. See Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968) (court relied on breach of
warranty that goods be fit for an ordinary purpose for which the goods are used under section 2314(2) (c)).
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e. Conformity with Affirmations on the Label or Container
Closely related to the preceding minimum standard is the fifth
standard, that goods must conform to the promises or affirmations
set forth on the container or label. 793 Furthermore, the probability
is that any promises or affirmations of fact contained on the label or
container would be deemed to create express warranties under
section 2-313. 194 It is not altogether clear why the drafters of the
Code thought it necessary to include subsection (2)(f), in light of
the earlier provision for express warranties in section 2-313.791 One
can only speculate that the drafters may have wanted to make it
clear that, even though the implied warranty might be disclaimed,
the express warranty would remain. Additionally, the drafters may
have sought to indicate to courts that, even though label promises
or affirmations might not go to the "basis of the. bargain ' 796 under
section 2-3 13, they were so fundamental to the parties' expectations
that they would create implied warranties. 79 7 In any event, because
of the overlap of the two sections the problems likely to arise under
one will to a large extent mirror those arising under the other.
Only a handful of cases have made express reference to
subsection (2)(f). 7 9 8 The clearest cases concerning failure to meet
the standard involve undisputed mislabeling, as where seed is
labeled as one thing and turns out to be another. 799 Slightly less
clear are the cases which involve puffing. As has already been noted
in connection with express warranties, puffing or sales talk may not
give rise to express warranty liability. In cases involving puffing,
the question becomes whether it should give rise to implied
warranty liability when the "puff" is contained on the label.
Logically, the result should be the same as in the express warranty
cases, although there is some authority to the contrary.8 0 0
Finally, there are cases in which warranty liability remains
unclear, as where the label contains no express promises or
affirmations of fact relevant to the dispute, but the container itself
793. U.C.C. S 2-314(2) (f) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-31(2) (f) (1968)].
794. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
795. U.C.C. S 2-313 [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-30 (1968)].
796. U.C.C. § 2-313(l)(a) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-30(1) (a) (1968)].
797. See U.C.C. S 2-314, Comment 10.
798. See Agricultural Serv. Ass'n v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir, 1977);
Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1975); Farmers Union Coop.
Gin v. Smith, 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 823 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971); Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa.
217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968); cf.Coffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 30 N.C. App. 134, 226 S.E.2d 534
(1976).
799. See, e.g., Agricultural Servs. Ass'n v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir.
1977); Farmers Union Coop. Gin v. Smith, 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 823 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971).
800. See Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1975) (package
labeled "completely safe," product caused injury; held implied warranty of complete safety
breached, express warranty breached as well).
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may infer some. 80 1 The case of Coffer v. Standard Brands, Inc. 80 2 is
illustrative. Plaintiff purchased a clear glass jar filled with nuts and
labeled only "Planters Dry Roasted Mixed Nuts, no oils or sugar
used in processing. "803 The jar in fact contained mixed nuts,
although plaintiff had the misfortune to find an unshelled nut
among the shelled nuts, which damaged his teeth.8 0 4 The court
declared that no express warranties were breached, and addressed
the question of whether the "clear glass jar revealing only shelled
nuts was a 'promise or affirmation of fact' "8105 under section 2314(2)(f). The court ruled that such an approach would be
inconsistent with the general concept of merchantability.8 0 6
Although the question seems to be a close one, there apparently is
no reason why the buyer's observations could not infer the
affirmation of fact, thereby creating the warranty. Had the label
contained the word "shelled," the warranty arguably would have
existed. Since the subsection provides that affirmations on the label
or container may imply the warranty, 80 7 there is every reason to
imply it when the product is visible through the container and the
buyer infers a fact from what he actually sees. On the other hand,
there are good reasons for caution before making liability depend
upon the clarity of the packaging.
f Fitnessfor Ordinary Purpose
By far the most important and most often invoked minimum
standard for determining whether goods are merchantable is
contained in section 2-314(2)(c), which provides that at a minimum
merchantable goods must be "fit for the ordinary purposes for
which such goods are used. "808 In fact, many people refer to the
standard as a synonym for merchantability. The subsection has
been described as the heart of the concept of merchantability, 80 9
and there can be little doubt that this description is appropriate.
Fitness for ordinary purpose does not mean perfection, 8 10 nor
801. Cofferv. Standard Brands, Inc., 30 N.C. App. 134, 226 S.E.2d 534 (1976).
802. 30 N.C. App. 134, 226 S.E.2d 534 (1976).
803. Id. at
.,226 S.E.2d at 536.
804. Id. at

__,

226 S.E.2d at 535.

805. Id. at __
, 226 S.E.2d at 537.
806. Id.
807. U.C.C. § 2-314(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-31(2) (1968)1,
808. U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (c) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-31(2) (C) (1968)].
809. Wisniewski v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 574, 323 A.2d 744
(1974).
810. Nassau, Suffolk White Trucks, Inc. v. Twin County Transit Mix Corp., 62 A.D.2d 982,
403 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1978); Tracy v. Vinton Motors. Inc., 130 Vt. 512. 296 A.2d 269 (1972).
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does it mean that the goods will be fit for all purposes.8 1 1
Additionally, fitness for ordinary purpose does not turn on whether
the seller or manufacturer intended the goods to be used in a
particular way, but rather depends upon whether the use to which
the buyer put the goods was an ordinary one. 8 12 Whether the buyer

has used the goods in an ordinary manner will be a question of fact
8 13
for the jury.
The huge number of pure warranty cases, coupled with the
enormous overlap of both standard negligence law and strict
liability in tort, makes it impossible to detail all of the variations
existing in this area. A few observations are, however, in order.
z. Ordinary versus ExtraordinaryUse
At the outset, it is crucial to keep in mind two related aspects
of fitness for ordinary purpose. First, by definition, ordinary
purpose, and hence fitness, is dependent on whether goods are
actually used in an ordinary manner. Thus, if the buyer's use is an
extraordinary one, and the goods would have been capable of
performing an ordinary use without malfunction, no warranty
liability follows.

814

However, merely because a buyer uses goods in

a manner not intended by the manufacturer or seller does not
demonstrate an extraordinary use. The intent of the seller is not the
key; rather, it is whether the buyer's use is ordinary. Thus, a chair
is intended to be used for sitting, but if the buyer stands on it, as
buyers often do, the chair, to be merchantable, must not break.
One of the most common misstatements by courts is to refer to the
warranty of merchantability as one of fitness for "intended use. "815
These two aspects of the warranty of fitness for ordinary
purpose are readily illustrated. The earliest post-Code case which
discusses these aspects of ordinary purpose is Robert H. Carr'&Sons
v. Yearsley, 8 16 which held that defendant's demurrer to a breach of
implied warranty claim could not be sustained on the allegation
that the ordinary purpose for which a "log chain" was used did not
811. See Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Zallea Bros., 443 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Wis. 1978), aff'd,
606 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1979); Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 445 F.
Supp. 537 (D. Mass. 1977); Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969).
812. See, e.g., Kelly v. Hanscom Bros., 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 357, 331 A.2d 737 (1974).
813. See Brickman-Joy Corp. v. National Annealing Box Co., 459 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1972).
814. On the other hand, the mere fact that the buyer's use is an extraordinary one should not
preclude liability if the buyer can prove that the goods were unfit even for ordinary purposes. See
Ambassador Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel Co., 33 Mich. App. 495, 190 N.W.2d 275 (1971); cf Texsun
Feedyards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 311 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 447 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1971) (contributory negligence not a defense when buyer proves that
goods were not otherwise fit for ordinary purposes).
815. See, e.g., Butterfield v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Kan. 123, 499 P.2d 539 (1972).
816. 1 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 97 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1963).
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encompass towing a Mack truck.8 17 Thus, the defendant was
required to affirmatively show that towing a truck was outside the
ordinary purposes for which a log chain would be used." 8 Since it
8 19
did not do so, plaintiff was found to have stated a cause of action.,
To find that the buyer's use will defeat a demurrer, absent
proof that it is an extraordinary use, answers only one part of the
question. The second part is how to determine an ordinary use. In
addressing this question, courts have fashioned various tests. One,
8 20
articulated in Brickman-Joy Corp. v. National Annealing Box Co.,
asks whether the buyer's use accords with that of "an appreciable
number" of like users.8 21 If it does, it is an ordinary use,
notwithstanding that other users would not have so used the
in conformity
product, or that the buyer's use was not completely
22
practices.
or
codes
with standard industry
A second test may have been advanced by the court in Kelly v.
Hanscom Bros., 823 which involved a cross-claim by a defendant
retailer against its supplier. In discussing whether the warranty8 of
24
merchantability which accompanied a child's toy was breached,
the court concluded that the "universal penchant" 25 of children to
put things in their mouths, including toys, would qualify it as an
826
ordinary use, even though it might not be an intended use.
Presumably, any use of a product which could fairly be described as
embodying a "universal penchant" would create the warranty,
since it would then amount to an ordinary purpose.
One of the most fertile areas of the case law articulating tests
for ordinary use and distinguishing intended use has been the
automobile crashworthiness, or second collision, cases. Although
the problems involved and the sheer number of cases preclude
extended discussion here, 82 7 the tests advanced and the logic behind
them deserve mention.
The second collision cases involve what is a deceptively simple
question: Must the manufacturer of an automobile design the
817. Robert H. Carr & Sons v. Yearsley, I U.C.C. REP. SERV. 97, 99 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1963).
818. Id.
819. Id.
820. 459 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1972).
821. Brickman-Joy Corp. v. National Annealing Box Co., 459 F.2d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1972).
822. See Handrigan v. Apex Warwick, Inc., 108 R.I. 319, 275 A.2d 262 (1971) (ladder user who
deviated from standard code for ladders was not barred from merchantability recovery).
823. 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 357, 331 A.2d 737 (1974).
824. Kell) v. Hanscom Bros., 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 357, 331 A.2d 737 (1974). Kelly involved the
choking death of a small child. Id.
, 331 A.2d at 739.
825. Id. at __
826. Id.
827. For discussions of this area, see Cousins, Second Impact - Principles of Crashworthiness 11
The Judiciary Responds When
TRIAL LAW. Q. 18 (1976); Golden, Automobile Crashworthiness -
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vehicle so that, in the event of accident, the passengers will not be
further injured by defects inherent in the automobile? This may
depend upon a variety of questions, including whether the
manufacturer was negligent, whether strict liability in tort
should be imposed, and, finally, whether the automobile is
merchantable. Merchantability, of course, depends upon whether a
collision is an ordinary use of an automobile.
The obvious, impulsive answer is that one does not ordinarily
use an automobile for purposes of crashing into other objects.
Equally obvious, however, is the fact that "appreciable numbers"
of people do unintentionally use cars in that fashion, and that there
is a "universal penchant" for cars to be involved in accidents.
Thus, the question arises whether, given the fact that cars are often
involved in accidents, this may amount to an ordinary use, so that
the car is unmerchantable when it fails to protect the passengers
from increased injuries in the event of a crash. There has been
anything but unanimity on this issue in the courts.
What is important here is not whether a car must offer total
safety or whether liability may exist apart from warranty; the
primary inquiry for the purposes of this discussion is what tests
have been advanced for determining whether a crash is an ordinary
purpose. Clearly the test could not be based upon intended use, for
no one would argue that crashes were intended uses. Rather, the
courts have expressed the test as whether the use could be
"anticipated," 828
and whether
it was
"foreseeable
or
inevitable. '829 This would imply as part of the warranty that there
is "a reasonable measure of safety'' 830 when a collision occurs.
Perhaps the best test combines both the intended purpose and the
foreseeable use, 831 and makes the determination of merchantability
a factual question for the jury.
The thrust of the second collision cases is clear, and their
impact in determining what constitutes an ordinary use of goods
cannot be underestimated. While courts often speak in terms of the
intended use of the product, 832 their opinions cannot be read to
mean that manufacturer or seller intent is controlling, for if it were
the second collision cases could not have arisen. Rather, the courts
Manufacturers Improperly Design Their Cars, 46 INS. COUNSEL J. 335 (1979); Sklaw, "Second Collision"
Liability: The Needfor Uniformity, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 499, 507-24 (1973).
828. Isaacson v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
829. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975); Volkswagen of
America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
,321 A.2d at 745.
830. 272 Md. at __
378 N.E.2d 964(1978).
Mass.
-,
831. Backv. Wickes Corp., _
832. See Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Serv., 468 P.2d 969 (Wyo. 1970); Turner v.
Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 217 S.E.2d 863 (1975).
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which equate intended use with merchantability either do so only to
demonstrate that the use of the goods was clearly abnormal or
misspeak themselves entirely.
From the foregoing it is readily apparent that ordinary use will
be dependent upon a number of factors, including some which
appear more frequently in tort law than in contract law. To add to
the confusion, the author would propose the following test for
whether a use is ordinary: Could the seller have reasonably
foreseen that a substantial number of persons in the position of the
plaintiff would have made use of the goods in the manner in which
he did? If so, the use is an ordinary one, and the failure of the goods
to satisfactorily perform that use results in a breach of warranty.
Closely related to the question of ordinary use is the fact,
implicit in section 2-314(2) (c), that goods can be merchantable and
not capable of performing an extraordinary use. Merchantability
does not require that goods perform abnormal, extraordinary uses,
or that they perform well when they are misused. Although courts
occasionally equate abnormal or extraordinary use with misuse, the
concepts are distinct, and their distinctions should be kept intact.
Furthermore, to the extent that misuse involves some affirmative
inappropriate use of the goods, the "misuse defense" often
becomes tantamount to a defense of contributory negligence or
assumption of risk, which should be kept distinct from the
abnormal use warranty case.
ii. Abnormal Use
An abnormal use, as distinguished from misuse, is involved
when goods are being used to perform a function different from
that which the seller could have reasonably foreseen. 833 Defined in
that manner, abnormal use might include misuse, as where the
buyer uses a power lawnmower to trim hedges. However, when the
seller asserts that abnormal use has occurred, he is not necessarily
attempting to deny liability for damages caused to the buyer.
Rather, he is asserting that the concept of merchantability does not
embrace the use to which the buyer put the goods. When the seller
asserts misuse, he is attempting to show that the buyer, because of
the way in which he used the goods, caused or contributed to the
injury received, and therefore that merchantability ceases to be an
issue. In this light, abnormal or extraordinary use will generally be
urged as a defense when the claim of the buyer is based on loss of
833. See, e.g., Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 217 S.E.2d 863
(1975).
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bargain. Misuse will be urged defensively when the loss is
consequential.
Thus, for example, where the buyer of a small car asserts
unmerchantability when the car is incapable of towing a large
trailer, the seller could defend on grounds of abnormal use.8 34 If the
small car exploded, the seller might defend on grounds of misuse.
The point, of course, is that there is a difference between a buyer
asserting that the goods do not adequately perform the function he
desires and asserting that the goods are unmerchantable. Few
cases, however, have articulated this difference, in part because of
the equation of abnormal use with misuse.
Illustrative is Gilbert & Bennett Manufacturing Co. v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 835 which involved the commercial sale of a
Precipitron, a pollution control device, by the defendant to the
plaintiff. 836 The plaintiff, a metal fence manufacturer, coated the
metal with plastisol, a plastic covering.8 37 The plastisol coating
process emitted noxious smoke and odor, and required the use of a
pollution control device. 38 Plaintiff had previously used a thermal
oxidizer to control the smoke and odors, but this was more
expensive than the Precipitron. 839 Plaintiff ordered and received a
Precipitron, and it failed to remove the smoke and odors
effectively. 84 0 Plaintiff ran afoul of local pollution control laws, and
8 4t
eventually had to replace the Precipitron with a thermal oxidizer.
Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of express and implied
842
warranties.
The district court found that there were no express warranties
8 43
and that the implied warranties had been effectively disclaimed.
Nevertheless, because it reached that conclusion on the basis of
questionable authority, the court felt compelled to determine
whether the Precipitron was merchantable. 844 The court stated:
"Merchantable

quality" means that the good shall be

834. Other examples of abnormal use are readily imaginable. An air conditioner which is too
small to cool a given room may be merchantable, but incapable of performing to the buyer's
satisfaction; the child's toy designed for one age group may not fit a child even within the age group
and yet still be merchantable; the ladder which will hold a 175 pound man, but not a 250 pound
man, might nevertheless be merchantable.
835. 445 F. Supp. 537 (D. Mass. 1977).
836. Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 537 (D. Mass.
1977).
837. Id. at 539.
838. Id. at 540.
839. Id.
840. Id.
841. Id.
842. Id. at 543.
843. Id. at 547.
844. Id.
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reasonably suitable for ordinary uses for which goods of
that kind and description are sold ....
The Precipitron is
ordinarily used "for normal air cleaning or for oil mist
control. . . ." The fact that the Precipitron . . . was not
designed to control the large quantity of plastisol
particulate matter and odors emanating from G & B Co's
• . . plant does not mean that the Precipitron was not
8 45
merchantable.
Thus, the mere fact that the product does not live up to the
buyer's expectations does not render it unmerchantable, so long as
the product would have performed its usual or ordinary
functions. 8 46 Thus, pipe which meets industry standards has been
held to be merchantable even though it corrodes when subjected to
some unknown, highly corrosive element. 847 Also, a hoist which is
overloaded and falls is not thereby deemed unmerchantable, since
the hoist would have worked properly under normal use.8 48 The
results are dictated by good sense and party expectation, since the
buyer can only expect that the goods will perform ordinary
purposes (absent particular purpose warranty circumstances), and
not that they will perform all purposes.
iii. Misuse
It will often occur that the buyer is not merely using the goods
for purposes beyond their capabilities, but that he is abusing or
misusing them, under circumstances where the misuse causes
injury. If it can be said that the misuse is the cause of the inability
to perform, and not that the goods themselves were unfit, the seller
should not be responsible. Again, the concept of merchantability
does not require that the goods be indestructable, or that they will
not cause injury if abused. The questions in these cases will be
whether the use is ordinary, whether the goods were otherwise fit
for ordinary uses, and whether it was the buyer's use of the goods
or the goods themselves which created the risk of harm. These
considerations have led many courts to speak in terms more
properly considered in tort law, such as contributory negligence
845. Id. at 548.
846. See also Nassau Suffolk White Trucks, Inc. v. Twin County Transit Mix Corp., 62 A.D.2d
982, 403 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1978) (cement trucks merchantable even though they were unfit for
particular purpose of buyer, and even though they occasionally broke down).
847. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Zallea Bros., 443 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Wis. 1978), aff'd, 606
F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1979). See also Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 516 F.2d
33 (10th Cir. 1975) (decided without reference to U.C.C.).
848. Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 217 S.E.2d 863 (1975) (court
speaks of misuse; abnormal use probably more likely).
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and assumption of risk. While one can readily appreciate why
courts would feel the need to express themselves in those terms, to
do so is to invite confusion, since, as long as the claim is breach of
warranty and not negligence, the buyer's negligence should play no
part in the analysis. What causes courts to refer to contributory
negligence and assumption of risk is the belief that a buyer should
not be allowed to knowingly use unfit goods to his detriment and
then shift the risk of his unreasonable actions to the seller.
Unfortunately, the articulation of this belief in traditional tort
terminology has created an incredibly confusing array of cases
which yield little clarity, even upon close examination.
The crucial question is "whether the causal connection
between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's injury is sufficiently
close to justify liability. "849 In Code terms, the question is whether
the loss resulted "in the ordinary course of events from the seller's
breach,'' 50 whether "special circumstances show proximate
damages" 8 5 1 beyond diminution in value, and, where there has
been injury to person or property, whether it "proximately
result[ed] from any breach of warranty. "852 All of these concepts
are embodied in the comment to section 2-3 14, which provides:
In an action based on breach of warranty, it is of
course necessary to show . . . that the breach of the
warranty was the proximate cause of the loss sustained. In
such an action an affirmative showing by the seller that
the loss resulted from some action or event following his
own delivery of the goods can operate as a defense ...
Action by the buyer following an examination of the
goods which ought to have indicated the defect
complained of can be shown as matter bearing on whether
53
the breach itself was the cause of the injury.
Because of conflicting decisions, it cannot be said categorically
that contributory negligence does not operate to bar the buyer's
action. Clearly, however, the doctrine has no application in the
initial determination of whether the goods are merchantable. That
is not to say that the buyer's actions have no bearing on his
recovery. Only if the buyer's actions, and not the breach of
warranty, caused the damage should the buyer be denied recovery.
849. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 62, at 411.
850.
851.
852.
853.

U.C.C.
U.C.C.
U.C.C.
U.C.C.

5 2-714(1) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-93(1) (1968)].
S 2-714(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-93(2) (1968)].
S 2-715(2) (b) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-94(2) (b) (1968)].
5 2-314, Comment 13.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court has not yet addressed this
issue. A number of other jurisdictions have, however, and their
rulings range from absolute denial of the efficacy of contributory
negligence 85 4 to acceptance of the doctrine entirely.8

55

Other courts

have accepted the doctrine only insofar as it relates to assumption
8 56
by the buyer of a known risk.
The only suitable way for the courts to resolve this confusion is
to avoid the use of imprecise phrases such as contributory
negligence and assumption of risk, and to address the central
question of whether the breach or the buyer's actions caused the
injury. This is the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Texas
in Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products, 57 in assessing the
buyer's right to consequential damages. Presented with both an
unmerchantable product and seller negligence, the court adopted a
"concurring proximate cause" test, which allowed the plaintiff to
recover that portion of the damages attributable to the breach of
warranty, but not those damages proximately caused by his own
acts or omissions. 858 Such allocation is suggestive of a form of
comparative negligence, but the court specifically delineated the
differences between the two approaches. 859 One of the most
important differences is that a seller may still be liable for breach of
warranty when he has not been negligent in any way. 86 0 If the
courts undertake a concurring proximate cause analysis, they will
readily be able to allocate damages justly, and at the same time
accord a disappointed buyer the degree of protection he
legitimately expected from the implied warranty accompanying the
product.
In fairness to the courts which have struggled with this issue,
most of them have been sufficiently aware of the incongruity of
854. Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967); Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn
Co. v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 16 Ill. App. 3d 638, 306 N.E.2d 337 (1973); Hubert v. Federal Pac.
Elec. Co., 208 Kan. 720, 494 P.2d 1210 (1972); Youngv. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 109 R.I. 458, 287
A.2d 345 (1972) (under section 2-315); Imperial Die Casting Co. v. Civil Insulation Co., 264 S.C.
604, 216 S.E.2d 532 (1975); Fredrick v. Dreyer,
-S.D.
__
, 257 N.W.2d 835 (1977).
855. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Erdman v. Johnson Bros.
Radio & Television Co., 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744 (1970); Wenner v. GulfOil Corp., 264 N.W.2d
374 (Minn. 1978); Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970).
856. See Phillips v. Allen, 427 F. Supp. 876 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (assumption of risk); Hensley v.
Sherman Car Wash Equip. Co., 33 Colo. App. 279, 520 P.2d 146 (1974) (contributory negligence
not a defense unless it amounts to assumption of risk); Ford Motor Co. v. Lee, 137 Ga. App. 486,
224 S.E.2d 168, rev'd on other grounds, 237 Ga. 554, 229 S.E.2d 379 (1976) (contributory negligence
per se not a defense, but goes to issue of causation); Gregory v. White Truck & Equip. Co., 163 Ind.
App. 240, 323 N.E.2d 280 (1975) (assumption of risk); Goblirsch v. Western Land & Roller Co., 311
Minn. 512, 246 N.W.2d 687 (1976) (assumption of risk); Vernon v. Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269,
488 P.2d 302 (1971) (assumption of risk).
857. 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978).
858. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 328 (Tex. 1978).
859. Id.
860. Id. at 329.
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applying standard tort doctrine to temper their opinions.8 61 Thus, a
number of cases indicate that contributory negligence will be a
defense, but couch their rulings in terms of assumption of risk,
proximate causation, or encountering a known risk.8 62 Still, only a
very few courts are sufficiently aware of the problem to analyze
beyond the convenient catchwords. 863 Until the courts clearly
define what it is that they are doing and clearly articulate why they
are doing it, the area will likely remain confused.
Questions concerning the proximate cause of the buyer's
damages may arise in a variety of settings. The first of these occurs
when a buyer discovers or should have discovered a defect, but
continues to use the goods in spite of his discovery.8 6 4 The question
of proximate cause may also arise where the seller foresees a risk of
harm from an unintended use of the product and the buyer is
thereby harmed. 865 Similarly, the problem may arise when the
buyer has been warned of the risk but fails to read or ignores the
warning.8 6 6 In all other settings proximate cause analysis will be
unnecessary, since the goods are either merchantable or not. If the
product is merchantable the injury is not caused by
unmerchantability, and there is thus no basis for recovery under
the Code. If the goods are not merchantable, the plaintiffs actions
could not be a concurrent cause of his injuries. Thus, for example,
a chemical which is by nature poisonous or inflammable is not
thereby unfit or unmerchantable, so that if the plaintiff is injured
his injury is not traceable to the merchantability of the product. 86 7
Similarly, a power saw which is capable of severing a hand is not
861. See, e.g., Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967); Pioneer Hi-Bred
Corn Co. v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 16 Ill. App. 3d 638, 306 N.E.2d 337 (1973); Wenner v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 264 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1978).
862. Seesupra notes 854-56 and accompanying text.
863. See Herman v. Midland AG Serv., Inc., 200 Neb. 356, 264 N.W.2d 161 (1978) (proximate
cause).
864. Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1971); Phillips v.
Allen, 427 F. Supp. 876 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Hensley v. Sherman Car Wash Equip. Co., 33 Colo.
App. 279, 520 P.2d 146 (1974) (express warranty); Erdman v..Johnson Bros. Radio & Television
Co., 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744 (1970); Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d
111 (1969); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978); Vernon v.
Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 488 P.2d 302 (1971); Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Serv., 468
P.2d 969 (Wyo. 1970).
865. It is here that the second collision cases enter. By definition, the use of the buyer is
ordinary, since it is foreseeable and engaged in by substantial numbers. Yet the buyer's
unreasonable action in, for example, speeding, becomes a concurring proximate cause. See Bigelow
v. Agway, Inc., 506 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1974); Phillips v. Allen, 427 F. Supp. 876 (W.D. Pa. 1977);
Gregory v. White Truck & Equip. Co., 163 Ind. App. 240, 323 N.E.2d 280 (1972); Murphy v.
Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Serv., 468 P.2d 969 (Wyo. 1970).
866. Again, by definition, this is an ordinary purpose, but here the unfitness is known by the
seller and communicated to the buyer. If the buyer fails to heed the communication, his actions
become a concurring cause. See Phillips v. Allen, 427 F. Supp. 876 (W.D. Pa. 1977); McCleskey v.
Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 127 Ga. App. 178, 193 S.E.2d 16 (1972); Chisholm v. J.R. Simplot
Co., 94 Idaho 628, 495 P.2d 1113 (1972).
867. See Wilhelm v. Globe Solvent Co., 373 A.2d 218 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977).
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thereby unmerchantable, and the plaintiff who in ordinary use loses
a hand will have no remedy.8 68 However, an unmerchantable saw
which in ordinary use kicks back, thereby injuring the plaintiff, is
not made merchantable or less defective by the fact that the plaintiff
8 69
exercised less than ordinary care.
It has been suggested that traditional tort defenses have no
place in a pure warranty case, other than as an adjunct to proof of
proximate cause. To the extent that the theory of the lawsuit is
other than pure warranty, the tort concepts do retain validity and
will undoubtedly continue to be invoked. So long as courts
recognize that the validity of the defenses depends upon the type of
action brought, no great harm will occur. However, failure to keep
the actions distinct will invariably lead to recovery where none
should lie, or to inappropriate insulation of defendants.
Beyond the questions of whether the goods are merchantable
and whether, if they are not, the buyer has concurrently caused his
injury, there are questions which will arise as to how one measures
merchantability. This is necessary to insure that the buyer gets
what he bargained for and that the seller is held responsible for no
more than what he legitimately agreed to provide. It must be
remembered that merchantability as a concept does not arise in the
abstract. Rather, it arises relative to goods, and different goods will
have to meet different standards of merchantability, depending
upon their characteristics and the characteristics and expectations
of the parties. For example, a new car is expected by virtue of its
character as a new car to provide "reasonable safety, efficiency and
comfort. "110 However, the degree of safety, efficiency, and comfort
is dependent on factors other than newness, such as "the size,
model and power of the vehicle." 8 7 1 Thus, while everyone would
agree that an automobile would not be merchantable if it burst into
flames, not everyone would agree that an automobile could not be
merchantable if it required extensive repairs.
iv. Used Goods and Second Quality Goods
The foregoing observations are so obvious that their
importance is often overlooked. When that happens there is
significant risk that an inappropriate view of merchantability will
be taken and liability will attach where none should, or exculpation
868. See Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., I 10 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970) (court found
breach of implied warranty under the Code, assuming existence of"merchantable" product).
869. Id.
870. Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184,
, 484 P.2d 380, 386 (1971) (pre-Code).
871. Id.
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will exist where responsibility should lie. Nowhere is the risk
greater than in the area of used goods, or goods known to be of
second quality. The courts have avoided the risk by focusing on the
"operative qualities" of the goods, and by inquiring into the
legitimate expectations of the parties. 872 This appears consistent
with the Code and its comments, which indicate that, although
used goods are covered by section 2-314, the scope of that coverage
8 73
is limited to the legitimate expectations of the parties.
Three cases, Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 874 Tracy v.
Vinton Motors, Inc., 875 and Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke
Co., 876 are illustrative of the Code's coverage of used goods and
goods known to be of second quality. Since automobiles are
frequently the subject of second-hand sales, many of the cases
discussing used goods involve cars, and Testo and, Tracy are neither
isolated nor unique in this regard. 877 They are, however, two of the
more recent cases, and clearly demonstrate the typical approach of
the courts.
In Testo, the plaintiff and his wife purchased a used car from
the defendant. 878 Unknown to the plaintiff purchaser, but known to
the seller, the car had been used for racing and had been modified
for those purposes. 879 Although the car was fitted with substantial
amounts of "racing equipment," the court found that there was
880
nothing to put the plaintiff on notice that it had been raced.
Shortly after the purchase, the car overheated and would not restart
until it was completely cooled, a pattern which continued in spite of
plaintiff's minor repair efforts, and which was caused by the racing
modifications. 88 1 Defendant offered to repair the car and split the
cost with the plaintiff. 88 2 Plaintiff refused, and eventually brought
suit to revoke his acceptance. The court held that the acceptance
could be revoked, because there had been a breach of the implied
872. See Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336A.2d 62 (1975).
873. U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 3. The focus on expectation should also yield correct results
when the goods possess certain characteristics known to be possessed by all like goods, as where shoes
are known to get slippery when they are wet, or a bathtub is known to be slippery when wet. See
Rupee v. Mobile Home Brokers, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 86, 183 S.E.2d 34 (1971) (showers with sharp
edges); Fanningv. LeMay, 38111. 2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1967) (shoes, Code not relied on).
874. 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976).
875. 130 Vt. 512, 296A.2d 269 (1972).
876. 151W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1 (1967).
877. See also Chamberlain v. Bob Matick Chevrolet, Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 685, 239 A.2d 42
(1967); Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 9 111. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168 (1972).
878. Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 41, 554 P.2d 349, 352
(19779. Id.
880. Id. at 45, 554 P.2d at 354.
881. Id. at 42, 554 P.2d at 352.
882. Id at 42, 554 P. 2d at 353.
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warranty of merchantability. 88 3
In order to reach that conclusion the court had to first
determine whether the warranty accompanied used goods, and, if
so, the extent of its scope. 884 The court concluded that the warranty
did exist, and, citing two earlier cases 88 5 from other jurisdictions,
stated:
The obligation appropriate to the sale of used goods is
primarily directed at the operative essentials of the
product .

.

.

. Thus, the measure of a used car's

merchantability turns not so much on aesthetic items
which, of necessity, must yield to age and previous use,
• . . but on its operative qualities. The price at which a

merchant is willing to sell an item is an excellent index of
the extent of quality warranted and the nature and scope
8 86
of his obligation.
In other words, operative qualities, functional utility, and party
expectation based upon objective factors such as price, age, and
prior use will determine the scope of warranty responsibility.
Although not significantly different from the factors employed in
the determination of the scope of the warranty with respect to new
goods, in that area these factors are often overlooked. With respect
to used goods, failure to consider these objective factors would be a
critical mistake.
In Testo, the car's ability to function as an "ordinary" vehicle
was so central to the operative qualities as to make the failure a
breach of warranty.8 8 7 In Tracy v. Vinton Motors, Inc., the court,
employing the same tools and analysis, found that the defect did
not seriously affect the operative essentials. Therefore, since the
888
goods were used goods, no breach was found.
In Tracy, the plaintiffs purchased a two-year-old Oldsmobile
and, after the thirty-day express warranty had expired, requested
that the defendant repaint it, since they were dissatisfied with the
existing paint job. 889 Repainting the car would have cost $400, and
the defendant refused. 890 Plaintiff sued, alleging breach of the
883. Id. at 46-47, 554 P.2d at 356.
884. Id. at 44, 554 P.2d at 354.
885. Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968), quoting
Chamberlain v. Bob Matick Chevrolet, Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 685, 239 A.2d 42 (1967).
886. 16 Wash. App. at 43-44, 554 P.2d at 354 (citation ommitted).
887. Id. at 44, 554 P.2d at 354.
-,
296 A.2d 269,272 (1972).
888. Tracy v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 130 Vt. 512,
, 296A.2d at 270.
889. Id. at
890. Id.
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implied warranty of merchantability. 891 The court found that the
express warranty had expired, but that the defendant had not
properly disclaimed the implied warranty.8 92 The court assumed
the existence of an implied warranty of merchantability for used
cars and reasoned that, since merchantability as it pertains to new
cars is directed primarily at "ordinary use,"
"operative
essentials," and "operational safety," it should certainly not be
broader as it pertains to used cars. 93 Therefore, the court held that
even if a warranty existed it would not embrace "the exterior finish
on a two year old used car. "1894 Again, it is clear that with respect to
used goods the focus will be on functional utility, objectively
8 95
measured, rather than on aesthetic characteristics.
If the correct focus of merchantability in the used goods
context is on operative quality, essentials, and objective
expectations, it is even more appropriate when the subject of the
sale is second quality goods. Like the cases involving used goods,
where the scope of the warranty is circumscribed by age and prior
use, those involving new but second quality goods of necessity deal
with warranty responsibility from a more narrow perspective. Here
the focus must be on the reasonable expectations of both parties.
This suggests that merchantability will be based not on operative
essentials, but rather on other objective criteria, including price,
expected quality, and trade usage.
Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co. 896 provides an
interesting example. Plaintiff had sold over 1,400 tons of coal to the
defendant for the alleged price of $2.50 per ton. 9 7 The defendant
had seen much of the coal in-piles at plaintiff's mine, and intended
to use it for coking. When the coal was delivered, its ash content
was found to be too high for coking, and the defendant attempted to
reject it.898 Plaintiff, in turn, sued for the price of the coal and was
awarded $1,000 by the jury.8 99 The Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia affirmed the jury award. 900
At issue was whether there were express and implied
warranties, and much of the court"s opinion merely reiterates the
891. Id. at
, 296 A.2d at 272.
892. Id. at _
,296 A.2d at 271-72.
893. Id. at __,296
A.2d at 272.
894. Id.
895. For a case applying similar analysis (albeit probably too broadly) to a situation involving
used goods other than automobiles, see Regan Purchasc & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d
858, 328 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972).
896. 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1 (1967).
897. Id. at__,
156 S.E.2d at 3.
898. Id. at__
, 156 S.E.2d at 4-5.
899. Id. at_,
156 S.E.2d at 3.
900. Id. at
, 156 S.E.2d at 8.
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proposition that questions of warranty existence are for the jury.
The court indicated that the evidence was in serious dispute, and
therefore the controversy was particularly appropriate for jury
resolution. 90 1 Beyond that, however, the court considered the scope
of the warranty of merchantability in this sale.
The court noted that trade testimony existed as to party
expectations in a sale of this character. 90 2 This included trade usage
which allowed buyers to reject coal with excessive ash content, and
usage which curtailed the right of rejection in the event the buyer
had previously seen the coal. The court also commented on the
plaintiff's testimony that he had told the defendant that the coal was
90 3
substandard, which, if believed, would reduce expectations.
Finally, the best objective criterion of all was the fact that the
standard price for coking coal ranged from $4.50 to $7.00 per ton,
whereas the price agreed to here was $2.50 per ton. 904 Citing
comment 7 to section 2-314, the court ruled that in determining the
expectations of the parties relative to particular goods, the price at
which the goods were sold was an excellent indicator of the
expected quality. 90 5 Since the price here was half the normal price,
the jury was entitled to find that the warranty of merchantability
90 6
was limited accordingly.
901. Id.
902. Id. at _
, 156 S.E.2d at 5.
903. Id. at
.,156 S.E.2dat 4.
904. Id.
905. Id. at _
, 156 S.E.2d at 7.
906. Id. As indicated, these same tests will play a role in regard to new goods, but their impact in
that area is often overlooked. By similar analysis, most other questions regarding warranty scope can
be resolved both rationally and fairly. Among the other questions regarding warranty scope are
whether the warranty attaches at all to transactions, and whether the warranty extends beyond the
physical properties of the goods. The former question was previously discussed in connection with
the sales-service dichotomy. The question appears occasionally in other contexts, for example,
whether non-traditional things are goods, or whether the warranty should apply in a clearly nongoods setting. Because most courts interpret the Code broadly, one would expect that the warranty
sections would cover almost any transaction. See, e.g., Public Finance Corp. v. Furnitureland of
Youngstown, Inc., 17 Ohio App. 2d 213, 245 N.E.2d 740 (1969) (warranty held to apply to seller of
security agreement); A.L. Bell v. Harrington Mfg. Co., 265 S.C. 468, 219 S.E.2d 906 (1975)
(warranty held to apply to seller of bulk tobacco curing barns).
At the present time, the courts are much less likely to impose warranty responsibility when there
is a question whether the warranty extends beyond the physical properties of the goods. In the future,
however, it is likely that courts will impose such responsibility. Viewed broadly in terms of either
expectation or risk spreading, liability is probably appropriate. Narrowly considered, as in terms of
operative essentials, liability will be slow in developing. See, e.g., Flippo v. Mode O'Day Frock
Shops, 248 Ark. 1, 449 S.W.2d 692 (1970) (spider which was concealed in slacks in retail store and
bit customer did not breach warranty of merchantability, since not within the physical characteristics
of the goods); Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 1977) (seller of cookbook not liable to customer
who was injured when recipe prepared therefrom caused illness; author, however, might be liable).
An additional inquiry is whether the imposition of liability in such cases could have the desired effect
of avoiding the harm caused, one of the goals of warranty law. If not, the question may become
whether that alone is sufficient justification for not imposing liability. Cf. Haralampopoulos v.
Capital News Agency, Inc., 70 I11. App. 2d 17, 217 N.E.2d 366 (1966) (retail seller whose liquor
license was revoked for selling obscene magazines could not recover in warranty from distributor of
magazines, in spite of the fact that license revocation was on ground that he knew or should have
known of the obscene character).
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The courts of North Dakota may in the future have occasion to
consider the merchantability issues raised by used or second quality
goods. They should have little difficulty in finding that the warranty exists, but that it is far narrower than the concomitant
warranty which attaches to new goods. As a guide in determining
the scope of the warranty, courts will be safe in employing an
analysis based upon the objective factors surrounding such sales.
With used goods, the controlling factors should be operative
essentials, operative quality, functional utility, and price. With
second quality goods, price, trade usage, and expectations of
quality resulting from the appropriate commercial surroundings
should control.
4. Disclaimer of the Warranty ofMerchantability
As indicated earlier, 90 7 all implied warranties under the Code
are capable of being disclaimed, and the implied warranty of
merchantability is no exception. Subsections (2) and (3) of section
2-316 govern such disclaimers. Subsection (2) provides that a
must mention
warranty
written
disclaimer of the
"merchantability" and be conspicuous. As noted earlier, courts
which look with disfavor on disclaimers generally will construe the
conspicuousness requirement strictly, so that only disclaimers
which clearly bring home their impact will be held to be effective.
The requirement that "merchantability" be specifically mentioned
is straightforward, and the cases rather consistently apply it so that
failure to mention merchantability is fatal, even if equally clear
language is used. 90 8 At least one court has ruled that even where
merchantability was mentioned it was ineffective, since it was
directed at new goods, whereas the contract dealt with used
goods. 909
Unlike disclaimers of warranties for a particular purpose,
which must be written, a disclaimer of merchantability could
907. See supra notes 298-354 and accompanying text for a detailed general discussion of
disclaimers of implied warranties.
908. SeeJones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976) ("There are no warranties
express or implied" held ineffective because merchantability not mentioned). See also Soo Line R.R.
v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977) (merchantability must be mentioned); Orrox
Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 441 (M.D. Ala. 1975) (same); Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v.
Howard, 9 11. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168 (1972) (same); Woodruffv. Clark County Farm Bureau
Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972) (same); Pearson v. Franklin Laboratories,
254 N.W.2d 133 (1977) (same). Cf Agricultural Servs. Ass'n v. Ferry-Morse
Inc., __
S.D. __,
Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1977) (merchantability not mentioned, but course of dealing
excluded merchantability); P.E.A.C.E. Corp. v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 568 P.2d 1273 (Okla.
1977) (indication that mere failure to mention merchantability, standing alone, might not vitiate
disclaimer); Recreatives, Inc. v. Myers, 67 Wis. 2d 255, 226 N.W.2d 474 (1975) (court applied
section 2-314(3) (a) to determine mention of "merchantability" unnecessary).
909. Tracy v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 130 Vt. 512, 296 A.2d 269 (1972).
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presumably be made orally if the seller mentioned merchantability.
This would be subject, of course, to parol evidence problems.
Obviously, there is no conspicuousness requirement if the
disclaimer is oral and the seller mentions merchantability, since by
definition the oral disclaimer would be conspicuous. 910
Courts which examine specific disclaimers of merchantability
do not have a difficult task. Whether the disclaimer mentions
merchantability is either observable or a question of fact, and
whether it is conspicuous will be a question for the court. 91'
Furthermore, as has already been noted, some states, including
North Dakota, have legislatively resolved some of the more difficult
questions likely to be raised, including those relating to human
products and animals of certain kinds. The range of problems is
thereby considerably narrowed.
a. "As Is" Clauses and Language Equivalents
The primary problems with disclaimers will arise under
section 2-314(3), and in North Dakota under a unique statute
passed in the heyday of the populist movement. Under section 2314(3) there are, in addition to the specific means of disclaiming
mentioned above, three general means of excluding all implied
warranties. These may be effected without a writing, and without
the mention of merchantability. They are the "as is" disclaimer,
the buyer's examination, and usage of trade or course of dealing.
Because all of these have been previously discussed at length, they
will be only briefly considered here.
Subsection (3)(a) indicates that, in addition to the specific
means of exclusion authorized by subsection (2), "unless the
circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are
excluded by expressions like 'as is,' 'with all faults,' or other
language which in common understanding calls the buyer's
attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there
is no implied warranty. "912 This section is designed to enable
parties to avoid the strictures of subsection (2), as long as the
disclaimer of the implied warranty is stressed to the buyer and the
parties' expectations are that no warranty has attached. Obviously,
the first test of the language used is whether it would be commonly
understood to exclude warranties. Thus, even if a seller used the
910. Cf Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1972) (oral statement of "as is" at start of auction not sufficient to put buyer on notice of
disclaimer).
911, See U.C.C. § 1-201(10)[N.D. CENT. CoDE § 41-01-11 (10)(Supp. 1979)].
912. U.C.C. § 2-314(3) [N.D. CENT. COE S41-02-31(3) (1968)].
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prescribed "as is" or "with all faults" language, if it is not likely
under the circumstances to be "commonly understood" as
removing warranty responsibility, it should not be given that effect.
Most of the courts which have approached the issue of
effectiveness of an "as is" clause have not, however, addressed this
question directly. Rather, they have split the inquiry, asking first
whether the language was placed in the agreement so as to draw
attention to itself, and only then asking whether the buyer would
have understood the language's impact. The courts have thus
generally held that before language can commonly be understood
to have an exclusionary meaning it must be conspicuous. This
analysis effectively makes the initial question of disclaimer validity
one of law and not of fact. Moreover, although conspicuousness is
not explicitly required by the Code, the vast majority of cases
correctly recognize that judicial engraftment of a conspicuousness

requirement accords with the intent of the disclaimer section of the
913
Code, in that it protects the buyer from surprise.
The premier case holding that conspicuousness is required
before an "as is" clause will be given effect is Gindy Manufacturing
Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 914 involving a commercial
transaction. Using little authority, but with distinct and pressing
logic, the court ruled that conspicuousness should be a condition
precedent to an effective disclaimer. 915 Well-reasoned opinions
following Gindy have been rendered by courts in Maryland, 9 16
Florida, 91 7 and Indiana. 91 8 In addition, Texas has apparently
adopted a conspicuousness rationale under the subsection as
well. 919
Only two jurisdictions, on the other hand, have indicated that
an "as is" disclaimer need not be conspicuous, and one of these,
Oklahoma, suggested that if the buyer has not read the disclaimer
or alleges a misunderstanding the conspicuousness requirement
might be imposed. Because the buyer had read and understood the
clause, however, and the clause clearly stated that no warranty was
made, the court held that the disclaimer was effective. 920 The other
913. SeeU.C.C. S 2-316, Comment 1.
914. 111 N.J. Super. 383, 268 A.2d 345 (1970).
915. Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383,
-,
268 A.2d
345, 351 (1970).
916. Fairchild Indus. v. Maritime Air Serv., Inc., 274 Md. 181, 333 A.2d 313 (1975)
(commercial transaction).
917. Knipp v. Weinbaum, 351 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (consumer transaction);
Osborne v. Genevie, 289 So. 2d 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
918. Woodruffv. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188
(1972) (commercial transaction).
919. MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (real estate contract; court
held that Code applied at least by analogy, and that conspicuousness requirement accompanied it).
920. Smith v. Sharpensteen. 521 P.2d 394 (Okla. 1974). Interestingly, the language did not
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jurisdiction to hold that the disclaimer need not be conspicuous,
Alabama, is represented by two cases. In DeKalb Agresearch, Inc. v.
Abbott, 921 the court considered the issue, and with little authority or
reasoning held that the language "notwithstanding subsection (2)"
did away with the need for conspicuousness. 922 In Gilliam v. Indiana
National Bank, 923 the court discussed a conspicuous "as is" clause
924
and approved the holding in DeKalb.
The question of whether an "as is" clause need be
conspicuous is best answered affirmatively, for the simple reason
that the buyer can have no common understanding of the meaning
of words when they are hidden from his view. It is not too
burdensome to require sellers to clearly indicate to the buyer that
no warranty is given.
Of course, ruling that conspicuousness is required does not
settle the overwhelming question of what will satisfy the
conspicuousness requirement. Nor will it always render the seller
liable. Both points are aptly demonstrated in Houck v. DeBouis.925
The court, after noting that in Maryland "as is" clauses must be
conspicuous, held that boldface language on the back of a form met
the requirement, since the buyer was referred to the reverse side by
926
clear language on the front of the form.
Before becoming mired in the debate over whether
conspicuousness should be required, a court would be well advised
to keep in mind the purpose of section 2-316: to allow sellers who
desire to avoid responsibility to do so, provided they give the buyer
fair warning of their intent. The conspicuousness controversy has
been spawned by the question of what constitutes fair warning. To
the extent that fair warning is present, conspicuousness really
becomes a matter of subsidiary concern. Thus, when the seller
refuses to sell unless an "as is" term is included, and the buyer has
a realistic opportunity to negotiate the term, 927 the "as is" term
should be given effect. Additionally, when the buyer testified that
he knew the sale was "as is" and that the seller had cautioned him
mention merchantability, and a later Oklahoma case, P.E.A.C.E. Corp. v. Oklahoma Natural Gas
Co., 568 P.2d 1273 (Okla. 1977), suggested that an inconspicuous disclaimer failing to mention
merchantability would be ineffective. A question might be raised whether a disclaimer, not using the
magic words "as is" or "with all faults," or expressly stating that it applied to merchantability,
might nevertheless pass muster under section 2-316(3) (a) as clearly indicating that there are no
warranties. Probably the better view would be that it could not.
921. 391 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
922. DeKalb Agresearch, Inc. v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152, 155 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
923. 337 So. 2d 352 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976).
924. Gilliam v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 337 So. 2d 352, 355 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976).
925. 38 Md. App. 85, 379 A.2d 765 (1977).
926. Houck v. DeBouis, 38 Md. App. 85, 379 A.2d 765 (1977).
927. SeeCrown Cork & Seal Co. v. Hires Bottling Co., 254 F. Supp. 424 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
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against buying without an inspection, the court could justifiably
find the "as is" term effective. 928 Similarly, when the buyer
actually reads the disclaimer and understands it he should not be
929
allowed to allege that it was inconspicuous.
A related question is what alternative language will effectively
disclaim the warranty when the seller fails to use the specified "as
is" or "with all faults" language. In spite of apparent conflicts
among the courts, and the fact that the Code seems to authorize the
use of other language, it appears to be the better view to insist that
any other language, before it is given effect, meet two tests in
addition to conspicuousness. First, the language must be clear and
unequivocal, and second, it must be equatable with "as is" or
"with all faults." Thus, the phrase "in its present condition"
would not ordinarily be sufficient, since it is neither unequivocal
nor equatable with "as is" or "with all faults. "930
The reasons for this insistence are simple and twofold. First,
unless the language is both unequivocal and equatable by the buyer
with "as is" or "with all faults," the seller is able to sidestep the
specific rule of section 2-316(2), which requires the mention of
merchantability, in favor of the more relaxed rule of section 2316(3)(a). While subsection (3)(a) is designed to allow sidestepping,
it is only available when the shorthand terms used are customarily
understood to mean that no warranty of merchantability or fitness
for purpose is intended.9 31 Second, and equally important, the
accepted shorthand terminology is effective precisely because it is
universally understood to eliminate warranties. Unless the
language used shares that characteristic, at least as to the particular
buyer, 932 it should not be given the same effect. Thus, language
928. See Robinson v. Branch Moving & Storage Co., 28 N.C. App. 244, 221 S.E.2d 81 (1976)
929. See Chamberlain v. Bob Matick Chevrolet, Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 685, 239 A.2d 42 (196 ');
O'Neil v. International Harvester Co., 40 Colo. App. 369, 575 P.2d 862 (1978); Smith v.
Sharpensteen, 521 P.2d 394 (Okla. 1974).
930. See Avery v. Aladdin Prods. Div., Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 128 Ga. App. 266, 196 S.E.2d
357 (1973) ("in its present condition" equals "as is"). Contra, Hull-Dobbs, Inc. v, Mallicoat, 57
Tenn. App. 100, 415 S.W.2d 344 (1966).
931. An illustration points this out clearly. Suppose the seller has a form which contains the
following disclaimer, prominently displayed: "There are no warranties express or implied which
extend beyond the face hereof." Such a disclaimer, although effective to disclaim the implied
warranty of fitness for particular purpose under section 2-316(2), is ineffective under that same
section to disclaim the warranty of merchantability,. since it fails to mention merchantability. Yet it is
unequivocal, and, if the seller were in a "relaxed "jurisdiction, he would urge that under section 26 3
31 ( Xa) such language would be commonly understood as eliminating all warranties. Such a
reading of subsection (3) (a) clearly vitiates subsection (2), and is therefore to be discouraged.
932. The buyer's familiarity with the universal meaning of the term used is of course critical.
This retains flexibility in the subsection, so that trade buyers, accustomed to different shorthand
terminology with the same impact as "as is," are put on notice by its use. Thus, for example, if in
the coal industry the phrase "where it stands" carries the meaning of "as is" it should be given
effect, although that same phrase would not be effective when used by a furniture retailer selling to a
customer.
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such as "in its present condition," "as and where it stands," or
"what you see is what you get" would be ineffective, either because
it is more equivocal or because it is not commonly understood as a
disclaimer, or both. By the same token, however, if it is shown that
such phrases have acquired an "as is" meaning in a particular
trade or locale, they should be given effect to the extent that the
buyer is aware.of the meaning.
933
Since the first case discussing an "as is" clause was decided,
the vast majority of courts which have dealt with the issues raised
by section 2-316(3)(a) have had little trouble reaching sensible
results. Those which have reached less commercially reasonable
results, including the Alabama courts, have done so by resorting to
934
the section without serious scrutiny.
b. Disclaimerby Examination
The second general means of disclaiming implied warranties is
for the buyer, prior to entering the contract, to examine goods or
refuse to examine them. Thereafter, under section 2-316(3) (b), the
buyer can no longer- assert any implied warranty with regard to a
defect which an examination should or would have revealed.
Section 2-316(3)(b) provides that, in addition to a specific
disclaimer being effective,
when the buyer before entering into the contract has
examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he
desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no
implied warranty with regard to defects which an
examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed
to him . ... 935
The obvious reason why a buyer should be bound by his
examination of goods is that, if he reasonably could have
discovered a defect, his expectation would have been diminished to
that extent. Similarly, if he refuses to examine after the seller has
requested that he do so, it is fair to say that he should take the goods
933. Kalodis v. Mayo Motors, Inc., 1 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 96 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1963).
934. See,e.g.,
Harison-Gulley Chevrolet, Inc. v. Carr, 134 Ga. App. 449, 214 S.E.2d 712 (1975)
(court states that examination of vehicle precludes warranties as to defects revealed and notes in
passing that sale was "as is"); Avery v. Aladdin Prods. Div., Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 128 Ga. App.
266, 196 S.E.2d 357 (1973) ("in its present condition" met requirements of Code, but no
examination of statute); Conran v. Yager, 263 S.C. 417, 211 S.E.2d 228 (1975) (court briefly
analogizes to section 2-316(2) (a) for purposes of giving effect to "as is" clause in contract for sale of
house); Lectro Management, Inc. v. Freeman, Everett & Co., 135 Vt. 213, 373 A.2d 544 (1977)
(lease, called sale by court, contained "as is" clause; court skimmed over section 2-316(3)).
935. U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (b) [N.D. CENT. CoDE 5 41-02-33(3)(b) (Supp. 1979)].
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subject to patent defects which he would have noticed. The fairness
and reason embodied in the provision make the fact that a number
of courts have struggled with it perplexing.
At the outset, the careful attorney will note that the Code here
envisions a pre-contractual examination, so that what the buyer
sees or fails to see once the contract has been entered into has no
bearing whatsoever on the existence of the implied warranty. The
focus of the statute is on examination by the buyer before he
decides to deal. The comment further clarifies this point, and also
differentiates the examination contemplated from either a casual
inspection prior to sale or a more intense inspection after sale but
prior to acceptance of the goods. 93 6 Moreover, although the statute
discusses the scope of the examination in terms of the buyer's
desires, it is clear that scope is determined more appropriately with
reference to all of the circumstances surrounding the transaction.
The mere fact that the buyer "has examined the goods as fully as he
desired" does not exclude warranties as to defects which even such
a full examination would not "have . . . revealed to him in the
circumstances." Thus, for example, if the buyer's full examination
under the circumstances could not have included testing or
chemical analysis, he should not be barred from asserting defects
which only a chemical or other test would reveal. 937
By the same token, if the defect is latent, so that in the course
of an ordinary or usual examination it would not be apparent, the
buyer's examination will not preclude allegation of the defect. The
question of whether the defect was latent or patent, and thus
whether it should or could have been discovered, is one of fact, 9 38
and necessarily depends not only upon the character of the defect
but upon the characteristics of the buyer. Comment 8 to the Code
section states:
The particular buyer's skill and the normal methods of
examining goods in the circumstances determine what
defects are excluded .... A failure to notice defects which
are obvious cannot excuse the buyer. . . . Nor can latent
936. See U.C.C. S 2-316, Comment 8.
937. U.C.C. 5 2-316, Comment 8. See, e.g., Murray v. Kleen Leen, Inc., 41 111. App. 3d 436,
354 N.E.2d 415 (1976) (dictum indicates that if testing is necessary, mere examination is
insufficient); Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 521 P.2d 281 (1974) (express
warranty as to freedom from disease diagnosable only by blood test); Ambassador Steel Co. v. Ewald
Steel Co., 33 Mich. App. 495, 190 N.W.2d 275 (1971) (evidence suggested that only chemical
analysis would reveal carbon content of steel, so examination performed was insufficient); S-Creek
Ranch, Inc. v. Monier & Co., 509 P.2d 777 (Wyo. 1973) (sheep infected with vibricosis, a disease
not diagnosable absent laboratory culture tests).
938. See Georgia Timberlands, Inc. v. Southern Airway Co., 125 Ga. App. 404, 188 S.E.2d 108
(1972).

686

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

defects be excluded by a simple examination. A
professional buyer examining a product in his field will be
held to have assumed the risk as to all defects which a
professional in the field ought to observe, while a
nonprofessional buyer will be held to have assumed the
risk only for such defects as a layman might be expected
to observe.

939

Thus, it has been held that a lamp retailer who inspects lamps
before purchase is bound by his inspection, since a professional
940
should have discovered the defects which allegedly existed.
However, the mere fact that a car buyer had some mechanical
knowledge would not exclude the warranty of merchantability
when a test drive revealed no defects. 9 41 Familiarity with the
subject matter does not equate with professionalism, although it
obviously should play a part.
It should be obvious that only patent defects which are
discoverable or latent defects which are discovered upon a
reasonable inspection will be excluded from subsequent warranty
coverage. Surprisingly, there are few cases which have actively
interpreted the section's coverage, and most of the reported
decisions either refer to the issue of examination waiving patent
defects only in passing, or merely affirm jury findings as to the
waiver. 942
Of the remaining cases, Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co. 943
is probably the most appropriate example of a patent defect which
should have been discovered. The buyer of wiglet cases,
experienced in the area, had examined pre-production models and
noted several defects. He did not indicate any problem with the
handle-housings, which later proved to be defective, although he
did examine the handle-housings at that time. The court ruled that
if the handle-housings were defective it should have been
939. U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 8.
940. Richards Mflg. Co. v. Gamel, 5 Wash. App. 549, 489 P.2d 366 (1971). The court probably
went too far when it indicated in dicta that, given the opportunity to inspect, a professional buyer
must take advantage of it. Id. at 550, 489 P.2d at 367. See also Michael-Regan Co. v. Lindell, 527
F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1975); Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Conn.
1975).
941. Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39,554 P.2d 349 (1976).
942. See, e.g., Calloway v. Manion, 572 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1978) (footnote indicating that
examination waived warranties, as found by.jury); Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co. v. Thermice Corp.,
352 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 197 1) (passing reference to effect of examination barring warranty); Willis
v. West Ky. Feeder Pig Co., 132 Il. App. 2d 266, 265 N.E.2d 899 (1971) (same); Michigan Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 63 Mich. App. 109, 234 N.W.2d 424 (1975) (broad statement);
Forys v. Queensboro Motors Corp., 10 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (per curiam
affirmance, no facts available).
943. 402 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Conn. 1975).
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discovered by the examination, since it was not so latent "as to
have been undiscoverable. ' 9 44 The point, of course, is that the
defect was either patent~or a latent defect which should have been
discovered under the circumstances.
Michael-Regan Co. v. Lindel, 945 again involving an experienced
buyer, concerned table tops manufactured according to plaintiff's
specifications. Plaintiff had inspected and examined samples, and
had demanded that the table tops be "unsealed." When they
subsequently warped, plaintiff refused to pay for them, asserting a
latent defect which caused a breach of the warranty of
merchantability. The court held that, as a professional, the plaintiff
should have been aware of the propensity of unsealed wood 9to
46
warp, and therefore he could not rely on the alleged defect.
Again, although latent, the defect was one which the reasonable
buyer in the plaintiff's position could have been aware of, and
should thus be held to have been waived.
From the foregoing it is apparent that an examination of goods
will exclude warranties as to patent defects or latent defects which
either could have been discovered or which should have been
anticipated. If the Code section did no more, the inquiry would end
here. However, the section goes further, and also places the risk on
the buyer who refuses to examine goods, at least as to those defects
which the examination would probably have revealed. 94 7 The
theory behind the provision makes sense only if one remembers
that refusal to examine is more than mere failure to do so:
[Ilt is not sufficient that the goods are available for
inspection. There must in addition be a demand by the
seller that the buyer examine the goods fully. The seller
by the demand puts the buyer on notice that he is
assuming the risk of defects which the examination ought
to reveal. The language "refused to examine" . . . is
intended to make clear the necessity for such a
demand. 948
Obviously, the mere availability of goods for inspection does
not create a duty to examine. 94 9 The typical car sale provides a
944.
945.
946.
947.
948.
949.
Richards

Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017, 1025 (D. Conn. 1975).
527 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1975).
Michael-Regan Co. v. Lindell, 527 F.2d 653, 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
U.C.C. S 2-316(3) (b) [N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-33(3) (b) (Supp. 1979)].
U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 8.
See, e.g., Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co. v. Thermice Corp., 352 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1971);
Mfg. v. Gamel, 5 Wash. App. 549, 489 P.2d 366 (1971).
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good example. The mere fact that a buyer sees the car on the lot
and buys it without test driving it, absent a demand that he do so,
would not operate to waive defects which a test drive would have
revealed. The Code recognizes that a pre-contract agreement may
permit examination, but the Code does not require pre-contractual
examination.
Two cases which discuss the difference between failure to
inspect and refusal to inspect are Holm v. Hansen95 0 and Austin Lee
Corp. v. Cascade Motel Inc. 95 1 In Holm, the buyer purchased cattle
from the defendant, but failed to have them tested for brucellosis.
The trial court held that the failure to test reduced plaintiff's
damages, apparently imposing a duty to examine. 952 The appellate
court reversed, holding that since no demand had been made by the
defendant there was no independent obligation to examine, and
plaintiff's failure to do so, on the advice of a veterinarian, did not
amount to a refusal to examine. 953 In Austin Lee, the plaintiff had
purchased 340 bedspreads from the defendant after inspecting and
examining two samples. The seller had informed the buyer that the
spreads were to be drycleaned only, and not washed. After the sale
a wet rag was dropped on a spread, causing a permanent black
waterspot. Other spreads also darkened when they came in contact
with water, and the buyer finally returned all of the spreads and
sued the seller. The seller defended on the ground that the buyer
had either examined the spreads or refused to do so. The court,
apparently believing water testing to be beyond the scope of an
examination, held that since there had been no demand for
examination there could be no refusal. 954 In short, the refusal must
be an actual refusal, after not only an opportunity to examine but
also a request by the seller to do so.
Two other points deserve mention in connection with the
statute. As a realistic matter, often while the buyer is making his
examination the seller is simultaneously exhorting the quality of the
goods. In such cases it would be unfair to limit the warranty as a
result of the examination, at least to the extent that the seller
assuaged the buyer's doubts. By the same token, if the buyer's own
eyes reveal a defect he should not be able to ignore his observation
and assert reliance on the seller's words. The comment suggests
that under such circumstances there exists a question of fact
950.
951.
952.
953.
954.
(1971).

248 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 1976).
123 Ga. App. 642, 182 S.E.2d 173 (1971).
Holm v. Hansen, 248 N.W.2d 503, 510 (Iowa 1976).
Id.
Austin Lee Corp. v. Cascade Motel, Inc., 123 Ga. App. 642,

-,

182 S.E.2d 173, 174
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whether the seller's words became an express warranty which
displaced the buyer's examination. The comment's assessment is
acceptable, but only to the extent that the buyer's own observations
do not contradict the seller's words. If, for example, the subject of
the sale is a car, and the buyer during his pre-sale examination
discovers four bald tires, he could not later assert that the seller told
him the tires had full tread. His own observations established the
contrary. 955 On the other hand, where the examination reveals no
major defects and the seller is exhorting the fact that there are none,
the examination should not be held to waive major defects
956
discovered later.

The final point to be raised regarding the exclusion by
examination concerns the timing of the buyer's examination. It has
been noted that for section 2-316 to be applicable any examination
must be made before the contract is entered into. The practitioner
must keep in mind that for this examination to effectively exclude
warranties it must be such as would reveal the defects later
complained of. Thus, the buyer of a mobile home who inspected
and examined the home on the seller's lot has been held entitled to
recover for breach of warranty when defects became apparent only
upon later delivery. 957 The point is that a pre-sale examination does
not have the effect of avoiding warranty responsibility entirely. If,
after the contract is entered into, the buyer discovers defects not
earlier discoverable, he can still recover for breach of the warranty
by giving notice to the seller.
c. Disclaimer by Usage, Dealing, and Performance
The final means to disclaim, exclude, or modify implied
warranties is through the operation of course of performance,
course of dealing, or usage of trade. The area has been thoroughly
discussed earlier,

958

and it would add little to reiterate what was

said previously. To the extent that all of these factors are to be
considered in interpreting the parties' agreement, it only makes
sense to ask whether, under any of them, the buyer's and seller's
expectations excluded warranties. If the parties have in the past
955. See U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 8. See also Davis v. Pumpco, Inc., 519 P.2d 557 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1974). Davis was a post-sale case in which, before the buyer used glue supplied by the seller, his
contractor discovered that it would not bond. After checking the labels and finding that the glue was
labeled to be the correct glue for the job, the buyer continued to use it. When the pipe was laid
underground it developed leaks because the glue was in fact the wrong kind. The court ruled that
plaintiff, in light of his own observations, should not have used the glue after discovering its defects.
Id. at 560.
956. SeeCagneyv. Cohn, 13 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 998 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973).
957. See, e.g., Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d 161 (1972); Davis
v. Vintage Enterprises, Inc., 23 N.C. App. 581, 209 S.E.2d 824 (1974).
958. See sut4ra notes 355-69 and accompanying text.
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acted as though no warranties existed, or if in the trade no
warranties would be deemed to exist, there is no reason to impose
warranty responsibility.
The major problems will be problems of proof, for it is
incumbent upon the party asserting the trade usage, dealing, or
performance to demonstrate its existence to the factfinder. 959 In this
regard, the cases indicate that the burden of proof is usually not an
extreme one, 960 and on appeal the findings of fact will probably be
subject to reversal only if clearly erroneous.
The remainder of the cases in this area have been discussed
earlier. It is appropriate to remind the practitioner here that, even
where the implied warranties have not been disclaimed in some
other permissible manner, usage, dealing, and performance may
have this effect. For obvious tactical reasons, any attorney
representing a seller would want to urge an applicable usage,
course of performance, or course of dealing, even when there are
better alternative arguments to be made. The effect of raising the
issue is to preserve it, giving it at least residual effect, rather than
run the risk of waiving it.961
d. Disclaimers:FarmMachinery in North Dakota
No discussion of warranty disclaimers in North Dakota would
be complete without an analysis of an extraordinary provision of
the Century Code, section 51-07-07,962 which in essence provides
that the warranty of merchantability as it pertains to certain farm
equipment cannot be disclaimed. The statute, by its terms,
requires at a minimum that the buyer of covered machinery have a
959. See U.C.C. S 1-205 [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-01-15 (1968)].
960. See, e.g., Torstenson v. Melcher, 195 Neb. 764, 241 N.W.2d 103 (1976) (evidence of usage
sufficient to go to jury solely on the basis of plaintiff saying that he expected no more than warranty
given in the trade); cf Georgia Timberlands, Inc. v. Southern Airway Co., 125 Ga. App. 404, 188
S.E.2d 108 (1972) (burden of showing usage not met).
961. A case in point is Torstenson v. Melcher, 195 Neb. 764, 241 N.W.2d 103 (1976), in which
the plaintiff argued that the defendant had not pleaded or proved a trade usage. The court ruled that
passing reference made to trade usage in the pleadings was sufficient to preserve it, so that a mere
scintilla of evidence as to it, offered by the plaintiff, created ajury question. Id. at 768-69, 241 N.W.2d
at 106.
962. Section 51-07-07 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
Any person purchasing any gas or oil burning tractor, gas or steam engine, harvesting
or threshing machine, for his own use shall have a reasonable time after delivery for
the inspection and testing of the same, and if it does not prove to be reasonably fit for
the purpose for which it was purchased, the purchaser may rescind the sale by giving
notice, within a reasonable time after delivery, to the parties from whom any such
machinery was purchased, or the agent who negotiated the sale or made delivery of
such personal property, or his successor, and by placing the same at the disposal of the
seller. Any provision in any written order or contract of sale, or other contract, which
is contrary to any of the provisions of this section, hereby is declared to be against
public policy and void.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 51-07-07 (1974).
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reasonable time within which to determine if the machinery is
"reasonably fit," and, if it is not, to rescind the sale. The statute is
apparently the only one of its kind in the United States. Because of
this, the statute, its historical underpinnings, its reception in the
courts, and its future deserve special consideration.
Section 51-07-07 is, at the outset, an extraordinarily broad
statute. By its terms it applies not only to farmers, but to "[any
person purchasing any gas or oil burning tractor, gas or steam
'
engine, harvesting or threshing machinery, for his own use. "963
The cases which have interpreted the provision, however, have
almost all involved farmers, and the constitutionality of the statute
has been upheld. by the United States Supreme Court, 964 largely on
the basis that the state legislature could reasonably protect
farmers. 965
The justification for applying the statute as supplementary to
the Code, as articulated by the North Dakota Supreme Court, 966 is
that the Code does not "impair or repeal any statute regulating
sales to consumers, farmers or other specified classes of buyers. "967
It should be noted that the one case which involved a non-farmer
buyer held the statute inapplicable, although it was not made
entirely clear whether it was because of the non-farmer status or
because the buyer had entered into the purchase with actual
knowledge of the equipment's defects, having leased the equipment
earlier. 968 However, the first North Dakota case to consider the
constitutionality of the statute9 69 sustained its validity precisely
because the classification made by the statute, all persons who
purchase the listed machinery, was not an unreasonable
classification.9 70 It might thus be argued that the statute is not
limited strictly to farmers but applies to all purchasers of the
enumerated equipment. Such a reading does not endanger the
statute's continued viability under the Code, since it still fits
comfortably within section 2-102, in that it is a "statute regulating
sales to . . . [a] specified class of buyers. "971 Additionally, such a
963. Id.
964.jackson v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., 62 N.D. 143, 241 N.W. 722, aff'd, 287 U.S.
283, 289-90 (1932).
965. Id.
966. Hoffman Motors, Inc. v. Enockson, 240 N.W.2d353 (N.D. 1976).
967. Id. at 355, quotingU.C.C. S 2-102 [N.D. CENT. CODE 5 41-02-02 (1968)].
968. Northwestern Equip. v. Tentis, 74 N.W.2d 832 (N.D. 1956). The case appears primarily
directed at the fact that the purchaser had knowledge, but the court's broad language of nonapplicability might well be based on the non-farmer status. It appeared that the machinery had been
purchased for construction rather than farm activity. Id. at 837-38.
969. Bratberg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., 61 N.D. 452, 238. N.W. 552 (1931).
970. Id. at 473, 238 N.W. at 561.
971. U.C.C. S 2-102 [N.D. CENT. CoDE 5 41-02-02 (1968)].
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reading would undoubtedly retain constitutional validity in light of
the developing notions of federal constitutional jurisprudence. 97"
Even a broad reading of the statute to include "any person"
buying the type of machinery listed would be a relatively narrow
classification, since few buyers other than farmers purchase gas or
oil burning tractors, gas or steam engines, or harvesting or
threshing equipment. In any event, the issue has not been squarely
presented to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, and the
practitioner might well consider the statute's probable applicability
to such items purchased for construction use, consumer use, or
9
other business purposes.

7

The next question presented by the statute is whether it creates
a warranty or merely prevents the exclusion of one. The cases
indicate the latter, so that those warranties otherwise excluded
remain a part of the contract. 9 74 The distinction may be an
unimportant one, for if the warranty cannot be disclaimed it exists
by virtue of the Code. However, the distinction may be critical in
one situation which apparently has not yet arisen. The statute by its
terms applies to any seller, and is not restricted to merchant
sellers. 975 As noted previously, under the Code only merchant
sellers will be deemed to make the implied warranty of merchantability. If the statute is read as merely incorporating the implied
warranties of the Code, the coverage of section 51-07-07 will be
severely restricted, for it would be of no effect in the casual sale.
Such a reading seriously narrows the statute.
An illustration might be helpful. Suppose that Farmer X has a
tractor which he wishes to Sell. He advertises it for sale, and Farmer
Y purchases it. Y uses it for one day and it breaks down. He notifies
X that he is rescinding the contract under section 51-07-07, since
the tractor was not reasonably fit for which he purchased it. X
defends by asserting that, even though the tractor was unfit, no
warranty was made and none should be implied, thereby
precluding rescission. If section 51-07-07 incorporates only the
warranty of merchantability or fitness, X must prevail. The author
would argue that, contrary to the indications of the cases, section
972. The appropriate test today would be whether the legislation bears a rational relationship to
a legitimate state interest. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
973. A related question which has yet to be determined is whether the definition given to the
enumerated equipment will be broad or narrow. For example, a consumer purchasing a small
garden tractor might well fit within the section coverage, as might a business purchasing a gas engine
for emergency energy use. One might also question whether a replacement engine purchased by an
automobile owner might not also fit within the statute's coverage.
974. See Hoffman Motors, Inc. v. Enockson, 240 N.W.2d 353'(N.D. 1976); Dwinnell v.
Boehmer, 60 N.D. 302, 234 N.W. 655 (1931).
975. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-07 (1974).
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51-07-07 does in fact create a warranty of reasonable fitness, which
may be akin to that of merchantability but which is not dependent
thereon. Therefore, Farmer Y, a purchaser from a non-merchant,
should be able to rescind; to read the statute otherwise is to make it
meaningless in all non-commercial transactions.
The statutory language allows for testing to determine whether
the machinery is "reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was
purchased." This might easily be construed to create a warranty of
fitness for particular purpose. It has not been so construed, but has
rather been equated with merchantability. 976 The most recent cases
to construe the section, however, have construed section 51-07-07
to void the disclaimer first, and thereafter imply the statutory
warranties. 9 77 Thus, while the temptation exists to say that the
warranty of fitness for particular purpose can be disclaimed, in
reality such a disclaimer might not be possible.
If the buyer discovers that the goods are not reasonably fit for
the purpose for which they were purchased, he must notify the
seller or the seller's agent of his desire to rescind, and thereafter
make the equipment available to the seller. The notice of rescission
may be oral or written, 978 but it must be given within a reasonable
time after delivery. 9 79 Whether the buyer acts within a reasonable
time is a question of fact, 980 as is the question of whether the
machinery is reasonably fit. 981 It has been held, however, that the
buyer who unsuccessfully attempts to get the machinery repaired
by the seller is not prejudiced by that fact, so that his subsequent
demand for recission is still deemed to have occurred within a
reasonable time. 982
Although section 51-07-07 speaks of recission as the only
available remedy, the statute has been interpreted to allow the
buyer to alternatively seek damages. 983 Such an interpretation is
justified only if one first voids the disclaimer contained in the
contract and then applies the Code as if the warranty had never
976. See Gimbel v. Kuntz, 286 N.W.2d 501 (N.D. 1979); Hoffman Motors, Inc. v. Enockson,
240 N.W.2d 353 (N.D. 1976).
977. Hoffman Motors, Inc. v. Enockson, 240 N.W.2d 353 (N.D. 1976).
978. See Gimbel v. Kuntz, 286 N.W.2d 501 (N.D. 1979); International Harvester Co. v. Olson,
62 N.D. 256, 243 N.W. 258 (1932); Jesperson v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., 61 N.D. 494, 240
N.W. 876 (1932).
979. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 51-07-07 (1974).
980. See Gimbel v. Kuntz, 286 N.W.2d 501 (N.D. 1979); Jesperson v. Advance-Rumely
Thresher Co., 61 N.D. 494, 240 N.W. 876 (1932); Hamman v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., 61
N.D. 505, 238 N.W. 700 (1931).
981. Gimbel v. Kuntz, 286 N.W.2d 501 (N.D. 1979).
982. See Gimbel v. Kuntz, 286 N.W.2d 501 (N.D. 1979); Northwestern Equip. v. Tentis, 74
N.W.2d 832 (N.D. 1956).
983. SeeHoffman Motors, Inc. v. Enockson, 240 N.W.2d 353 (N.D. 1976); Kramer v. K.O.
Lee& Son, 61 N.D. 28, 237 N.W. 166(1931).
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been disclaimed. As indicated earlier, this is apparently how the
North Dakota Supreme Court has proceeded. The court, however,
has also recognized that the seller, although he cannot disclaim
warranties because of section 51-07-07, can nevertheless limit the
remedy of his buyer to that provided in the statute. 984 Such a
985
reading would appear to comport well with the Code.
Section 51-07-07 is a fascinating example of North Dakota's
extraordinary independence. The statute's legislative history is less
than revealing, and the North Dakota Supreme Court has noted
986
that it was probably rooted in the political history of the state.
The court has suggested that the Nonpartisan League passed the
statute in an attempt to lessen exploitation of farmers. 987 However,
that explanation does not answer the questions of where the idea for
such a statute came from or what precipitated its adoption.
Research indicates that the statute was borrowed from similar
provisions in two Canadian provinces. 98 8 It is suggested that the
underlying reason for the passage of the statute was not the
perception that sellers were taking advantage of farmers per se, but
rather because the North Dakota courts were giving full rein to
freedom of contract, thereby strictly enforcing contractual
provisions to the detriment of North Dakota farmers. It thus
appears that a series of North Dakota Supreme Court decisions at
the turn of the century which strictly construed contractual
provisions to the disadvantage of farmers 989 is what actually
prompted the passage of section 51-07-07. It was only because the
courts failed to police bargains that the legislature entered the
arena. Therefore, the statute was as much designed to curtail the
exercise of the courts' power as to curtail the exercise of sellers'
power.
Having traced the historical development of the statute, only
two tasks remain: first, to consider the two most recent cases
construing the statute, and second, to assess the interplay between
section 51-07-07 and the Code. The two most recent cases
discussing section 51-07-07 are Hoffman Motors, Inc. v. Enockson 990
984.
985.
986.
987.

See Palahiuk v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 57 N.D. 199, 220 N.W. 638 (1928).
See U.C.C. S 2-719 IN.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-98(1968)1.
Hoffman Motors, Inc. v. Enockson, 240 N.W.2d 353, 355 (N.D. 1976).
Id.
988. See 15 ALTA. REV. STAT. S 1-6 (1913); 13 ALTA. REV. STAT. S. 13 (1918); 2 SASK. REV.
STAT. ch. 56 (1917) (originally enacted in 1915). See also MAN. REV. STAT. ch. 83 (1919).

989. See Hanson v. Lindstrom, 15 N.D. 584, 108 N.W. 798 (1906); Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v.
Mahon, 13 N.D. 516, 101 N.W. 903 (1904); J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Ebbighausen, I1

N.D. 466, 92 N.W. 826 (1902); Fahey v. Esterley Harvesting Mach. Co., 3 N.D. 220, 55 N.W. 580
(1893).
990. 240 N.W.2d 353 (N.D. 1976).
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and Gimbel v. Kuntz. 99 1 In Hoffman, the seller sued to recover the
balance due fiom the defendant for the purchase of a tractor, and
for the cost of repairing the tractor after it had broken down. The
trial court awarded plaintiff the balance due on the purchase price,
but refused to award recovery based on the repair cost because of
section 51-07-07.992 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed

the trial court's ruling, but remaned the case to allow the selleri
993
interest on the balance of the purchase price.
The tractor which was the subject of the contract was a used
model, and the contract contained a clause providing that used
equipment was sold "as is with no warranty of any character. "
When the tractor was first delivered it broke down, and the
defendant returned it to plaintiff, who made the necessary repairs.
After the tractor was returned to the buyer it broke down again,
and plaintiff repaired it and returned it to defendant, billing him
approximately $950. When the tractor still did not work the
defendant had it repaired elsewhere, but refused to pay the $950
and the balance of the purchase price. The plaintiff sued, seeking to
recover the total sum allegedly due.
The court, after reciting the facts and setting forth the statute,
considered whether the defendant could retain possession of the
tractor and still void the disclaimer, and thus whether rescission
was the only remedy available under section 51-07-07. Citing an
earlier decision which discussed section 51-07-07, 99 4 the court held
that the defendant was entitled to avoid payment for repairs, since
he could resort to the provisions of the Code. The court's reasoning
was deceptively simple. 995 Since the "as is" clause is void as a
result of section 51-07-07, all of the implied warranties of the Code
apply, including the warranty of merchantability. The trial court
found that the tractor was unfit for farm work, and thus not fit for
an ordinary purpose. 996 Therefore the warranty of merchantability
was breached, and the defendant was not liable for the repair
CoStS.

997

There are two problems with the court's analysis, one which it
addressed and one which it ignored. The first is that the statute
991. 286 N.W.2d 501 (N.D. 1979).
992. Hoffman Motors, Inc. v. Enockson, 240 N.W.2d 353, 354 (N.D. 1976).
993. Id. at 356.
994. Kramer v. K.O. Lee & Son, 61 N.D. 28, 237 N.W. 166 (1931). The statute has had an
interesting history in the courts, with the vast majority of the cases decided under circumstances
where depressed agricultural prices surely contributed to the results. Eleven of the sixteen cases
under the statute were decided between 1926 and 1933, and nine were decided in the years 19311933.
995. 240 N.W.2d at 355-56.
996. Id.at 355.
997. Id. at 356.
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does not by its terms void all disclaimers of warranty. Rather, it
makes "any provision in any . . . contract of sale . . . which is
contrary to any of the provisions of this section . . . against public
policy and void." 998 The provisions of "this section" referred to
are that the buyer shall have a reasonable time to inspect, and that
he may thereafter rescind if the tractor is unfit. Here, the provision
in the contract, that the sale was "as is," was void only insofar as it
would disallow rescission. However, since the defendant did not
seek to rescind, the "as is" provision was never at issue. The court
addressed this question by holding that, since "the public policy
. . . which makes disclaimers void was enacted separately from
the provision authorizing purchasers to rescind, . . . the provision
• . . relating to voiding a disclaimer . . . can be
relied upon by one who does not demand rescission. "9 99 The
problem, of course, is that even though the second sentence of
section 51-07-07, voiding certain contractual provisions, was
originally a separate section, it still referred exclusively to the first
section of the statute, and not to any and all disclaimers. Thus, the
public policy statement refers only to provisions which preclude
inspection and rescission. The "as is" clause merely disclaims any
implied warranty, since it cannot, because of section 51-07-07,
preclude inspection and rescission. Therefore, as long as the buyer
does not exercise his statutory right to inspect and rescind, section
51-07-07 should not come into play.
An even more disturbing facet of Hoffman is the damage issue,
which the court failed to address. The court merely affirmed the
trial court's conclusion that the repair costs were not chargeable to
the defendant. Certainly it would be true that the buyer would not
be responsible for the repair costs where, as in Hoffman, the repairs
were ineffective. However, the defendant buyer had also refused to
pay the balance due on the purchase price. Once the "as is"
disclaimer is voided and the warranty of merchantability attaches,
the buyer, under the Code, would be entitled to recover damages
for the breach, and not merely to avoid paying for ineffective repair
attempts. At the very least, he should have recovered the difference
in value between the goods as accepted and their value had they
been merchantable. 0 0 0 In the absence of proof of the respective
values, the buyer may have been entitled to recover his cost in
having the tractor repaired. 10 0 ' Furthermore, he should also have
998. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 51-07-07 (1974).

999. 240 N.W.2d at 355.
1000. See U.C.C. 5 2-714(2) [N.D.

CENT. CODE S 41-02-93 (2) (1968)1.

1001. See id. (special circumstances).
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been entitled to consequential damages, resulting, for example,
from down time or loss of use. 100 2 Finally, and perhaps most
problematical, the buyer may have been able to assert a right of
revocation of acceptance under the Code akin to rescission, even
though the time for exercising his right to rescind under section 5107-07 had lapsed. 10 03 The court's failure to even consider the
damage issues suggests yet another reason why section 51-07-07
should not be interpreted to preclude warranty disclaimers, but
should be interpreted solely to permit rescission. At the very least,
the court should not have ruled as it did without exploring the
remainder of the buyer's allegation that he was not required to pay
the balance due.
If the Hoffman decision stretched section 51-07-07 to its
outermost limits, Gimbel v. Kuntz'0 0 4 does little to suggest that the
elasticity is diminishing. On its surface, Gimbel fits within the
statute as enacted, for it involved the sale of a new 1977 tractor by
the defendant to the plaintiff, followed closely by a breakdown,
repairs, and another breakdown. The plaintiff then demanded
rescission. 00 5 The defendant offered to repair the tractor a second
time, 00 6 and further offered to supply a replacement tractor of the
same type while it was being repaired. The plaintiff refused both
offers, and maintained his demand for rescission. Thereafter, the
plaintiff made his rescission demand in writing and defendant
refused. The plaintiff sued, seeking a return of his purchase price
or, in the alternative, damages based upon the difference in value
between a 1977 and 1978 model. The trial court found that the
plaintiff had failed to prove any difference in value, and held that
rescission was unavailable because the defendant had acted both
1002. SeeU.C.C. § 2-714(3), 2-715(2) [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-93(3), -94(2)(1968)].
1003. This remedy is the most fascinating aspect of the interplay between the Code and section
51-07-07, as interpreted by the court. Under section 51-07-07, the buyer has a reasonable time to
inspect and test, and if the goods are not fit he may, within a reasonable time after delivery, rescind.
Under section 2-608 of the Code the buyer may revoke acceptance within a reasonable time after he
discovers or should have discovered the ground for revocation. The ground for revocation may be
any nonconformity which substantially impairs the value of the goods to the buyer which appears
after acceptance, if the acceptance was made on the reasonable assumption that repairs would be
made or where the nonconformity was not discovered because of difficulty in discovering it or
because the seller assured the buyer of the conformity. Since the measuring times are different, it is
possible that the buyer's right to rescind under section 51-07-07 would lapse if the unfitness did not
appear within a reasonable time after delivery, and yet he would still be entitled to revoke his
acceptance, based on, for example, a defect not readily discoverable or the seller's continuing but
ineffective attempts to repair.
1004. 286 N.W.2d 501 (N.D. 1979).
1005. Gimbel v. Kuntz, 286 N.W.2d 501, 503 (N.D. 1979). The plaintiff had requested a new
1978 Model 285 Massey-Ferguson tractor, and instead received a new 1977 Model 285 tractor. He
had traded in a 1977 Model 265 tractor. Although the proof indicated that the 1977 Model 285 was
defective, at least a portion of the plaintiff's legitimate dissatisfaction was based on the fact that he
had received a 1977 rather than a 1978 model. Id.
1006. Id. The repairs were extensive, and cost 1,362.49. Id.
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promptly and in commercial good faith.100 7 The court also found
that the tractor was fit during the period when it was
operational. 1008 The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed. 1009
The court determined that the issue was whether the tractor
was reasonably fit at the time the buyer gave notice of rescission. 01 0
Were that the question, however, the inquiry would have ended
there, for clearly at the time the buyer initially sought to rescind the
tractor was in need of extensive repairs, and was not only unfit but
inoperable. In reality, the question was whether the buyer could
exercise his right to rescind under section 51-07-07 when the
tractor, although unfit, was capable of repair, and when the seller
offered to make repairs, offered a replacement tractor, and in fact
made the repairs. The court held that the right was available,
indicating that the question was not how well the tractor operated
.during the period when it was operational, but how well it operated
during the entire testing and inspection period under section 51-0707.1011 Since the tractor at issue was inoperable during much of that
01 2
period, it was unfit for its purpose and the buyer could rescind.
The court was obviously uncomfortable with its ruling, both
because of the seller's accomodating attitude and because of the
holding's apparent breadth. As to the latter problem, the court
attempted to narrow the applicability of the rule by indicating that
not all defects would trigger application of section 51-07-07:
We believe that the term "reasonably fit for the purpose
for which is was purchased" has to mean that the tractor
is free of serious defects which would render it inoperable,
and that, under ordinary and reasonable operating
conditions, the tractor will perform as intended and
expected.
Certainly, every mechanical failure in a new and
complex machine does not render the machine
unreasonably fit for the purpose for which it was
purchased ....

Mechanical failures in new machines are

to be expected, and no buyer is absolutely entitled to a
break-in period that is completely free of the need for
service. So at the outset, it may be necessary to
1007. Id. at 504. The trial court did not use the term good faith, but the supreme court indicatea
that, in essence, the trial court had found for the defendant on the basis of its good faith efforts to
accomodate the buyer. Id. at 507.
1008. Id. at 504.
1009. Id. at 509.
1010. Id. at 506.
1011. Id. at 508.
1012. Id. at 506-07.
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distinguish between defects which merely require minor
repair to correct, and significant defects which render the
machine inoperable, and remain after the seller has been
afforded a reasonable opportunity to correct. 1013
The court's approach thus appears reasonable, in that only serious
defects trigger the section, and even then only when they remain
after the seller has a reasonable opportunity to repair. Thus, as long
as the defect can be characterized as serious the seller may get one
opportunity to correct it. If he fails to do so, without regard to
the commercial reasonableness of his conduct, the buyer has a right
to rescind. 10 14 Such a result may accord superficially with a literal
reading of section 51-07-07, but seems incompatible with
commercial notions of fairness, good faith, and reasonableness. It is
suggested that a more reasonable, commercially justifiable result
could have been obtained had the court sought guidance from the
cases which have interpreted section 2-608.1015 Although it cannot
be said with certainty that the outcome would have been different
had the court employed section 2-608, the probability is that it
would have been.
In summary, it is believed that the two most recent decisions
discussing section 51-07-07 have the following effects. First, they
may make it impossible to disclaim implied warranties in the sale of
the farm machinery enumerated in the statute. Second, they permit
the buyer to resort to remedies other than the statutory remedy of
rescission. Third, they permit rescission (and presumably the other
remedies) in spite of the reasonableness of the seller's actions,
although the seller is to be given one opportunity to repair. Finally,
although in order to trigger application of section 51-07-07 the
defects must be characterizable as serious, seriousness is as likely to
be measured by repair time as by, for example, cost involved.
Coupled with prior decisions regarding the statute, it is
apparent that the court will continue to construe section 51-07-07
broadly,
giving purchasers of the enumerated products
extraordinary protection. Although the statute was clearly designed
1013. Id. at 507 (citation omitted).
1014. Id. at 508-09. Since the court's approach is to a large extent dependent upon the amount
of time the tractor spent being repaired, id. at 508, it is likely that even a series of minor repairs will
trigger the statutory right to rescind, in spite of the assertion previously set forth. See supra notes 100413 and accompanying text.
1015. U.C.C. S 2-608 [N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-71 (1968)]. Section 2-608, as indicated
earlier, seesupra note 991, is the Code's revocation (rescission) section. Under section 2-608, most
cases have held that the seller has a reasonable, though not unlimited, opportunity to correct defects,
and that if the defects are not corrected the buyer's right to revoke acceptance is not waived. See
generally WHITE and SUMMERS, supra note 62, at 301-18. See also Erling v. Homera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d
478 (N.D. 1980).
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to provide a measure of protection for the farmer, and such a
measure of protection is surely necessary and appropriate, it is
believed that the court has gone too far in interpreting the statute.
While the statute affords protection, it need not be interpreted to
confer complete insulation from contractual undertakings. Nor
need it be interpreted to occasion commercially unreasonable
results. This, however, is what has occurred, and it has occurred
less as a result of legislative action than ofjudicial fiat.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to study some of the more pressing
and, it is hoped, interesting aspects of warranty law, and to
consider them with particular reference to North Dakota. Although
the article has touched on a number of warranty concerns, the
reader should realize that much more could be written. Little has
been said about applicable federal law, about the rapidly
approaching merger between contract and tort in the area of strict
liability, or about the ever-expanding scope of warranty
encompassing the rights of disinterested third parties who may be
affected by, although not in privity with, the seller. Daily, courts
are confronted with warranty claims which a few years ago would
have been summarily dismissed, and which may form the basis for
future developments. While the underlying precepts of warranty
have remained remarkably unchanged, the coverage afforded by
warranty has expanded and continues to expand. As it expands,
and perhaps eventually contracts, future generations will be called
upon to deal with developing issues. Undoubtedly they will do so as
past generations have done so, resulting in a reasoned body of
warranty law. One can only hope that courts will pay heed to the
developments and render their decisions with an eye toward
accomodating the legitimate interests of all of the parties, and with
an eye toward both the legislative commands and the
underpinnings upon which those commands are based.

